Lessons of Ahimsa and Anekanta for Contemporary Life

Author(s): Tara Sethia
Publisher: California State Polytechnic University Pomona

Page 80

Anekānta, Ahimsā and the Question of
Pluralism
ANNE VALLELY McGill University
Jainism embraces the philosophy of anekānta as staunchly as it espouses the righteousness of ahimså. Anekānta and ahimsā are customarily discussed in terms of how each presupposes the other. The acceptance of the partiality of knowledge is an expression of non-violence; and a commitment to non-violence necessitates a pluralistic outlook. The two are seen essentially as different aspects of the same ethical orientation. But can we treat ahimsā as a normative ethical ideal, and accept as morally just the view (and practice) of others who repudiate it? It has been argued that a truly pluralist approach is a logical impossibility--that some criteria of truth is essential to all worldviews. Pluralism, therefore, becomes either a form of moral relativism, or another form of religious exclusivism. In this paper, I suggest the possibility that anekānta is a way out of this epistemological quagmire, and that a genuine pluralist view is possible without lapsing into extreme moral relativism or exclusivity. An Experiment with Jain Pluralism
As I entered the western gates of the Jain Vishva Bharati Institute (JVBI), the spiritual base of the Terāpanthi Jains in India, there was a large sign post indicating the rules of conduct that must be observed while in the JVBI. Although these rules include
Gavin D' Costa, “The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions," Religious Studies, 32 (June 1996): 223-232, quote from pp. 225-26.
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