Jain Journal 1969 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 41

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not so, reality should be perceived or thought in one form by the whole universe without any sort of sanketa or samskāra.
In this context, Santaraksita refers to the view of Sumati and then refutes it from the Buddhist point of view. Acarya Sumati argues accordingly that "all things have two aspects, the universal and the particular. Consequently, the universe is a combination of atoms which exist in two forms, viz., the common and the uncommon. Of these, the common form is apprehended by the senses, and the form of the atoms which is uncommon is held to be amenable to mystic perception." This means that the compendium of atoms, the so-called skandha, is the universe which we perceive, and the atoms which are so subtle that they cannot be perceived by us are perceived by the omniscient.
JAIN JOURNAL
tulyam rūpam yadā grahyamatulyam naiva grāhyate. aṇūnām dvyarūpatve tadā kim nopapadyate. tatsāmānyaviśeṣātmarūpatvātsar vavastunah. tulyātulyassarūpatvadvirüpa anavah smṛtah. samānam tatra yadrūpam. tadākṣajñānagocaram. ekakarmatojñānamanu svevopapadyate.
asmanām tu yadrūpam yogipratyakşmişyate. iti durmatayah kecit kalpayanti samākulam.51
Thus the external world in the Jaina view is not imagination, but a multitude of atoms. It cannot be ignored, as perception of an entity which represents the external world is based on knowledge or feeling. Since an entity had different names, it can be fictitous, but its existence cannot be ignored. The entity is paramārtha sat like knowledge or vijñāna. Knowledge can be dependent on the entity, but the entity cannot be dependent on knowledge. The innumerable things in the world cannot be seen by the ordinary man, but it does not mean that they are not in existence.52
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Santaraksita does not agree with these views. He remarks that they are the confounded assumptions of some ill-witted persons (durmatayah). He argues that the two different forms of a thing must be different from each other. It cannot therefore be right to say that a single thing has two forms. The second and the most touching argument is raised to the effect that as the particular form of an entity is not entirely different from the universal form, there would be a possibility of the
Tattvasangraha, 1980-83.
Nyaya Kumuda Candra, p. 134; NVV, Pt I, p. 344; SVT, Pt. I. P. 158.