________________
366
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 367
sebami
For the peculiar use of was the last member of the compound (e.g. nr phim) see for instance NAV 29.17: inare intamahudiy tapu SYATA YA 49, p. 122.20-123.2: at clipathiyapandhu- mo-ruer athari' சன்மகள் aattrrisprurieவாடைகால்வான் ராமா Aaran frangumawardharyumurtaputter in drugamdidieniri m
See also Vidyananda's discussion of amputhanyamalt and the refutation of in labrana is on pp. 198-217.
Siddhasena maintains that dradila is not an essential part of syllogistic' reasoning inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (
w ow) suffices to prove the thesis, see NA 20:
antar wa r ádware siddhar bakir-dlaka yarthd syd tad aradw y ayu-vido vichell -Since the probandum is proved only by the intrinsic invariable concomitance, an exemplification from outside would be pointless, experts in logic have
recognised that also in its absence (this exemplification is such (pointless). Conspicuously Siddhasena refers to some earlier tradition ( e-vidovi ) *ŠBh 1.1.5 (p. 11): arthrir Andri Snowboard gradutely are appaa yashminaran சாக்கியவர் கேமரா 27 MŠV 5.7 (arttapatti-pariccando) (p. 320):
pramano-sata-wito yairdrto nima blower
என்தான் வர வாயன் arpatti Malaysi "LT 2.16 (Pramanarea 2(Pankara fricchedd) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462-463):
adriya-para-childer alten lawiki wicht
tad-aikana wikander anwarmapapaita // * Se people infer the existence of various invisible events, eg assume that other people are endowed with consciousness, etc., even though these are not directly perceived LT 2.16 (Pramana provela 2 (Panton paricched) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462): ada-para-
caider abchian loubka it! Aad-abang-abander mangpaat NKC, p. 463.1-6. ad c redit
c ardena baita graha parigrabataryMiwkilde bataily atro dreiddle arse para cildininko isurina-gula magpari-larang dikirattad Aldret aru-
b adiracam-sena tapetamata This is an interesting point to notice how differently the same ostensibly obvious Case can be described depending on cultural background and presuppositions. In European cultural context in general the question whether a person is dead or alive is determined in terms of what the Jainas would consider mere symptoms.
This attests to practical usefulness of 'inexplicability otherwise' and its indispensability in any activity ascribed by the Jainas.
NAV 1.8: ... sanawuthuppannarradharitácchina-ssd -lingபொதக்கவைக்க்ப்பால் சிரமம் iataiyaar tor-praiரை-prime Mia-nyi-patindarsanád, anyathalota muddhidha prarangal » For the Mimamsaka position, comp see above an. 26, 27 (ŚBh: strto de and MSV 5.7 Arthaparicinde 1). For the Jaina examples, comp. above an. 21, 23 (YA 49.p.122: umidin
a damNA Sab:
d
a tud will paramdriditidina, and NA 9b: apa-wirohata). Similarly, commenting on LT 2.12 (p. 435.4-5). Prabhicand states explicitly that the invariable concomitance (comsists in the Imeperable connection with the inferable property that
is qualified by a distinctive feature not subverted by what is accepted (s testimony) (க கittle-is-நாமகdைaip pa..)
The idea that we may rightfully presume the existence of something perceptually inaccessible, either because of subtlety (e.g. some invisible potential, as in the example below), distance or time, is accurately expressed by Siddharigani in NAV 1.14: arthparts papadi-gocari-
t ill-paddiduga dahane a ddiowhudder arranjaran dan pemand samadhitam awianian paikan pramadiwany ent-
a vad'However, taking into account that people conclude from fire, etc., another object, which is additional to the domain of previous perception (andundeviating.namely, that fire) is possessed of the power of burning, etc., inasmuch as such entities as blisters, etc., that constitute the domain of perception, etc., are otherwise inexplicable, presumption (100) appropriates undeniably cognitive validity, because it satisfies the definition of this cognitive criterion *CI. NBh 2.2.1: atbild par ardui dati prin prangat
M undine te veprat pragut nyarimga a r bu kiwaru preguntes
AS (Fantas ) 15.29: padatta al padre d amit
See, for instance, the usage of the presumptive scheme in Dharmottara's reasoning in NBT 1.9 (p. 62.2): ckrataan karacidapi wanan
Onderwe, it would be inclinable how the sensory consciousness could be based on the eye.
See above p. 344 and n. 11. Despite some similarity, this is a different kind of reasoning that the one found in MSV 2 (cadand ) 182ab (p. 74-75): Jimane pun e sde drape nidarianam/
Interestingly, this case is first classified by Siddharsigani as a proper instance of presumption in NAV 1.14: arttapam prascidi gocari p otidia ut
datangan didikan Auderar durant darsan.
paramaian awabarilan para prami d rary en alakunyoyil Immediately afterwards Siddharigani adds that even this case is an instance of indirect cognition ( or in Samantabhadra's terms and), NAV 1.14:an
parte hartues granditaru dersione di prestandaard And all these (sub-varieties are included in the indirect cognition because they are apt to produce) a sensation of the object under discussion by the means of perception of another object which is otherwise inexplicable.' MÁV 5.7 (arthianti pariccheda) 878-88 (p. 335): sambandet fra deid astill arawididyasamariasami sn ng
W uid anda adal ana py and Mandani labbet end and their mall Cf. 'impossibility otherwise' (anathanamt ) in TSa 1367 (widewpu, n. 10).
C. TS 1.1: mag-darsianas-and-cdni mo d ra "CC VP 1.30:
did te dharma antena suratate! ரா காங்மா பyரம்மா
And the normative principle cannot be established by reasoning without testimony, even the knowledge of [Vedic seers, too, was preceded by testimony Also Siddhasena Divakar (probably around the same time, c. 500 CE) expresses a similar idea that the application of reason is limited and subordinate to scriptural testimony (pm, the eschatological aim, ergo the truly ethical dimension and
