Jain Journal 1978 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 21

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knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible in the absence of universal concomitance. It follows, therefore, that induction or inductive reasoning is a separate organ of knowledge. It is known as tarka or uha in the Jaina logic.
Deduction or inference is the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya) on the strength of the probans (sādhana). It was of two kinds: for one's own self, i.e., subjective and for others, i.e., syllogistic. The subjective inference consists in the cognition of the probandum from the probans ascertained by one's own self as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Necessary or universal concomitance with the probandum means the impossibility of the probans apart from the probandum. In other words, the probans has inseparable relation with the probandum. Inseparable relationship (avinābhāva or anyathānupapatti) consists in the universal necessity of simultaneous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events. The triple characteristic of the probans maintained by the Buddhist, viz., its subsistence in the subject (pakṣadharmatva), its subsistence in the homologue (sapakṣa-sattva) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (vipakşavyāvṛtti), as well as the five-fold characteristic maintained by the Naiyayika, viz., the absence of contradiction of the probandum (abādhita-viṣayatva) and the absence of a countervailing probans (asat-pratipakṣatva) in addition to the above three, is nothing but an elaboration of this inseparable relationship, i.e., avinābhāva or anyathanupapatti, recognised by the Jaina.
JAIN JOURNAL
The syllogistic inference is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the satement of the probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance. Philosophers of different schools hold different views as regards the constitution of syllogism. The Sankhya maintains that a syllogism consists of three parts: thesis (paksa), resaon (hetu) and example (dṛṣṭānta). The Mimamsaka asserts four parts with the addition of application (upanaya). The Naiyayika asserts five parts with the addition of conclusion (nigamana). The Jaina holds that the thesis and reason constitute a syllogism adequate for an intelligent person.22 For others it may have more propositions also.
The cognition produced by the statement of a reliable person is called verbal knowledge. One, who knows the object as it is and states
22 Jaina-tarka-bhasa, 1.50.