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LAMOTTE AND THE CONCEPT OF ANUPALABDHI
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marana ti. SN III 109, 21f.) It therefore concludes with renouncing this idea as a wrong view (papakam ditthigatam 112,11). And the conclusion primarily intended in this Sutta would thus have to be: since the Tathāgata is imperceptible, it is denied that we can say that the Tathaghata does not exist. But, although not necessarily demanded in this context, we can, of course, continue to draw also the reverse conclusion that because of his imperceptibility it is also denied that we can say that the Tathāgata exists.
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This is less than the straightforward "denial of the existence" which Frauwallner did not think was intended, but it is nevertheless a strong denial, such that it would not lend itself towards being taken as including an affirmation of a transcendent entity following Oldenberg's interpretation. But it also means that as an imperceptible element a definitive cognition of the Tathāgata's non-existence is also impossible: That the Tathāgata does not exist cannot be known from his not being perceived in the visible world. Or, in other words, it seems impossible for historical reasons to accept within the Buddhist context the semantic hypothesis that "not to
be known" means "not to exist".
The theory of non-perception (anupalabdhi) as developed by Dharmakirti at a period of the Buddhist tradition very remote from the canonical expressions has turned out to be a most valuable aid towards a correct assessment of the meaning of these early statements, where the terms used were not yet defined by a systematical network of concepts. That the presystematic usage of the terms in the canon makes good sense in the
39 In other Suttas (e.g. SN XLIV.2) the denial extends to all four possibilities, that he exists, not exists, exists and not exists, neither exists nor not exists. And as Vetter says (loc. cit., 54): "By denying all four possibilities in the case of the continuation of the existence of one who is released one wants to reject every theory as being irrelevant." (emphasis mine).
40 A positive statement of non-existence would be possible only in cases of perceptibility. In Dharmakirti's system, this "negation of cognition etc. with reference to non-existence" is not mentioned as such as something to be inferred from the non-perception of something imperceptible (adrsya) because it has no particular and independent systematical value in his epistemological context. It must be seen as being implied by the category of a "negation of cognition etc. with reference to existence" as the result of a non-perception of imperceptibles. For, if with regard to something imperceptible we can only deny a statement with reference to its existence, how much more can we deny a statement with reference to its non-existence.
