Jayarasi Criticism of Verbal Testimony

Author(s): Jaydev M Shukla
Publisher: Z_Aspect_of_Jainology_Part_2_Pundit_Bechardas_Doshi_012016.pdf

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Jayarādi's Criticism of Verbal T estimany
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4. Words and sentences cannot be accepted as a valid means of knowledge since they naturally fulfill the desire of a speaker to express meanings.
5. Meanings cannot be obtained only from grammatically correct words.
Let us try to understand Jayarāti's criticism in these sub-sections one by one.
Some persons declare : "the word go (cow) is valid because it expresses a correct meaning, Jayarāśi says this is not correct because there is no relation between the word 'go' (cow) and the meaning, the animal cow' (go). There is nothing like a relation between words and their meanings.
The objector, however, will like to point out that there is a relation between a word and its meaning. The relation may be of the nature of identity (tādātmya), or of the nature of causality (tadutpatti), or of the nature of a convention (sāmayika), or is natural (svābhāvika).
Jayarāģi has referred to four kinds of relations : First is 'identity' which is accepted by the Mimāṁsakas and the grammarians; the second 'causality', accepted by the grammarians; third, 'naturalness' accepted by Mimāṁsaks and the grammarians; and fourth, the relation called 'convention' (samaya) which is accepted by the Naiyäyikas.
The 'eternal relation is called nitya or autpātika, or tādātmya-rūpa, or yogyatā. rūpa. The Mimāṁsakas and the grammarians who accept this kind of relation also call it the relation between the expressed and the expressor (vācya-vācaka-bhāvarūpa). The grammarians were the first to emphasize a natural relation between a word and its meaning, which they called eternal (nitya) or evident (siddha). The Mimāṁsakas meticulously followed them. It has become the bedrock of their interpretative superstructure, because, on the basis of this relation they explain the eternality and the infallibility of the vedas.
The Buddhists do not accept any relation between words and their meanings. For them neither words nor their meanings are real; how, then, can the relation between the two be taken as real ?8 For the Vaiseșikas and the Naiyāyikas neither the samyoga nor the samavāya can be a relation between the words and their meanings. Vätsyāyana is reluctant to call the understanding of a word in the form 'this is expressed by this' and 'this is the expressor of this' as a relation. At least, he would be pleased to designate it as convention samaya 10).
Jayarāsi says that the relation called identity (tādātmya) cannot be accepted, because, words like go (cow), hasti (elephant) and their meanings are not alike in form. The relation causality (kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva) also is not possible, because, even when meanings have vanished and hence no longer are present, words are still known to exist,