On Dharmakirtisunderstanding Of Pramanabhuta And His Definition Of Pramana

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

Page 10

190
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On Dharmakirti's 'ndlerstanding of prowwabibila
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condition for a conventional cognition's being a pramana. From this it follows that Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of artha in ajñalarthapra kaso vä, as referring to absolute reality consisting in the cognition's nonduality, and of PV 2. lab and 5c as presenting conventional and absolute definitions respectively," is not in accordance with Dharmakirti's own intention. So far we have seen that the Bhagavat is proven to be a pramana in terms of the second definition, while aplavada, pratyaksa and anumana are shown to be pramānas in terms of the first definition. Moreover, from among conventional cognitions only pratyaksa and anumana refer to an unapprehended (avijriata) particular (svalaksana). Thus it is clear that both pramanas, perception and inference, are considered by Dharmakirti as being both avisamvādin and arialarthaprakasa. This is also how Devendrabuddhi and Jinendrabuddhi understand it when they explicate that the Bhagavat is said to be a pramana because he, like pramanas qua cognition, is reliable and because he makes known an unapprehended state of affairs. From this it can be concluded that the two qualifications, although not conceptually identical, are equivalent in the sense that exactly the same ranges of objects are subsumable
under them, that they constitute both necessary and sufficient condi tions for a cognition's being a pramana and that it is sufficient to prove and formulate only one of them in a specific context. That Dharmakirti considers it sufficient to prove one of them can be seen from the passages referred to above (p. 185-187) where either the one or the other is applied." This also implies that the particle vī in PV 2.5e which connects the two defining characteristics can only be understood as carrying a disjunctive meaning ("or"), not a conjunctive meaning ("and"), be cause otherwise, if pramana were defined as both X and Y. it would by no means be sufficient to prove only X or only Y for a specific claimed
That anadhigalarthavisaya qualifies & conventional cognition is also con firmed by another statement of Dharmakirti's with regard to mental cognition (manovijnana): 'di tahad ma na ma yul 'dzin pa yan ma yin lelahad ma nima rloge pa yul can yin pa riid kyi phyer te gaan du na ha canthal ba'i phyir ro | (PVin 1.60,17-19) "This does not grasp the object of the previous pramona either because a pramina relates to something unapprehended; if not, this would lead to absurd consequences".
CY PVA. 79,15-19: atha värthaabdendira paramitha woyale ajridlärthapra kada ili paramarthaprakása ily arthah. paramarthas cadwaitarald alprakdanam era pramanam, latha ca pratyapadi - sarūpaya salo galir ili, wktam ca-prāma. nyam pyara hareneli tatra piramarthikapramanalaksanam elal, püram tu imoyavahari kasya.
Thus, of the three possibilities of combining PV 2.lab and 5c 88 proposed in Oetke 1999a: 250, the second one can be excluded: "... Thus the two specifications might not be extensionally equivalent, and Dharmakirti's definitional enterprise could be paraphrased by expressions of the form: 'Pramdna, in so far as it relates to empirical reality, is equivalent to F. and pramana, in so far as it relates (also) to absolute reality, is equivalent to G"
* C above, p. 182: ji liar... mislu ba'i phyir dari muides poi dongsal bar byed pai phyir Lahad ma rid yin no || de llar na bcom Idan das kyan ... mislu bar mdzad pa dari...don..mi des pa ston par mdaad a'i phyir tshaid ma nid yin no II. and p. 175: yatha hi pratyaksidipramanam ... anadhigalasyarthasya prakadakam avisontvadakam ca, latha bhagawin api... lasyanadhigalanya prakdako visamvadakasca
This corresponds to Oetke's first proposal (1999a: 250): "First, even if the specifications represented by avisamvadi and ajnálathaprakso were equivalent in the sense that exactly the same ranges of objects are subsumable under them, they are not conceptually identical and their equivalence is not trivial or self evident
In view of the material presented so far, the claim that Dharmakirti does not provide a general definition in the initial verses of PV 2 as formulated in Franco 1997: 45f., in his second chapter "The Initial Verses: On the Absence of a Definition of Means of Knowledge in Dharmakirti's Writings", has to be reconsidered
* I do not agree with van Bijlert's interpretation (1989: 151) that PV. "complements the definition of a pramana given in PV II lab" and "only refers to direct perception, for only through direct perception it is possible to directly cognize new objects, previously unknown particulars". If the qualification in or did not constitute a sufficient condition but only complemented the first one, the disjunction ud would be difficult to account for. Besides, on account of his corre spondence to the specification in 5c, the Bhagavat is subsumed under the concept of pramana which - as in the case of a platāda - can only mean that he represents an instance of anumana. Moreover, if anumana did not relate to and indicate a pre viously unknown particular (cf. PV 3.81-82), even though indirectly, it would he excluded from the realm of pramana, like the conceptual cognitions subsequent to the first moment of seeing.
# The fact that in his Pramanaviniscaya Dharmakirti distinguished valid from non valid cognitions by their reliability only, without referring to ajalorthaira käia, led Go rams pa to the conclusion that PV 2.lab (pramanam arinardi irlanam is a complete definition. This is in accordance with Sakya Pandita who considers the two defining characteristics as having the same intention (dgn pa gcig). For references and also for the differing views of the die lugs pas of Kimura 1997: 257-256 (also Kimura 1995: 176-175).
1 Based on such statements of Devendrabuddhi as the one treated above (el p. 182: ji lar ... mislu ba'i phyir dari mi se pai don gaal har byrd pe phyir ishad ma nid yin no de llar na bcom ldan 'dar kyan...mislu bar mdzad pa dan ...don. mi des paslon par mdaad pay phyir (shad ma nid yin wo) Dunne (1999: 3438. n. 185) strongly argues against a disjunctive and for a conjunctive meaning of vi All the passagen he adduces for his argument. however, smoothly can be real assuming a disjunctive meaning of ex.