Jain Journal 1969 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 38

OCTOBER, 1969
The Buddha says that by severe penance all the sufferings will be destroyed (sabbam dukkham nijjinnam bhavissati). This means that freedom from all karmic matter is mokṣa or salvation, according to Jainism.44
Kundakunda says that if the causal condition of karma disappears through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of karma get blocked. When the springs of karma get blocked, the dravya karmas get repulsed. When the dravya karmas completely disappear, the person becomes all-working and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life:
hedumbhava niyamā jāyadi nānissa āsavanirodho. āsavabhāvena vinā jāyadi kammassa du nirodho. kammassabhāvena ya savvañhu sarvalogadarsi ya. pavadi indiyarahidam avvavaham suhamanantam.45
Universe
The common topics, which are said to have been debated by the recluses, Brāhmaṇas and Paribbājakas, are referred to in Pali literature. The Jaina conception of the nature of the universe also appears to be recorded in the Brahmajalasutta. The four different propositions maintained by contemporary teachers in this connection are as follows46:
(i) This world is finite and circumscribed (antavā ayam loko pari
yanto).
(ii) It is infinite and without limit (anantavā ca ayam loko apariyanto). (iii) It is finite and infinite (antavā ca ayam loko apariyanto). (iv) It is neither finite nor infinite (nevāyam loko antavā na panananto).
The third theory appears to be the view of Nigantha Nataputta. Buddhaghosa does not clarify this view. He suggests only that the limited and unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited view taken by the contemplator in his mental perception or vision.47 Perhaps he missed here the philosophical aspect of the proposition. If we apply the standpoint of non-absolutism, its inner meaning can be easily grasped. However we can point out that from the standpoint of substance (dravya) and place (kşetra), the world is limited and from the standpoint of kāla and bhāva it is unlimited.
44 M. i. 93; cf. M. ii. 31; M. ii. 214 ff; also see A. i. 220.
Pancastikaya, 157-158, translation.
D. i. 23 ff.
Sumangala Vilasini, i. 115.
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