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330
A. Wezler
On the Quadruple Division of the Yogasastra
dayanirodhamargakhyacaturdryasatyajndnam muktyartham istam /... 12 ... tad evam paramate 'pi heyddicatustayajAdnan mukrinimittam istam / tanmatanişedhartham atmadibhedopanyasah kytahl.
To put it in a nutshell: according to Bhasarvajña - who, on the one hand, almost grotesquely comes short of historical truth, but, on the other, i.e. if his presuppositions are taken for granted, argues in a quite understandable and remarkable manner - Gautama did not expressly state the prameya to be fourfold, but instead confined himself to teach and define the twelve different objects of valid cognition, because he wanted to refute the opinion of others, viz. the Samkhya-Yogins and the Buddhists, who equally considered the knowledge of the four elements of heya etc. to be a means for liberation. His final remark may be taken as a hint at the importance Bhäsarvajña attributes in this connection to the concept of arman and the Nyaya view of it. This is corroborated by what he says in introducing the next paragraph, viz. 1 tatrdimajnane sari paralokukamksa bhavati nanyatheti vaksymall, the desire for the other world (i.c. the wish to attain liberation) arises (only) when among these [different kinds of knowledge) there is knowledge of the atman, not otherwise this I shall teach (later)
But before examining the further development of his argument it is necessary to dwell on the passage just quoted. Bhasarva na was evidently not the first to realize that the idea of the doctrine of salvation being divided into the four systematic parts does not constitute a peculiarity of Nyaya; but Uddyotakara's relevant remark 1 looks rather colourless in that he still confines himself to claiming for the Nyayasastra the status of being, among other things, an adhyatmavidya, too, and does not deem it necessary to determine more precisely the relation in which his school stands in this respect to other doctrines of salvation. Viewed against this background Bhasarvajña's corresponding remarks are not only much more informative, but are also evidence of a considerable progress in analysis. For he not only points out the basic doctrinal cor. respondence between the school of Nyaya and particular other systems which he does not hesitate to name, but he also enters into a discussion of the specific doctrinal differences. It is, of course, by no means sur prising that what he right from the beginning aims at is to prove the claim that, inspite of the quadruple division being common to other doctrines also, it is the Nyaya doctrine of salvation alone that stands a critical test and should hence be universally accepted. This claim is not, however, connected with the fourfold division as such, but with the definitions of the four systematic parts as given by the Samkhya-Yogins
and Buddhists, respectively: it is but the conceptional and doctrinal content that his criticism is directed against. Yet his remarks, systema. tically comprehensive as they are, arrest the philologist's attention in other respects, too: They furnish a welcome corroboration of the conclusion arrived at earlier in the present study as regards the problems of the quadruple division being attested already in the YS itself and the correspondence between it and the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha. Noteworthy, however, is that Bhasarvajña does not refer in this connec tion to the caturvyliharva of the Cikitsasastra; he must have known the relevant passage in the YBhāşya; apparently he was not interested in pointing out this similarity; a further reason may have been the conspi. cuous absence of this comparison in the older Nyaya tradition.
In continuing his exposition Bhāsarvajna draws attention to the fact that there is still another reason for the prameya having been taught in the NS as being twelvefold. The argument is as follows: when the body (Sarlra) is recognized as being different from the atman, it is not any longer mistaken for the Arman and henceforth one does not commit acts of violence, etc., for the sake of one's body. When it is realized that the body is the seat of pain and suffering (duhkha), attachment to it ends. The next step consists in coming to know the nature of the senses (indriya), i.e. that defects (dosa) do not arise when the senses do not function even though there may be causes that could give rise to defects; thereupon one strives to withdraw the senses (pratyahara), and in doing so one does not any longer look upon their objects (artha) (which have been recognized as causing suffering) as something one should grasp. and then one frees oneself of all desires (vairágya). Having realized that false (mithyabuddhi) and true knowledge (rattvabuddhi) are the causes of liberation and samsdra, respectively, one eliminates the former and develops the latter by making consistent efforts for it. Then greatest efforts are made to conquer the mind (manas) which is the root of all functions of the senses. When the activities (pravrtti) are recognized to be the root of suffering in so far as they bring about merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), etc., they are avoided. As soon as the true nature of the defects (dosa) is understood, viz. in the light of NS 4.1.60 1, one undertakes the greatest exertions to remove them. Then it has to be realized that the beginningless process of rebirth (pretyabhava) and, hence, the extreme suffering in the form of birth and death cannot be brought to an end but by liberation (a pavarga); and similarly it is to be realized that the result (phala) [of activities and defects) a consisting
122. Read thus against the edition! In the passage left out here. viz. NBhos 442.11.19, Bhisarvajna gives a brief explanation of the Four Noble Truths.
123. NBhas 442.22. 124. Viz. NBhas 461.15 ff. 125. Cl. above p. 326.
126. CF. NBhus 442.22-26 and 443.6-15. 127. Cf. NBhu$ 440.10-13 to which Bhasarvajña refers back.
128. According to the numbering in: Die Nyayasútra's. Text, Ubersetzung, Erlau terung und Glossar von W. Ruben (AKM XVIII.2), Leipzig, 1928.
128a. Cf. Paksilasvamin's definition (NBhasya 31.7): pretyabhdvomid punar. janma.
129. CE. NS 1.1.20.
