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In the Tractatus3 Wittgenstein maintained that the meaningful words denote the logical atoms. In other words, the meaning of a word is particular. particular is designated by a proper name according to Russell. “The only kind of word",3 says Russell, that is theoretically capable of understanding for a particular is a proper name, and the whole matter of proper name is rather curious. Proper name - words for particular definition."'4
However, the particular which is given in knowledge by acquaintance cannot be designated by a proper name because the proper name, like "John" does not refer to a particular person, it can be the name of so many persons and hence, it turns out to be only a verbal description like any other word, Finding difficulty with the proper names Russell suggested that the particular is to be specified by this' and 'that'. For example, the particular toothache which I am having can be identified by the expression, "This toothache". However, the difficulty which was with proper names persists with “this" and "that" also Hence the logical atomists had to accept that all words are only "descriptions"; they denote a class and not to any particular individual. The momentary bits of sensation or knowledge by acquaintance cannot be described through words. Hence meaning of a word turns out to be universal.
Further, Wittgenstein found that there are, many words which are, no doubt, meaningful but they cannot be called the picture of any fact. For example, the conjunctions like "and", "lf-then”, “either or", etc. These have their function in the language scheme but then do not picture any fact. Finding no way out Wittgenstein designated these words as “odd job" words,5
In the Philosopbical Investigation Wittgenstein acknowledged that there is no relation of picturing between language and reality because there is no one one-relation between word and object. If the word would have been the lable of the object, with the destruction of the object, the meaning of the word should also cease and the word would become unintelligible and absurd. As Wittgenstein contends : "It is important to notice that the word 'meaning' is being used illicitly if it is used to dignify the thing that "corresponds to the word. This is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N.N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning, it would make no sense to say “Mr. N.N. is dead"6
3. Tractatus, 2.221 4. Russell, Logic and Knowledge (George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., London, 1156), p. 200 5. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 19 6. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackweff Oxford, 1953, p-20
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Mahavira Jayanti Smarika, 76
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