Introduction to Jainsim

Author(s): Dewan Bahadur A B Lathe
Publisher: Jain Mitra Mandal

Page 70

JAINISM grau permanent on the ground that it is [h], cease to make Prakratis also permanent i. e. synonymous with Purush from whom they are so fictitiously distinguished? Again, the denial of all non-being by the Bhavaikantis means that the four kinds of Abliavas are unreal. But by denying, e. g., pragabhara and pradhiyansabhava i. e. the absence of an effect before its production, and after its destruction, everything becomes eternally existing, which means that no change or evolution is possible in the world. Similarly the denial of Anyonyabhava or the absence of a thing at a place where another thing exists, would result in reducing all the diversity in the universe to blank uniformity. Lastly the denial of Atyantabhava i. e. the non-being of one thing what its redical opposite is would lead to the confusion of every-thing with everything else.
We, therefore, discard this form of monism and take up the next that follows to see if it satisfies our needs. Thought is said to move to and fro like the pendulum of a clock. As the school of Parmenides was followed by that of Heracleitus, Bhavaikant was followed by its opposite counterpart, the Abhavaikant. Both agree in being confined to an absolutely one-sided view of the universe; but the latter takes up just the end of the stick that their predecessors totally failed to grasp. Abhavaikant means that form of monism which holds every-thing to be Asadroop or non-being. It is hard to understand what this exactly means. But in its most obvious form, it is met very easily by Jainism by saying that if everything is unreal, the reasoning which tries to prove all else unreal cannot save itself from the same fate. The Baudhas, who are known in philosophy Kshanikekant Vadis, are however too hard to be thus summarily silenced. They slightly differ from their specultive kinsmen in emphasising upon the fleeting nature of all