On Quadruple Division Of Yogasastra

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler

Page 9

A. Wezler
On the Quadruple Division of the Yogasastra
305
to be admitted as another possibility that Buddhist monks themselves have taken it to mean the cause of Suffering, i.e. that which causes duḥkha to arise. And it is this possibility that alone matters in the present context; for, if understood thus, the second Noble Truth would indeed fully correspond to the second vydha.
As for duhkhanirodha, similar observations can be made. In view of its formation, the term could denote the process of suppressing or destroying, viz. that which causes Suffering; or else it could mean the
is process is ultimately to lead to, viz. the final suppression or rather cessation of Suffering. Again, there are passages indicating that Buddhist authors themselves may well have taken the term to denote the result; c.g. at S III.158 it is defined as tanhaya asesaviraganirodho cago pafinissaggo multi andlayo, and explained at Nd 1.94 by nibbanam. There are two possibilities of interpreting the first of these two statements: either it is a definition proper; in this case, the implicit equation of dukkhanirodha with tanhanirodha (which is expressly given at A III.416) precludes the possibility of taking nirodha, to denote the result; or it is a quasi-definition, i.e. an inexact explanation where the substitution of the result by that which causes it, i.e. of dukkha by tanha, is quite understandable, and not only in terms of metonymy; in this latter case, it would have to be regarded as evidence warranting the assumption that the term dukkhanirodha has in fact been used to denote the result. Interpreted in this manner, and, to be sure, this interpretation is more probable, the third Noble Truth could be said to be quite similar to the third vyaha, i.e. drogya/hana . This assumption is further corroborated by the fact that the nirvana is compared also in the Abhidhar makosabhäsya to the state of drogya .
However, the fact should not be lost sight of that the latter term virtually means the state of being again free of disease, ie. that the basic idea is in this case palpably different in that, in accordance with biological facts, a previous state of health is presupposed which is but regained. The Buddhist analysis of existence does not, of cours, know of an analogous previous state of freedom from Suffering: on the contrary, Suffering is recognized as the fundamental constituent element of existence. However, this conceptional difference does not really detract from the conclusion arrived at above, viz. that the third Noble Truth in fact corresponds to the third element in the quadruple division of the Cikitsasastra; for, what has been said with regard to the
relation in which the term duḥkhanirodha stands to the term arogya, holds good likewise for the comparison between the science of medicine and Yogasastra: for, also according to Yoga there is no such thing like a previous state free from duhkha, i.e. preceding samsára. There fore, one cannot but observe that already the correspondence between the four vyähas of the Cikitsasastra, on the one hand, and the four divisions of the Yogaśāstra, on the other, is conceptionally and terminologically not an absolutely complete one. Yet, at the same time one will recall the mediaeval proverb omne simile claudicat " and, accordingly, refrain from overrating this element of discrepancy in either case, i.e. as regards the correspondence between the Cikitsasastra and the Yogasastra as well as that between this caturvyâhatva and the Four Noble Truths. In any case, one cannot subscribe to Hacker's including that last voiced by him, viz. that in accordance with the more positive outlook of Brahmanism a chapter is added on the final goal; for, though the concepts of hana, etc., on the one hand, and of duhkhanirodha, etc., on the other, are admittedly different in terms of philosophical content, one cannot fail to notice that the descriptions given in Yoga texts of the final goal, i.e. absolute independence (kaivalya), too, do not stand out by being particularly detailed. On the contrary, one is rather struck by the obvious reserve of Yoga authors in this regard
Thus one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that, since the third line of our chart might well correspond to the third Noble Truth, there is hardly any basis for Hacker's assumption that this vyäha forms a peculiar addition on the part of the Brahmanical Sastras, not to speak of the more positive outlook of Brahmanism it allegedly demonstrates. The Buddha, too, did not confine himself to analysing existence and to unveiling its basic character of being nothing but Suffering, but has at the same time claimed to have discovered a practical path to liberation.
The final question to be discussed in this connection is whether the last Noble Truth, i.e. that of the dunkhanirodhagamini pratipad (P. duk. khanirodhagamini pațipada), can also be compared to one of the four vyuhas. Though Hacker is silent on this question, it is, I think, by no means illegitimate to assume a correspondence between this dryasatya and the remaining Vyaha, i.e. bhaisajya or hanopdya.
Systematically, they are in fact not different: common to all three of them is the status and function of a remedy. But there are also
32. Note that hdna is explained by Yoga authors to consist in the non-existence (abhava) or in the coming-toan-end (nivsiti, uparama) of that which causes Suffering or in liberation (moksa).
31. P. 202.8: I thank Dr. Ch. Lindtner for having drawn my attention to this passage. According to the Hobógirin p. 229. le Nirvana est deja compare a l'absence de maladie ... dans une stance gnomique du Madhyamagama... [MN 1.510.9-10). CF. also Pancaskandhaprakarapa, ed. by Ch. Lindtner, in AO, 40 (1979), p. 122, fn. 28, as well as the relcrences s.v. drogya in the CPD.
34. At least not for the individual living beings.
35. Cf. H. WALTHER, Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sentenzen des Mittelalters. Göttingen, 1963-69, Bd. II, 3. p. 590 (nr. 19877b).
36. This reserve may be caused either by the Yoga conception of kaivalya itself (cf. the Vivaranakära's characterization of hdna as an avastu: see fn. 27) or to the well-known reluctance of mystics to give a detailed positive description of their experience(s), or to the lack of such experience(s) on the part of the authors con cerned, or, finally, to a combination of some of these reasons.