Jain Journal 2002 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 51

118
JAIN JOURNAL : VOL-XXXVII, NO. 2 OCT, 2002
simply means 'word') has been taken to mean indriyarthasannikarsa (the contact between the senses and objects). This explanation was suggested by the well-known Jain savant, Siddhasena Gani (p.35 However, in the Jain tradition, wherever the two words, vyanjana and artha, are juxtaposed, they mean 'word' and 'mcaning respectively. He cites from Siddhasena's own work, his commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra (1.35), in support of his contention.
Shah then describes the marks of the instruments of valid knowledge (pramāṇalakṣaṇa) and explains all the indirect (parokşa) means, such as sense-perception (indriyapratyakşa), memory (sinriti), recognition (pratyabhijna), and inference (tarka). He also interprets how in Jain logical studies anumāna (inference) is divided into three kinds on the basis of the temporal factor --- atita, vartamāna and anāgata-grāni, i.c., relating to the past, present and future. This is in addition to, not a replacement of the three (common) distinct varieties mentioned in the Nyāyasūtra (1.1.5), viz. pūrvavat, scşavat and sāmānyatodrsta, i. c., having the antecedent as the probans, having the consequent as the probans and inference based on general observation. The only difference is that the last one is called drstasádharmvaval in the Anuyoga-dvārasutra. Shah notices that Siddhascna Divākara was the first Jain philosopher to deal with anumāna and it was left to Akalanka to give it a more matured form (n. 41). This section ends with the marks of hetu and other related issues (pp. 43-44).
The third lecture is devoted to the problem of Pure Knowledge (kevalajnana) and the problem of omniscience. Shah refers to the preBuddhist, Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaisesika traditions in this regard. Unlike the Buddhists, the Jains do not impose omniscience on Mahāvīra (pp. 59-60) but consider Pure Knowledge to be one with disintercsted knowledge, free from any desire, ctc. He suggests that the term, kevalajnāna should be taken to mcan specifically the knowledge of the self and dharma (1. 52).
The monograph is an important contribution to the understanding of Jainism which, to most of the students of Indian philosophy, unfortunately begins and ends with syädväda and anekāntavāda. Shah takes the the reader to unexplored areas and presents his findings with perfect lucidity for which he deserves our thanks.
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
Education International