Lessons of Ahimsa and Anekanta for Contemporary Life

Author(s): Tara Sethia
Publisher: California State Polytechnic University Pomona

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Lessons of Ahimsā and Anekanta for Contemporary Life
suggests that its origin can be traced to Mahāvīra's responses to the questions of his disciples as recorded in the Bhagavatī Sūtra. Being omniscient, Mahavira was the seer of total truth. Yet he could not express this totality due to the limitations of language, and therefore used the language of naya. It was in the millennium following Mahāvīra that Jain acāryas constructed new terminology for explaining the significance of the nayas leading to the evolution of anekāntavāda. Its application in the context of the present world, she concludes, can help us understand multiple dimensions of truth, reconcile opposing views, and make us tolerant of others' views.
John Koller advances a logical argument demonstrating the significance of anekāntavāda, especially for addressing the problem of growing violence in our society. He argues that violence is rooted in “dogmatic but mistaken knowledge claims that fail to recognize other legitimate perspectives.” Anekāntavāda, he suggests, provides us with an alternative epistemology to support dialog among people of diverse viewpoints. Such an epistemology allows us to respect the views of others. Epistemological respect for the views of others, Koller cautions, should not be confused with relativism. It does not mean conceding that all views are equal. It does suggest, however, that logic and evidence determine the validity of a given view. Such an epistemological approach, explains Koller, allowed the Jain thinkers to maintain the validity of Jain view of reality, and to respectfully criticize the views of others, and their own views in terms of weaknesses. Such epistemological respect for the views of others, Koller concludes, “has a great potential to eliminate violent argument between ideological opponents by methodically both disarming and persuading them.”
Epistemological tool of anekānta, argues Anne Vallely, allows us to accept a pluralistic approach to reality without falling
? Jayandra Soni points out that Jain epistemology included a provision to explain error
human cognition, and also the reason for such error. He quotes from Mānikyanandin's Pariksāmukh and Hemcandra's Pramānamimämsā to support this point. See his article, “Basic Jaina Epistemology," op. cit., p. 370.