Jain Journal 1966 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 25

OCTOBER, 1966
between one thing's attaining a state and another thing's attaining that state 'as also to the spatial intervals between two or more things. (7) Alpa-bahutva or 'relativity'; a correct cognition of a thing involves a comparative estimate of it in relation to other things as regards number, magnitude, etc. (8) Bhāva or modification'; the nature of a thing is variously modified by its coming in contact with other things; the Jaina philosophers classify the modifications in a thing generally under five heads which are as follows. (i) First of all, we have the audayika or the 'originative' modification, brought about in a thing when it is under the influence of a foreign thing. (ü) When the influence of that foreign thing upon the thing under observation is mitigated to a certain extent, we have a corresponding modification in the latter thing, which is called the aupašamika or ‘mitigative'. (iii) The thing under observation has in it the modification called the miśra or 'mixed', when the influence of the said foreign thing upon its nature is not only mitigated but is partially destroyed. (iv) The complete elimination of all foreign influences from the nature of the thing under observation gives rise to a state in the latter which is termed the kṣāyika or the 'annihilatory'. (v) The nature of a thing is dynamic, according to the Jainas ; its substance is not an unchanged and eternal identity but is essentially self-preservative, through its ceaseless passing modifications ; there are again modifications in the nature of a thing, even when it is established in its own pure nature and these modifications in the substance of a thing continuously evolving from within itself and independently of the influence of anything foreign or external to it are its pārināmika or the 'essential' bhāvas or modifications.
Now, as regards the processes evolved by knowledge for the determination of its object in its above mentioned aspects, it refers to the pramāna and naya. The former grasps the thing as a whole while the latter confines itself to the consideration of it in one of its particular aspects. The pramāna is either direct (pratyakşa) arising directly from within the knower's self or indirect (parokşa). Under the direct knowledge come the cognitions known respectively as (1) the avadhi or the clairvoyant by which we perceive the non-sensuous aspects of a material thing, (2) the manah-paryāya or the telepathic, which gives us the knowledge of other men's minds and (3) the kevala, which consists in omniscience or knowledge of all things, of all times and of all places, with all their attributes and modes. The parokșa knowledge is so-called because besides the internal psychical activity, it is dependent on the operation of other factors also. The indirect knowledge is primarily divided into the śruta or knowledge derived from the authoritative sources and the mati which is dependent upon sense-operations, either directly or indirectly. The śruta refers to knowledge, arising from a study of the