On Dharmakirtisunderstanding Of Pramanabhuta And His Definition Of Pramana

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

Page 11

192
H. Kranser
On Dharmakirtis Understanding of pramanabhala
193
instance of pramana. This is sufficient only under the condition that X and Y are different concepts that have the same impact with regard to a cognition's being a pramána. That is to say, when a cognition is pramana it not only is reliable but reveals an unknown object. However, to define pramana as being X and Y would not be appropriate if Y is thus already implied in X and vice versa. This leads us to the next question, namely as to why Dharmakirti provides us with these two defining qualifications at all. Would it not suffice to give only one definition? An answer to this question can be found in Arcata's commentary on the digression in the HB I have discussed above (p. 188-189), in his explanation of HB 3,8-9:
tamad anadhigalarthavi ayam pramanam ily apy anadhigale salakyana ili višesaniyam. Therefore, the definition] "pramana is a cognition which relates to an unapprehended object", too, is to be qualified by the words) "with
regard to an unapprehended particular". Arcata comments on this passage as follows (HBT 33,8-21):
tad esam nilam drafvá nilam id jäne pratibhasamánam sämänyam na karicid arthakriyam upakalpayatiti prasidhyanarthakriyakarivisaya - sypi vikalpasya pratyaksaprathabhavinah pramanyaprasangid alivyapbir ili latrapúrvartha vijanam ili pramanalaksane mimamuakair videga nam upadeyam ili darsayann āha -lasmál. gala evam anarthakriyded dhanaviqayalaya dardanaprothabhävino vikalpasya pramanyam ayuktam, tasmad a.madabhimatam pramanam avisamuddi jrianam (PV 2.lab) ili pramanalaksanam vyudasya, anadhigatarthariqayap pramanam, talrd. púrvarthavifanam pramanam ily api, elasminn apy áhopuruskayanyas min pramanalaksane kriyamane 'livyaptipariharaya videpaniyar vienanam upadeyam. katham višepaniyam anadhigale salakpara ili anena hi videranenánumănavikalpasya ca pramanyam sidhyati, alocanajfiana prsthabhävinas ca vikalparya pramanyam vyudasyala ili saruam mustham. Having thus demonstrated that a universal which appears after one has seen blue in a conceptual) cognition in the form "this is blue" does not fulfill any purpose, [Dharmakirti says "therefore" in order to show that the Mimamsakas must employ a qualification in their definition of pramaņa (namely there [i.e of them (pramana) is a cognition with regard to a new object", as iti) otherwise) there would be an overextension of the definition), because there obtains the (undesired) con sequence that a conceptual cognition that is subsequent (prethabhävin) to perception, although it has an object which does not fulfill any pur pose, would be a pramudna. Because in this manner, inasmuch as it has an object which does not fulfill any purpose, it is not appropriate that a
conceptual cognition subsequent to the first moment of seeing is a pramana, therefore(Dharmakirtil, putting aside (uyudasya) the defini tion of pramana maintained by us, [i.e. "pramana is a reliable cogni tion". (said that the definition) "pramana is (a cognition) that relates to an unapprehended object" (which corresponds to "there i.e. of them pramana is a cognition with regard to a new object", too, is to be qual ified, li.e. also in this other definition of pramana when being made due to great self-confidence, a qualification is to be employed in order to exelude this over-extension. Why is it to be qualified by the words "with regard to an unapprehended particular"? Because by this qualification on the one hand the validity of the conceptual cognition consist ing in inference is established, on the other hand the validity of the conceptual cognition that is subsequent to the perceptive awareness is
excluded. Thus, everything stands well. The major points of Arcata's position that can be derived from this explanation are:
The Buddhist definition of pramana is avisamvadi janam. The definition of the opponent addressed by Dharmakirti with ana dhigatarthavisayam pramanam is that of the Mimamsakas formu.
lated as apūrvarthavijnanam pramānam. ► This definition is correct when it is understood in a modified way. If we now, basing ourselves on this information provided by Arcata, combine the two pertinent passages
lasmad anadhigatarthavisayam pramanam ily apy anadhigate svalaksana
iti visesaniyam. (HB 3,8-9) and
ajriálärthaprakaso v svarūpädhigaleh param praptam sāmányavijnanam avijfåte salakxane
yaj jianamity abhiprayat malaksanavicaralah II (PV 2.5c-6) I feel justified to suggest that already Dharmakirti's second definition of pramāna as ajñátarthaprakāśa in PV 2.5e corresponds to that of the Mimamsakas, namely apurarthavijñanam pramānam, in a modified form because Dharmakirti explicitly understands his definition here as including the qualification (avijñále svalaksane ... abhiprayat) which, according to his statement in the later HB, must be added in the defini tion of the opponent. If the scenario thus derived from Dharmakirti's
The aim of the digression in the HB therefore is not, as suggested by Stein kellner (cf. above, n. 63), to show that Dharmakirti's own definition of PV 2.50 should be specified, but to show that the definition of the Mimamsakas is faulty