Historical Development Of Jaina Philosophy And Religion

Author(s): Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Z_Jaina_Literature_and_Philosophy_a_Critical_Approach_001936_HR.pdf

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Aspects of Jainology: Volume VI
phical traditions, particularly in Nyaya and Sankhya school, but in due course of time they got it associated with their concept of five-fold knowledge. Thus, whatever development of Jaina theory of Pramana is seen in Jainism, is the result of its synthesis with Pañcaiñanavada. While classifying the Pramaņa some new concepts came into existence. They are undoubtedly unique contributions of Jaina philosophy. For instance, Smrti (memory), Pratyabhijñā (recognition) and Tarka (Induction) were for the first time considered as Pramāṇa.
We shall now see as to how the development of Pramāṇavāda took place in Jaina agamas. Jaina agamas refer three and four types of Pramana accepted by Sankhya and Naiyayikas, respectively. Sthānanga clearly mentions three types of Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), i.e., Pratyakṣa (perception), Prätyika and Anugāmika (inference ) whereas Bhagavati mentions four types of Vyavasaya, i.e., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna (comparison) and Agama (verbal testimony). Similarly, in Sthäninga four types of pramāṇas called Hetu are mentioned.
In this way Sthānanga mentions both, threefold and four-fold classification of Pramana in the form of Vyavasaya and Hetu, respectively. Anuyogadvarasutra not only clearly mentions four types of Pramāṇa but also elaborately discusses each of them. The details about the four Pramāņas given by Anuyogadvārasūtra is very much similar to that of Nyaya school. As I have stated earlier, Bhagavati refers to the Anuyogadvara for more details about the Pramāņas. It indicates that at the time of Valabhi council (c. 5th A. D. ) the concept of four types of Pramana had already been accepted by Jaina philosophers but when Pramāṇavāda got synthesized with the conception of five-fold knowledge, the Upamana (comparison) had no place in it.
Later, Siddhasena Divakara in his Nyāyāvatāra and Haribhadrasuri in his Anekāntajayapatākā
mentioned only three types of Pramāņas. Umāsvāti (c. 3rd-4th A. D.) for the first time declared five-fold knowledge as Pramāņa and divided it into two classes Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. Later on, Nandisūtra divided Pratyakṣa in two sub-classes Sāmvyāvahārika and Paramarthika, including sensory perception into the first one and Avadhi, Manah-paryaya and Kevala into the second, respectively. The four Agamic divisions of Matijñāna -Avagraha (the cognition of an object as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, etc.); Tha (the thought process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertain the general object that has been grasped by avagraha ); Avaya (when further attentiveness to final ascertainment takes place regarding the particular feature grasped at the stage of Ïhā) and Dharaṇā (the constant stream of the ascertainment, the impression left behind it and the memory made possible by this impression, all these operations or the form of matijñana are called dharaṇā) were accepted as the two classes of sensory perception. The indirect knowledge (Paroksa-jñāna) enumerated the cognition originated from mind ( manasajanya jñāna) and Verbal testimony ( Śrutajñāna) with a view that Inference (Anumāna) etc. are the forms of Manasajanya-jana.
Thus, the attempt to synthesize the concept of Pramana with the theory of five-fold knowledge in the true sense begins from the period of Umāsvāti. Acārya Umāsvāti maintains that these five types of cognition (knowledge) are five pramāņas and divides these five cognition into two Pramāņas direct and indirect. Pt. Malvania has observed that the first attempt of this synthesis was made in Anuyogadvarasutra, the only text accommodating Naiyayika's four-fold division of Pramana into knowledge. But this attempt not being in accordance with the Jaina view, the later scholars tried to solve this problem and ultimately succeeded in doing so. They discussed the