Jain Journal 1978 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 25

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The Jainas believe in the doctrine of anekāntavāda, and hence do not accept either complete non-difference or complete difference between soul and knowledge. Although in one aspect knowledge and soul are identical, they point out that in practice (vyavahāra) both are different, when the self is used as karta and knowledge is used as its karma. As when some one says fire burns by its hotness, fire is used as kartā and hotness is used as its karma. Here both are different. In the same way knowledge and self may be different in practical use, for example "One knows by knowledge".
JAIN JOURNAL
The Jainas do not accept the Nyaya view of complete difference and Advaita view of complete non-difference between them. They hold that difference and non-difference are based on different aspects.
2. Is knowledge eternal or non-eternal?
The Jainas accept knowledge as both eternal and non-eternal. In one sense knowledge is eternal because it is the essential quality of the soul. There is no soul without knowledge. Knowledge is eternal from the transcendental point of view. But from the empirical point of view knowledge is non-eternal. Because empirical knowledge perishable. It arises when the object is present and it disappears when the object is absent.
3. Is knowledge svaprakasa or Paraprakāśa?
According to the Jainas, the Buddhist Vijnanavadins, the Prabhakaras and the Advaita Vedantins knowledge is known by itself. Though all these schools of philosophy agree to the self-revealing character of knowledge, yet there are some differences amongst them with regard to the nature of knowledge. On the other hand, some like Nyaya-Vaisesikas and Kumarila hold that knowledge is not self revealing.
According to the Jainas knowledge is self-disclosing. What is meant by this is that in every case of knowing an object we are immediately aware of the knowing itself. The same knowledge that reveals an object also reveals itself. In order to establish this claim the Jainas point out that if knowledge is not self-disclosing, then an act of knowing, it will have to be known by another knowledge B. But B in turn can not reveal A without being revealed by C and C by D and so on without end. The vicious infinite regress involved in this process would make even the knowledge of object impossible. The Jainas point out that which is itself revealed can possibly reveal other. Knowledge is like the lamp of an