Jain Journal 2002 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 29

JAIN JOURNAL VOL-XXXVII, NO. 2 OCT. 2002
duced by the Advaitavadins to explain such differences. The Jaina view is that the acceptance of Maya at once does away with the abstact Brahman and as soon as Brahman begins to work, its essential characteristic vanishes. In other words, the Jaina doctrine urges that the attempt of Advaitavadins to connect the ideal with the real world has failed.24
96
Another argument against Advaitavada is that in an inference. we prove a thing through universal concomitance (vyäpti). which is a kind of relationship between the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya). For example, we infer fire (which is the major term or sadhya) from smoke (which is the middle term or hetu) through the relationship of universal concomitance, viz. where there is fire, there is smoke. If one says that Advaitavada is established by inference. one must accept a major term and middle term. This is against the view that there is nothing but one (Advaita), hetu (the middle term) and sadhya (the major term) being used in a reasoning to establish Advaitavada, it must bring in duality (Dvaitavada), the very opposite of Advaitavada.25
If one says that Advaitavāda is not established by reason but by itself, the reasoning will be absurd. Nothing can be its own proof. If from mere words, a thing is established, anybody can establish anything by merely uttering it in words. Further, if Advaitavada can be proved by itself without the help of any reasoning, Dvaitavada can also be said to be established in this manner, which will give a deathblow to the former. Moreover, the very word “Advaita" implies dvaita, because there cannot be refutation, if there is no object to be refuted. It is a universal law of the mind to have negative ideas based upon the knowledge of its positive ideas."
On ethical grounds, it may be said that if as is claimed by the Vedāntin, reality is an unchanging permanency there is no scope for life, no scope for samsara, no necessity for mokṣa, or mokṣa-mārga either. The whole religious framework will thus appear to be superfluous and useless, as it is based upon unreality. Change must be accepted as real, if life is to be real and if samsara is accepted to be as real. It is only then that we can appreciate the utility of piety or dharma, and religious doctrines contributing to the salvation of the soul.28
24. Samantabhadra. Āptamīmāṁā. translation and commentary by J.L. Jaini, verse II. 24 (Bharatiya Jñānapīṭha, 2002), pp. 71-72.
25. Ibid., 11.26. p. 73.
26.
27.
28.
Ibid.
Ibid., II.27. p. 74.
See Jagdish Prasad Jain "Sadhak". "Jainism in the 21 Century." Jain Mission News (New Delhi). April-June 1999.