________________ Vacaspatimisral introduces his theory of single reflection and Vijnanabhiksu? of double reflection to explain it. According to the former Purusa is reflected into Buddhi and according to the latter the Buddhi having Purusa's reflection is again reflected back into Purusa. It implies that the bhoga of Purusa is different from that of Buddhi. The bhoga understood in common parlance can be divided into two stages in Sarkhya In the case of experience of taste, for example, the physiological organ of taste coveys its impression to Buddhi which assumes a state abounding in Sattva, Rafas and Tamas in accordance with the nature of the object. This is real bhoga. Purusa situated in contact with Buddhi as a witness feels himself the owner of the feeling. This is the bhoga of Purusa. Purusa develops this feeling as long as his sense of ownership is not dispelled by true knowledge of his unrelated nature. Here also a question naturally arises if experience of Purusa is not real why Purusa is considered to be an enjoyer and not an apparent enjoyer as is the case with its being active. The real position of Samkhya remains that the characteristics not demanding some change are supposed to really belong to Purusa while the others requiring some deviation from the real nature are negated in him. It clarifies why Purusa is not an agent, but is an experincer. The sufferings due to committing sin are actually experienced by Buddhi which accompanies Purusa as long as he is bound. The impressions of past acts-good or bad are stored in Buddhi while Purusa enjoys or suffers only through its association with Buddhi. The Samkhyas can thus alleviate the objection raised by Kundakunda that the experience of suffering through transgressing the moral conduct cannot be satisfactorily explained in Samkhya. As a matter of fact all experiences are unreal from Purusa's side but seem to be real due to ignorance. This is precisedly bondage. When this notion is dispelled, Purusa gets liberation. The above discussion is concluded with the following remarks. Samkhya is very close to Jainism in metaphysical position but some presuppositions of the two syslem introduce such differences. The Jainas consider karmans as molecules affecting the soul while the Sarkhyas consider karmans to be the functioning of Buddhi. According to Jaina metaphysics soul reacts to the karmans and becomes the object of vyavaharanaya, while according to the Samkhyas there is no fundamental difference in Purusa in its vyavaharska state from the parmarthika state. Even in body Purusa remains uncontaminated and without change. The above defects may apply to Samkhya if the whole situation is viewed in light of Jaina metaphysics, but the Samkhyas may alleviate them in their own way, which may not be acceptable to the Jaina position. At the present state of our knowledge we cannot rise abovecertain presuppositions to explain the metaphysical problems, and hence the objections. Kundakunda has suggested the drawbacks in uncompromising absolute dualism of Samkhya, which serves as a guideline for later authors. No Samkhya text tries to alleviate these objection from Samkhya point of view. It adds to the credit of Kundakunda that his discussion of the nature of Purusa presents picture more vivid than that presented by Samkhya authors themselves. 1. Samkhyatattvakaumudi, 5 Samkhyapravac प्रचार्यरत्न श्री वेशभूषण जी महाराज अभिनन्दन ग्रन्थ Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org
