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408
ERNST STEINKELLNER
understood quite naturally is that the two are “not being perceived as true and real". And when the Buddha in this Sutta then continues to show that the five constituents cannot be identified with what belongs to oneself (mama), with oneself (aham) and with one's Self (me attā), he clearly gives an explanation of the formulation saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne by stating in exactly what way these crucial items are not perceived among those elements that can be taken as real. Thus, this explanation can be taken as a reason for understanding the saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne formulation as meaning that the respective items, namely mama, aham, me attā, are imperceptible as true and real
Thus the passage's import is: “When they are not perceived as true and real, and as such are imperceptible, the view that they are existent as something permanent is out of the question."
I would therefore interpret the statement saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne as a statement of the condition of imperceptibility for a Self and for what belongs to the Self as a clear reason for the rejection of a view affirming existence. And – again with Dharmakīrti - I would conclude that the text means that - as Dharmakīrti would add - because of a non-perception of a Self and of what belongs to the Self when they are not perceived as true and real, i.e. when they are imperceptible, the view that they exist can definitely be rejected.
The only difference between the canonical phrasing and Dharmakīrți's possible systematic conception would consist in the following: with Dharmakīrti two terms are to be distinguished here: non-perception as a reason for the denial of the affirmation of existence, and the imperceptible as the hypothetical object of this non-perception. In the canonical passages only the imperceptibility would be expressly stated as the primary condition for the consequent denial, while their non-perception as naturally implied in the expression of imperceptibility was not given separate expression. The latter fact, however, is not peculiar at all, since at that time a systematic theory of non-perception had not yet been developed.
I can find no reason why we should not interpret the phrase saccato thetato anupalabbh(iy)amāna in the same way, whether the attā and attaniyam are its subject or the Tathāgata.
Returning to the statement of SN III 112 (also SN IV 384), ... ditthe va dhamme saccato thetato anupalabbhiyamāno, we may now understand it as meaning: the Tathāgata is an imperceptible in the visible world (and thus not perceived). Of course, this Sutta to Yamaka seems to be mainly directed against the nihilistic view (ucchedavāda!) propounded by Yamaka at the beginning, that one does not exist after death (na hoti param
