Jinamanjari 2002 04 No 25

Author(s): Jinamanjari
Publisher: Canada Bramhi Jain Society Publication

Page 46

as Mati Lal observes, hold that "if something exists, it should exist always. And since only Brahman is the existent, it is eternal, everlasting and unchanging. Hence, change has to be ruled out as only appearance." At the other extreme, are the Buddhists (especially perhaps the Sautrantikas) who deny completely that there is a substantial (i.e. permanent) aspect of reality -- existence is a pure process or becoming.
The Jaina doctrine of anekanta synthesizes in its unique way the seeming differences between the standpoints of being (substantial) and becoming (modification). According to the dravyarthika standpoint, the "substance exists" standpoint, (naya), the soul (jiva) is substantially, that is to say in terms of being or continuity or permanence, eternal (unchanging). But according to the paryayarthika naya, the "modification exists" standpoint, i.e. in terms of its modifications or modes, that is to say in terms of becoming and change, it (jiva) is non-eternal (ever-changing). "The permanence of the jiva makes liberation and omniscience possible, its mutability or capacity for modification accounts for the reality of Karmic bondage."18
If as is claimed by the Vedantin, reality is an unchanging permanency there is no scope for life, no scope for samsara, no necessity for moksha, or moksha-marga either. The whole religious framework will thus appear to be superfluous and useless, as it is based upon unreality. Change must be accepted as real, if life is to be real and if samsara is accepted to be as real. It is only then that we can appreciate the utility of piety or dharma, and religious doctrines contributing to the salvation of the soul.
Similarly one-sided is the Buddhist emphasis of change alone as real. The Buddhist doctrines of kshanik-vada (momentariness of reality, which denies the permanent underlying reality of self or nonself) and anatmavada (denial of the existence of a permanent self or atman) are also lacking in a complete comprehension of reality. Since there is no permanent self, there is no responsible person who can be taken to be author of his conduct. "Moral conduct and its evolution would become meaningless. The person who did the act passes away and a different person comes to enjoy the fruits thereof. There is no justification why a different personality should enjoy the fruits of the karma by another distinct personality. Ethical responsibility loses its meaning and value in this, anatmavada."
The Jaina philosophy combines in its system both aspects of permanence and change when it describes reality as ever changing
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