Historical Development Of Jaina Philosophy And Religion

Author(s): Sagarmal Jain
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Historical Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion
(c. 3rd-10th A. D. ] The Western scholars often remark that the tions, changes and developments took place in Jaina Indian philosophies and religions are not dynamic but thoughts and practices. Jainas were proud of the rigostatic. But this remark is not tenable when we study rous and austere life-styles of their monks. But in the any Indian Philosophy or religious tradition from post Nirvana era of Mahavira some relaxations and historical point of view. We notice a sequence of exception creeped into the code of conduct of Jaina changes and developments in their thoughts and monks. Not only the junior monks, i. e., Kșullakas, practices. This is true with regard to Jainism as well keeping three, two or one cloth alongwith a bowl but as other schools of Indian philosophy.
the senior monks, having accepted nudity also started Though the basic tenets such as non-violence,
keeping one woolen blanket to save themselves from self-control etc. of Jainism, in thought and practice,
the extreme cold of northern region and also a bowl remained the same throughout the ages yet their
for accepting the alms, particularly some liquids, explanations and their applications were modified in
necessary in the old age. Thus, the code of Jinakalpa conformity with time and circumstances by Jaina
and Sthavirakalpa along with sāmāyik-căritra Tirtharikaras and Acaryas. Even in the earlier times, (junior monk-hood ) and Chedopasthāpaniyacaritra every successive Tirthankara made reforms and
(senior monk-hood ) came into existence, which, changes in the religious practices and ethical code of later
later on, after c. 2nd A. D. divided Jainism into conduct as per the need of his age. As regards the
Schism such as Digambara, Svetāmbara and Yapaniya, code of conduct of monks and nuns, 23rd chapter of with th
ter of with their own Codes of Conduct. Uttarādhyayana, Avaśyakaniryukti ( verses 1258
It was the first phase of major changes in the 1262 ) and some other commentaries on Jaina canons Jaina code of conduct, particularly the one for Jaina clearly maintain that the religious code of Mahāvira monks and nuns. The second phase is known as and his predecessor Lord Pārśva and other Caityavāsa, i. e., the temple based living of monks. Tirtharkaras were different. It was found that where- With the advent of idol worship and the acquisition of as Lord Aristanemi laid more stress to avoid the great wealth in the name of these temples and deities violence and cruelity towards animal kingdom in by the community, the ceremonial-ritualistic aspect social rituals such as marriage ceremonies etc. Lord of religion became dominating and the monks started Pārsva opposed the violence in the name of religious taking interest in external and pompous modes of austerities ( practices ). Lord Mahāvira discovered religious practices. There also developed a special the root cause of violence in the will for the accumu- group of administrator clergies. Thus, the Bhattārakas lation of wealth and lust for worldly enjoyment hence in the Digambara sect and the Yatis in Svetāmbara laid much stress on celebacy and non-possession and sect, started living under luxurious conditions, prescribed a new religious code of conduct. Not only became managers of the temples and temple associain the earlier period but in the above said period, i. e., ted properties and assumed control over the templecorresponding c. 3rd-10th A.D. also, several revolu- rituals as well as over certain part of community

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Historical Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion
living in a certain province. In their time, the code of Anekāntavāda (c. 4th-6th A. D.). conduct of monks and nuns remained confined into
(iii) The age of systematization of Jaina the books only and did not appear in the practical life. philosophy (c. 7th-10th A. D.). Against this situation a revolution was
This nomenclature underlies the tendencies, worked out, in Digambara tradition by Kundakunda dominating the particular era. However, this division (c. 6th A. D.) and in Svetāmbara tradition by is only a tentative one. No water tight compartment in Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.). But this revolution failed the division of ages is possible. The tendencies of one to reap any fruit and remained ineffective and the age can be traced in other ages also. For example, institution of Bhattārakas and Yatis thrived in the Agamic age terminates with c. 3rd A. D. but the final later centuries also. Its only credit was that the tradi- editing as well as the composition of some Agamic tion of the real ascetics, following the rigorous path of texts continued up to the c. Sth A. D. Not only this but Mahāvira, could be saved for some centuries. Again the date of composition of commentaries on Āgamas in Svetāmbara tradition, a great revolution took place extends up to the c. 11th A. D. Similar is the case in the c. 10th A. D. under the leadership of Jineśvara- with the age of critical presentation of Anekāntavāda; süri against the temple based living of the monks, i.e., as seeds of Anekānta can be traced in Agamas such as Caityavāsa and administrator clergies. Due to this Bhagavatisütra etc. but its critical presentation contirevolution Kharataragaccha came into existence in nued not only upto Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.) but upto the c. 10-11th A. D. This revolutionary and reforma- Yaśovijaya and Vimaldas (c. 17th A. D.). Similarly tive spirit continued in Jaina community in the later the age of philosophical systematization commences centuries also and owing to that sub-sects Tapa- from c. 7th A. D. but the actual effort in this direction gaccha (c. 12th A. D. ), Lonkāgaccha (c. 15th A.D.), starts from the composition of Tattvārthasutra and its Sthānakavāsi (c. 16th A. D.) and Terăpanthi (c. 18th auto-commentary by Umāsväti long before during the A. D.) came into existence in Svetambara tradition. c. 3rd A. D. and continued upto the period of YasoSimilarly, in Digambara tradition also Banārasimata vijaya, i. e., the c. 17th A. D. Thus, it is very difficult Digambara Terapantha (c. 16th A. D. ) and Tarana- to divide these ages strictly into a particular framepantha a non-idol worshipper sect, came forward work of time. with their reformative outlook. In fact, it is due to the The Age of Āgamas impact of Hindu devotionalism and Tantrism that the
Most of the Āgamic literature was composed ritualistic idol-worship started in Jainism and it is that during c. 5th B. C.-3rd A. D. but some of Āgamic due to the Muslim impact non-idol worship sects texts like Nandisutra and the present edition of such as Lorikāgaccha, Sthanakavāsi, Terapantha and Praśnavyākarana were composed in c. 5th-6th A. D. Taranapantha took birth in Jainism. This shows that in In the most important councils (Vācanās ), which practice Jainism is not a static but a dynamic religion. were held at Mathura and Valabhi in c. 4th-5th A. D.
So far as the changes in the Jaina thought are respectively, for editing and rewriting of these concerned, Jaina scholars divided their history of Agamas, some new additions and alterations were philosophical development in three ages which are as also made and that is why some of the Agamas under:
contain some informations and conceptions, develop(i) The Agama Age (c. 5th B. C.-3rd A.D.). ed later in c. 4th-5th, in Jaina philosophy. (ii) The age of critical presentation of The Āgamas are mainly concerned with the

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religious code of conduct and moral preaching. Pt. Akalanka's Rājavärttika and Vidyānandi's SlokaDalasukha Malvania rightly observes that Anga vārttika are the two works, regarded as main contriAgama deals with moral code of conduct (Carita- butions in Digambara tradition. Both these works crinuyoga ) rather than metaphysics (Dravyānuyoga ). tically elaborate the contents of Tattvārtha. Through, So far as the subject-matter of Agamas is concerned these works we can assume that, the differ-ences this position remains the same upto the period of between Digambara and Svetāmbara became more Niryuktis (c. 3rd-5th A. D. ), Bhāşyas (c. 6th A. D.) prominent in this era and the disputes on the problems and even Cümnis (c. 7th A. D.). Some scattered seeds of 'Stri-mukti', 'Kevali-bhukti' and simultaneousness of philosophical discussions maay no doubt be seen and succesiveness of Jñānopayoga and Darśanopain some of the Āgamas and their commentaries; but yoga of Kevali came into prominence. Along with Viśeşāvasyakabhāsya, mainly a work full of philoso- these internal disputes of Jaina sects, logical refutaphical discussions, is an exception.
tion of other schools of thought, is also the main Age of Critical Presentation of Anekāntavāda
characteristic of this age. All the important philoso
phical works, composed in this particular era, critically Similar is the case with the second era, i. e.,
evaluate the views of other schools of thoughts and the age of critical presentation of Anekantavāda. So
try to establish Jaina view of non-absolutism, based far as Anekāntavāda is concerned, it can be traced in
on their theory of Anekāntavāda, as most logical and Āgamas as a mere conception. Its critical presenta
true. tion as a Jaina doctrine was introduced with the works of Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra inc. 4th
The Main Objective of Early Jainism 5th, respectively. The treatises, composed by them,
Before discussing the early metaphysics and mainly for critical presentation of Anekāntavāda also epistemology of Jainas it would be proper to discuss worked as a base for the age of philosophical syste
the main objective of early Jainism and its attitude matization.
towards life, which is to get rid of the cycle of birth
and death and thus, to emancipate man from sufferSiddhasena Divakara's Sanmatitarka and Dva
ings. It tries to track down sufferings to their very trimsikas is regarded as the first book of critical
root. The famous Jaina text of an early period Uttaraphilosophy. The concept of Pañcajñāna ( Five-fold
dhyayanasūtra says: knowledge ) is, for the first time, critically analysed
kāmānugiddhippabhavaṁ khu dukkham in its subtle form in the said composition. It embraces
savvassa logassa sadevagassa. other different contemporary views prevalent in Jaina
jam kāiyam mānasiyam ca kinci tradition. The author dives deep in evaluating the
tassa antagam gacchai viyarīgo. ( 32.19) established concepts in Jainism rather than peeping
That is the root of all physical as well as outside in different systems.
mental sufferings of everybody, including the gods, is In the works attributed to this age, particular the desire for enjoyment. Only a dispassionate attily in commentaries on Tattvārthasūtra, the first extant tude can put an end to them. It is true that materialism commentary, after the auto-commentary of Umā- seeks to eliminate sufferings, through the fulfilment svāti, is Sarvārthasiddhi of Pujyapāda ( first half of of human desires, but it cannot eradicate the prime the c. 6th A. D..). It not only depicts the concept of cause from which the stream of suffering wells up. Guņasthana but rather describes it with more details. Materialism does not have at its disposal an effective

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means for quenching the thirst of a man permanently. life. Spirituality consists in realising these higher Not only this, its attempts at the temporary appease- values of life. ment of a yearning, have the opposite effect of flaring
Jaina spirituality teaches us that happiness or it up like the fire fed by an oblation of butter. It is unhappiness is centred in the soul and not in worldly clearly noted in the Uttarādhyayana :
objects. Pleasure and pain are self-created. They are suvanna-rūpassa u pavvayābhave
subjective in nature also. They do not depend totally siya hu kelāsasama asamkhayā.
on the objects, but depend also on the attitude of a narassa luddhassa na tehim kiñci
person towards them. The Uttarādhyayanasūtra iccha u āgāsasamā aṇantiyā. (9.48 )
( 20.37 ) mentions: That is even if an infinite number of gold and
appă katta vikattā ya, duhāna ya suhāņa ya silver mountains, each as large as the Kailāśa, are
appā mittamamittam ca, duppatthiyasupatthio. conjured up, they would not lead to the final extin
That the self (atma ) is both the doer and the ction of human desires, because desires are infinite enjoyer of happiness and misery. It is its own friend like space. Not only Jainism but all spiritual tradi- when it acts righteously and foe when it acts unrighttions unanimously hold that the root cause of sorrow eously. An unconquered self is its own enemy, unis attachment, lust or a sense of mineness. The ful- conquered passions and sense organs of the self are filment of desires is not the means of ending them. its own enemy. Oh monk ! having conquered them, I Though a materialistic perspective can bring material move righteously. prosperity, it cannot make us free from attachments
In another Jaina text of the early period Auraand yearnings. Our materialistic outlook can be com- paccākkhānam (c. 3rd A. D.) it is mentioned : pared to our attempt of chopping the branches off
ego me sasado appā, ņānadamsanasamjuo while watering the roots of a tree. In the above men
sesā me bahira bhāvā, savve samjogalakkhanā. tioned gāthā, it is clearly pointed out that desires are
samjogamūlājiveņam, pattā dukkhaparamparā endless just as space (Akaśa ) and it is very difficult
tamhā samjogasambandhar, savvablavena vosire. to fulfil all of them. If mankind is to be freed from
(26.27) selfishness, violence, exploitation, corruption and
The soul endowed with knowledge and peraffliction stemming from them, it is necessary to out- ception alone is permanent, all other objects are alien grow materialistic outlook and to develop an attitude,
to self. All the serious miseries, suffered by self, are which may be described as spiritual.
the result of individual's sense of 'mine' or attachThe word Adhyatma, the Samskrta equiva- ment towards the alien objects and so it is imperative lent of spirituality derived from adhi+ ātmā, implies to abandon completely the sense of mine' with regard the superiority and sublimity of Ātman, the soul to the external objects. In short, according to Jainism force. In the oldest Jaina text Ācāranga, the word not identifying oneself with the objects not belonging ajjhatthavisohi, connotes, inner purity of the self, to the soul, is the starting point of spiritual practice which is the ultimate goal of Jaina-Sadhanā. Accor- (sādhanā ). Non-alignment with material object is the ding to Jainism, the realisation of physical amenities pre-requisite for self-realisation, the main objective or creature comforts is not the ultimate aim of life. of early Jainism. According to it, renouncement of There are some higher ideals of life which are over attachment is the same as the emergence of a balanand above the mere biological and economic needs of ced view of even-sightedness ( samadrstita ).

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The reason, as to why Jainism regards aban- donment of 'sense of mine' or of attachment as the only means for self-realisation, is that so long as there is attachment in a man, his attention is fixed not on self or soul, but on not-self, i.e., material objects. Materialism thrives on this object-oriented attitude or indulgence in the not-self. According to the Jaina philosophers, the identification with the not-self and regarding worldly object as a source of happiness or unhappiness, are the hallmarks of materialism. This is considered as a wrong view-point. The right view point regards the self as of supreme value and aims at the realisation of its quiddity or its ideal uncondi- tioned state of pure knower, which is free from attach- ment and passions. It is mentioned in Samayasāra (209): evaṁ sammaithi appānam munadi janagasahāvar.
that the self, possessed of a right view-point, realises the pure soul as knowledge. Thus according to Jainism the right view-point regards self as pure knower ( śuddha drasta ) and distinct from not-self. This detached attitude only can free one from one's mental as well as physical sufferings. Cause of Bondage and Suffering of the Self
Jainism maintains that the attachment (Rāga ) and delusion (Moha ) obscure our spiritual nature and are responsible for our worldly existence and suffering. The most intense väsana is hrdaya- granthi, which is a deep attachment towards sense objects and worldly desires. The oldest nomenclature of Jaina sect is Niggantha-dhamma. The word Nig- gantha means the one who has unknotted his hrdaya- granthi, i.e., the 'mine'-complex. It means, in other words, one who has eradicated ones attachments and passions. The word, 'Jaina', also conveys the same meaning; a true Jaina is one who has conquered one's passions. According to Lord Mahavira, "to remain attached to sensuous objects is to remain in the whirl" (Ācārānga, 1.1.5). The attachment towards sensuous
objects is the root of our worldly existence (Acārārga, 1.2.1). Further, it is also mentioned in the Acārānga, 1.3.1, "only he who knows the nature of the sensuous objects is possessed of self, knowledge, scripture, Law (dhamma ) and Truth (bambha )." The five senses together with anger, pride, delusion and desire are difficult to be conquered, but when the self is conquered, all these are completely conquered ( Uttarādhyayana, 9.36 ). Just as the female crane is produced from the egg and the egg from the crane, in the same way desire is produced by delusion and delusion by desire (Uttarādhyayana, 32.6). Attachment and hatred are the seeds of karma and delusion is the source of attachment and hatred. Karma is the root of birth and death. This cycle of birth and death is the sole cause of misery. Misery is gone in the case of a man who has no delusion, while delusion is gone in the case of a man who has no desire; desire is gone in the case of a man who has no greed, while greed is gone in the case of a man who has no attachment" (Uttaradhyayana, 32.8 ). According to the Tattvarthasūtra 8.1, a famous Jaina text, perverse attitude (mithya-darśana ), non-abstinence ( avirati ), spiritual inertia ( pramāda ), passions (kaşāya ) and activity ( Yoga ) - these five are the conditions of bondage. We can say that mithyadarśana (perverse attitude), mithya-jñana (perverse knowledge ) and mithya-caritra ( immoral conduct) are also responsible for our worldly exis-tence or bondage. But perversity of knowledge and conduct depends upon the perversity of attitude. Thus, the perversity of attitude, which is due to darśana-moha is one of the important factors of bondage. Nonabstinence, spiritual inertia and passions are due to the presence of perverse attitude. Though activities of mind, body and speech known as Yoga are considered the cause of bondage yet these, in theirselves
re incapable of bondage unless by perverse attitude and passions. They are only the cause of Asrava (in

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flux of kārmic matter ), not the cause of bondage. Bondage is possible only through the Yoga in association with perverse attitude and passions. The perverse attitude (mithya-darsana ) and the passions (Kasayas) are mutually cause and effect of each other just as the egg and the hen or the seed and the tree. We can not fix the priority of one over the other, passions are due to the perverse attitude and perverse attitude is due to the passions. Early Jaina Doctrine of Karma/Bondage
According to Jaina philosophy every activity of mind, speech and body is followed by the influx of a finer type of atoms, which are technically known as karma-varganā-pudgala. In the presence of passions, this influx (āsrava ) of kārmic matter cause bondage, which is of four types – 1. Kind ( prakịti), 2. quantity (pradeśa ), 3. duration ( sthiti ) and 4. intensity (anubhāga) (Tattvārthasūtra, 8.4). The activities of mind, body and speech, technically known as yogas, determine the prakrti and the pradeśa of kārmic- matter while the passions determine the dura-tion ( sthiti ) and the intensity (anubhāga -mild or intense power of fruition) of the Karma. Karma, in Jainism is the binding principle. It binds the soul with the body hence responsibile for our wordly existence. Karma has the same place in Jainism, as unseen potency ( adrsta ) in Nyāya, Prakrti in Sankhya, Maya in
naya in Vedānta, Vāsanā in Buddhism, Sakti in Saivism and Pāśa (trap ) in sākta school. Karma is something foreign which veils the natural faculties of infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. It is also responsible for our pleasant and unpleasant experiences and worldly existence. According to Vidyānandi, two functions of the Karma are to obscure the natural faculties of soul and to defile the soul. Jainism also believes in the same modus operandi of karma. According to it karma itself is compe-tent to produce its fruit in due course of time and there is no need of God or other external
power for its fruition.
The Karmas are of eight types — (i) jñanavarana : knowledge obscuring, (ii) Darśanīvarana : perception obscuring, (iii) Vedaniya : feeling producing, (iv) Mohaniya : deluding, (v) Ayu : age determining, (vi) Nama : body or personality determining, (vii) Gotra : status determining and ( viii) Antarāya : obstructive (Tattvārthasūtra, 8.5).
Among these eight types of karma, Jñanavarana, darśanāvarana, mohaniya and antarāya - these four are considered as destructive karma or ghati karma, because they obscure the natural faculties of infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power, respectively. The other four – vedaniya, ayu, nāma and gotra are called aghāti or non-destructive karma. They are only responsible for bodily existence of present life and incapable of continuing the cycle of birth and death. It is only due to the deluding karma (mohaniya karma) that the cycle of birth and death continues. This deluding karma is responsibile for perversity of attitude and the passions. The emancipation of soul is only possible when the perversity of attitude is destroyed and passions are overcome.
The Uttaradhyayanasūtra says that just as a tree with its root dried up, does not grow even though it is watered, similarly actions (Karma ) do not grow it up when delusion (moha oravidya ) is destroyed ( 28. 30). 30 ). One devoid of a right attitude (darśana ) cannot have right knowledge (jñāna ) and there can not be rectitude of will (carana-guna ) without right knowledge (jñana ). One devoid of the rectitude of will cannot have emancipation from evil will and one devoid of emancipation from evil will ( induced by karma ) cannot attain final emancipation ( 32.9).
The Ultimate End: Mokşa
The attainment of emancipation or mukti is the pivot on which all the ethico-religious philoso

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phies of India revolve. Jainism maintains that the four non-destructive karmas, i.e., Nāma, Gotra, liberation - the perfect and purified state of the soul, Ayuşya and Vedaniya, are not exhausted the soul of is the only and ultimate goal of every individual. Arhat remains in a highly refined physical body and Mukti does not mean in Jainism, the losing of one's preaches truth to the world. Shedding physical and own identity. The self retains its identity even in the kārmic body, when these four non-destructive karmas state of liberation.
are exhausted the soul of Arhat goes upto the topIn Acărănga the nature of Paramātmā (the most of the universe - abode of liberated soul known immaculate soul) is described as that which is be- as siddhasila, remains there eternally and enjoys peryond the grasp of logic and intellect. He is one and
fect knowledge, perfect power, perfect perception alone. He is harmless. He is neither long nor short,
and perfect bliss ( Niyamasāra, 181-182 ). Thus, nor a circle nor a triangle. nor a quadrilateral nor a emancipation, according to Jainism, is nothing but sphere. He is neither black nor blue, nor red, nor
realisation of one's own real nature. yellow, nor white. He is neither pungent nor bitter, Jaina Sadhana in Early Period nor astringent, nor sour, nor sweet. He is neither hard
In the earliest Jaina ägamas, particularly in nor soft, neither heavy nor light, neither cold nor hot, Ācāränga and Uttaradhyayana, we have a mention of neither greasy nor dry. He is not subject to birth and Triyāma. Caturyāma and Pañcayāma. Though decay. He is free from attachment. He is simileless. Acārānga mentions Triyama, it does not give any deHe baffles all terminology. There is no word to des- tail about it. Its commentator Silanka had derived the cribe. He is neither sound nor form, nor odour, nor
meaning of three-fold path of liberation, i.e., Right taste, nor touch. (Ayāro - Ed. Yuvācārya Maha
faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct. But in my prajña, J. V. B., Ladnun, 1981, pp. 262-266.)
opinion this derivation of Silanka is hardly in accorIn the Niyamasāra ( 181 ), 'Being' (astitva ), dance with its real meaning. Triyāma refers to the the pure existence is considered to be one of the three vows - Non-violence, Truth and Non-possesqualities of a liberated soul. Moksa, according to sion. Jaina tradition is very firm in maintaining that Jainism, means a complete perfection and purifica- Lord Pārśva, the twenty-third Tirthankara had preation of soul. In the state of liberation there is neither ched Caturyāma - Non-violence, Truthfulness, Nonpain nor pleasure, nor any obstruction, nor any anno- stealing and Non-possesiveness. Mahāvira added one yance, nor delusion, nor any anxiety. A liberated soul more yāma celebacy as an independent vow in the is really free from all sorts of impurities and from the Cāturyāma of Pārśva and thus, introduced Pañcacycle of birth and death (Niyamasāra, 178-180 ). In yāma. Formerly, it was taken for granted that woman liberation the soul realises the ananta-catustaya, i.e., is also a possession and no one can enjoy her without infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinte bliss having her in his own possession. But Mahāvira took and infinite power. This ananta-catustaya is the in- it as an independent vow. In some of the canonical herent nature of the soul. Jainism believes that every works we also have a five-fold path of liberation but individual soul has the potentialities of Godhood and in a different way as Right faith, Right knowledge, the soul can attain to it. By shedding away all the Right conduct, Right penance and Right efforts. In kārmic particles of four destructive karmas (ghāti- Uttarādhyayana as well as in the works of Kundakarma ), the soul attains Arhathood, which is the kunda the four-fold path of liberation, i.e., Right state of vitarăga-daśā or jivana-mukti. So long as the faith, Right knowledge, Right conduct and Right pen

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ance are mentioned. Here Right effort has been Jaina scripture. merged into Right penance. Similarly, later on merg
So far as Samyak-Caritra (Right conduct ) is ing the Right penance into Right conduct, Umāsvāti
concerned, the meaning of the term remains the same prescribed the three-fold path of liberation in his throughout the ages. It encompasses the observance Tattvārthasūtra (c. 3rd A. D. ). Acāränga has also of five great vows (mahāvratas ), five vigilances mentioned the three-fold path in a different form, (samitis ), three controls (guptis ) and ten dharmas. namely — non-violence (nikşiptadanda ), wisdom This right conduct is exclusively prescribed for the (prajña ) and ecstasy (samadhi ) which is more like monks and nuns. Similarly, five minor vows ( anuthe three-fold path of prajña, sila ( supplementary Vratas ), three guna-vratas and four sikşāvratas as well vow) and samadhi of Buddhism. Satraktänga and as eleven Pratimās are prescribed as a right-conduct some other canonical works also mention two-fold for the house-holders (Śrävakas ). According to both path of liberation, i.e., vidya (wisdom ) and carana - the sects Svetämbara and Digambara, the code of (conduct ( Viljacarana pamokkho ). We see that conduct of Jaina monks and nuns was very rigorous at there are different views about the path of liberation the time of Mahāvira (c. 6th B. C.) but with the pasbut Jainas never accepted single path either of knowl
sage of time, coming to the period of Bhadrabāhu-I, ( edge or devotion or action. They believe that neither c. 3rd B.C.) it became lenient. By this period various knowledge, nor faith nor conduct alone can be regar- exceptions in the five great vows as well as in other ded as a means of salvation. But all the three com- rules and regulations of Jaina monks and nuns has bined together make an integrated path of liberation been accepted. This lenient tendency is clearly visible which is a peculiarity of Jainism. In this integration in the Chedasūtras of Bhadrabahu-l in the form of we have a reflection of its non-absolutistic approach atonements of the various exceptions and transgresAnekāntavāda, the central doctrine of Jainism.
sions in the code of conduct. This liberalism in the Now, if we take each constituent of the three- code of conduct culminates in c. 6th-7th. In Bhāsyas fold path, separately, Right faith (Samyak Darśana ) and Cūrņis of Chedasūtras, one can find ample comes first. In earliest canonical works such as examples of this liberalism. It is quite difficult to Acărănga and Sūtraktārga, the term Darsana is used mention all those changes which took place in the either in the sense of self-realisation or right vision Jaina code of conduct during the period of c. 3rd (right attitude). As 'faith' it is used for the first time B.C.-3rd A. D., because of two reasons - firstly, in Uttarădhyayana, and there it means nine catego- some of the exceptions mentioned in Bhäsyas (c. 6th ries (Tattvas ). The same meaning is retained in A. D.) and Curnis (c. 7th A. D.) might have come in Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra while defining Samyak- practice after c. 3rd A. D. A period which is beyond Darsana. But after c. 3rd 4th the meaning is also the purview of this article and secondly, it is imposchanged and Samyak-Darsana is defined as faith, sible to include, all the changes that occurred, in the Vina' as a Deva (Ideal ), Nirgrantha as a Guru frame of this brief article. Here we can only refer the ( Teacher and non-violence as a Dharma.
scholars to see these Chedasūtras and their commenSimilarly, the term Samyak-Jrāna ( Right taries. knowlege ) is used in the sense of discriminative
The major changes which took place during knowledge of self and not-self in the earlier canons. above period are regarding the use of clothes and begBut later on the term is used as the knowledge of ging bowls by Jaina monks. On the basis of the fig

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ures of Jaina monks and nuns inscribed on the pedestals of Jina-images of Mathura (c. 1st B. C.-2nd A. D.) it can be easily inferred that by that time the use of clothes and begging bowls was in vogue, though the ideal state of nudity was intact. The figures of monks found at Mathura are almost nude but are depicted having a folded large piece of cloth, on their left arm, may be a woolen blanket, and which seems to be instrumental in hiding their nudity. Similarly, there are certain figures of Jaina monks, having begging bowls in their hands. These figures clearly show that in these centuries, i. e., c. 2nd B. C.-3rd A. D., the use of woolen blanket and begging bowls was common atleast among the Jaina monks and nuns of North India. But in South India, practice of nudity remained intact in that period.
The Cause of Schism and Caityavāsa
Remarkably, it was this use of blanket and begging bowls, along with certain other exceptions in the code of conduct which led to the schism in Jainas into Śvetambara, Digambara and Yapaniya. According to Avasyakamula-bhāṣya, the controversy regarding the use of clothes and begging bowl was raised first time after 606 years of the Nirvana of Lord Mahavira, i. e., c. 1st-2nd A. D.
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Name of Nihnavas
Jāmāli
Tiṣyagupta
Asadha
bhūti
Asvamitra
Aspects of Jainology: Volume VI
Dhanagupta

However, on the basis of facts, narrated above, it can be concluded that liberalism in the rigorous code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns caused the schism into Śvetambara, Digambara and Caityavāsa, i. e., living in temples or Mathas in Jaina order. This tendency of living in the temples of Jaina monks and nuns further caused the deterioration in their strict code of conduct and various exceptions were accepted into general rules. This liberalism, later on, also gave birth to the various Tantrika Sadhanās in Jainism.
Though on the basis of the code of conduct, particularly the use of clothes and bowls, the first sectarian division took place inc. 1st-2nd A. D. But prior to that, we have also trace of another type of differences in Jaina order particularly pertaining to doctrines, started in the life-time of Lord Mahavira itself.
In Jaina tradition, the persons, having doctrinal differences with the tradition of Mahavira, are called as Nihnavas. These Nihnavas were seven in number. Avaśyakaniryukti (Verse 778-783) and Uttaradhyayananiryukti ( Verse 165-178) mention the following Nihnavas and their basic differences from the traditional Jainism along with time and place of their origin. The names of Nihnavas and their details are as under:
Time of Origination
Their particular theory on which they differed from Mahavira's tradition
Bahuratavāda (An action, in the process of completion, can't be called completed, it is uncompleted.
Jiva-pradeśavada (Any one pradeśa of the soul 16 years after Mahā
can be called as Jiva.
vira's enlightenment.
Avyaktavāda (difficult to say who is who).
Samucchinnavada (All the objects are transient and get destroyed just after their origination.) Dvikriyavada (possibility of having two experiences simultaneously.)
14 years after Mahāvira's enlightenment.

214 years after Mahavira's Nirvana.
220 years after Mahavira's Nirvana.
228 years after Mahavira's Nirvana.
Place of Origination Śrāvasti
Rṣabhapur
Śvetämbikā
Mithila
Ulukatira

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6.
7.
Name of
Nihnavas
Rohagupta
Gostha
mahila
Historical Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion
Their particular theory on which they differed from Mahavira's tradition Trairāśikavāda or no-Jivavada (three categories in world-living beings, non-living beings, neither living nor non-non-living beings.

Abāddhikayāda (Karma-particles only touch the soul- pradeśas.
Apart from these, some divisions took place in the Jaina order only due to administrative needs. In Kalpasūtrasthaviravali, the Jaina order is said to be divided in various Ganas, Kulas and Sakhas. This type of division was based neither on any theoretical differences nor on the Code of Con-duct. This division of Gana, Kula and Śākhā was based on the hierarchy of the spiritual teachers or on the basis of the group of the monks belonging to a particular region. The final division of the Jaina church such as Śvetambara, Digambara and Yapaniya came into existence in the c. 4th-5th A. D. as we do not find any literary or epigraphic evidence for these sectarian divisions dated pre- c. 4th-5th A. D. Development of Jaina Theory of Knowledge
The development of Jaina theory of five-fold knowledge extends over a long period of 2600 years. The tradition of Mahavira's predecessor Pārsvanatha (c. 800 B. C.) bears clear marks of Pañcajñāna or five-fold knowledge, a preliminary conception of Jaina epistemology. In Rajapraśniyasutra (165) Arya Keşi; a follower of Parsva tradition, called himself believer of the theory of five-fold knowledge and explained the same to King Paesi. Uttaradhyayana also the same refers. It is remarkable that there is not much difference between Parsva and Mahavira, so far as their Metaphysics and Epistemology are concerned. Had there been any difference on these issues, it would have been definitely mentioned in Bhagavati and Uttaradhyayana, both pointing out the differences regarding ethical code of conduct the traditions of
Time of Origination
544 years after Mahāvira's Nirvāṇa.

544 years after Mahavira's Nirvana.
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Place of Origination
Antaranjia
Dasapur
both. Except some issues on the ethical code of conduct in which he makes some additions later on, Mahavira accepts the metaphysics and epistemology of Parsva as it is. The reference of Jñanapravāda, the fifth one of fourteen Purvas (the literature belonging to the tradition of Mahavira's predecessor Lord Parsva) also proves that before Mahavira there was a concept of Pañcajñānavāda assigned to Nirgrantha tradition of Parsva and was later developed in Mahavira's tradition. Acaranga and Sūtrakṛtänga, the oldest extant Jaina literature, do not bear any mark of the discussion over the theory of knowledge, whereas Uttaradhyayana, Sthānanga, Samavāyānga, Bhagavati, Anuyogadvära and Nandisütra, elaborately discuss the gradual development of the conception of Pañcajñanavāda. It suggests that although the theory of five-fold knowledge (Pañcajñānavāda) was derived from Parsva's tradition, it was later on developed by Mahavira.
Pt. Dalasukha Malvania, in his well-known book 'Agama Yuga kā Jaina Darśana' has mentioned three stages of the development of Pañcajñānavāda based on the chronology of Jaina Agamas. At the first stage knowledge was divided into five types Mati ( the knowledge obtained through the senseorgans (indriya ), quasi-sense-organs (anindriya), and mind (mana), Śruta ( scriptural knowledge); Avadhi ( clairvoyance ); Manaḥ-paryaya (telepathy or knowledge of others' mind) and Kevala ( perfect knowledge comprehending all substances and their modifications or omniscience). The description of

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five-fold knowledge, found in Bhagavatisūtra, is in vācaka, respectively. Regarding the authorship of accordance with this first stage. The Sthānanga and Anuyogadvarasūtra scholars have different opinions Umāsvāti's Tattvärthasūtra (c. 3rd A.D.) refer the as to whether Aryarakṣita himself is the author or second stage where the knowledge is divided into two some one else. So far as the question of Aryarakṣita is main heads (i) Pratyakṣa ( direct knowledge concerned it is a fact that he for the first time transincorporating sensory and scriptural knowledge) and lated the Jaina technical terms by Anuyoga-vidhi. It (ii) Parokṣa (indirect knowledge which incorpora- is the text of philosophical method. In the beginning, tes the three extra-sensory knowledge ). Umäsväti Anuyogadvarasutra mentions that mati, avadhi, also supports this two-fold division. At this stage, it manah-paryaya and kevala these four types of was supposed that apart from the cognition depend- knowledge depend on experience only. They can not ing on the soul alone (Atmasāpekṣa Jñana ), the be preached where as śrutajñāna can be studied and cognition depending on sense-organs and quasi- preached. At this third stage of development Anusense-organs (indriya-anindriya sapekṣa ), depend- yogadvära gives importance to the four-fold division. ing on the intellect (buddhi sapekṣa) and the cog- In this third stage of development particularly based nition depending on the Agamas, should be consi- on Nandi and Anuyogadvara, the cognition dependdered as Indirect knowledge (Parokṣa Jñana ). It ing on sense-organs, even being considered transcenbecame a special feature of Jaina Epistemology dently as indirect (parokṣa), was also included in because others were considering it as a direct know- direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) following the concept ledge (pratyakṣa ). The development of this second of other traditions and it was designated as samstage was very essential as it was to pave the way of vyavahārika pratyakṣa ( perception according to the synthesis between the theory of knowledge (Jñana- common usage or ordinary perception). vada) and validity of knowledge. At this stage, the knowledge (Jñana) itself was considered as an instrument of valid knowledge (pramāņa) and was divided into Direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) and Indirect knowledge (parokṣa ).
32
The third stage of the development is represented by Nandisūtra (c. 5th A. D. ). In the whole of the Agamas, Nandisūtra is the only composition which thoroughly deals with the theory of five-fold knowledge. In Nandisūtra another development is also visible where the sense-cognition is included in pratyakṣa, following the common tradition. The second work, dealing with the conception of five-fold knowledge is Anuyogadvarasutra (c. 2nd). Anuyogadvara is earlier than Nandisutra because former does not include sense cognition in Direct knowledge as the latter does. It is believed that Anuyogadvara and Nandisūtra are compiled by Aryarakṣita and Deva

In my opinion, primarily empirical sensual cognition was included in darśana and contemplative matijñāna was confined only to the deliberative intellectual knowledge (vimarśātmaka jñāna ). This distinction was also recommended in later period. Four early classifications of matijñāna, i.e., avagraha, ihā, avaya and dhāraṇā are also considered as deliberative knowledge but when sensory cognition was included in matijñāna, the question arose as to how the knowledge, originated from sense-organs, would be regarded as indirect knowledge. Consequently, it was accepted as samvyavahārika pratyaksa (perception according to common usage) following the other philosophical traditions.
To synthesize the first stage of five-fold knowledge with two-fold classification of pramāṇapratyakṣa and paroksa of second stage, a third stage was introduced. An attempt was also made to

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correlate the Jaina concept of pratyakșa ( direct change in later periods also. Similarly the scriptural knowledge ) with the concept of perception knowledge also continued to be considered as indirect (pratyakşa ) of other philosophical traditions.
(parokşa ). But among the two classes of matijñana -
indriyajanya matijñāna (originated from senses ) and Akalanka (c. 8th A. D.) who contributed a
manojanya mati-jñana (originated from mind ), the parallel system of Jaina logic based on the Āgamic conception and some later Acāryas classified the
sense originated matijñāna was considered asparokşa
from the transcendental (pāramārthika ) point of pratyakṣa into two parts, i.e. sarvyāvahärika
view and pratyakșa from the point of view of pratyakșa ( perception according to common usage )
common usage ( saṁvyāvahārika ). The other tradiand pāramārthika pratyaksa (transcendental percep
tions were considering sense originated matijñāna as tion ). Its brief reference can be traced in Nandisutra and a detailed one in Jinabhadra's Viseşāvasyaka
pratyakşa. When discussions over Pramāņaśāstra
( science of valid cognition ) started, the matijñana, bhasya (c. 700 A. D.). Akalanka etc. have followed
originated from mind, was further divided in different the same two-fold concept of pratyakşa.
classes and got assimilated with different Pramānas. So it is clear that the conception of five-fold After Nandisutra the development of this conception knowledge is quite old but its gradual development of the five-fold knowledge is found in Višeşāvasyakatook place only during the c. 3rd-7th A. D. Because bhāsya where not only its different classifications are Tattvārthasūtra and its auto-commentary, both donot mentioned but the doubts regarding the very concept refer these two types of pratyaksa-saṁvyāvahārika and the solutions are also discussed. This era witnesand pāramārthika. By that period mati-jñana was sed intensive discussions over the relationship of considered as parokşa. The hypothesis of these two darśana and jñāna as well as śrutajñāna and matitypes of pratyakṣa - samvyāvahārika and pāramār- jñana. thika came into existence after c. 3rd-4th A. D. in the
The development of the conception of fiveperiod of Nandisutra (c. 5th A. D. ) as the above fold knowledge continued during the c. 3rd-7th A. D. division was clearly mentioned in this text.
but it got interrupted after the c. 7th A. D. and discus
sions over Pramāņavāda (science of valid cognition) Bhagavatisātra refers to Nandisutra and
started. This is noteworthy that Pramāņavāda in Anuyogadvāra for the details about the Jaina theory
Jainism was the result of the impact of other philosoof knowledge. It concludes that this portion was
phical traditions. incorporated in Bhagavati at the time of Valabhi Vācana (c. 5th A. D.). Sthānānga's classification of Jaina Concept of Pramāņa knowledge as pratyakṣa and parokșa, also is contem
The then
The theory of five-fold knowledge, originally porary to Tattvarthasutra (c. 4th A. D.). In the above belonged to Jainas but the case is different with the mentioned scriptures avadhijñana ( clairvoyance), theory of Pramāņa. This latter conception is borromanah-paryaya-jñana (telepathy or knowledge of wed by Jainas from other philosophical traditions. others' mind ) and kevalajñāna (perfect knowledge The concept of Pramāņa in Jaina philosophy came comprehending all the substance and their modes,
into existence in c. 3rd 4th A. D. and continued to i.e., Omniscience ), all being beyond the range of our senses are considered as transcendental perception or
Jaina Ācāryas, first of all accepted the conself perception. This conception did not undergo any cept of Pramāņa as it was prevalent in other philoso

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phical traditions, particularly in Nyaya and Sankhya school, but in due course of time they got it associated with their concept of five-fold knowledge. Thus, whatever development of Jaina theory of Pramana is seen in Jainism, is the result of its synthesis with Pañcaiñanavada. While classifying the Pramaņa some new concepts came into existence. They are undoubtedly unique contributions of Jaina philosophy. For instance, Smrti (memory), Pratyabhijñā (recognition) and Tarka (Induction) were for the first time considered as Pramāṇa.
We shall now see as to how the development of Pramāṇavāda took place in Jaina agamas. Jaina agamas refer three and four types of Pramana accepted by Sankhya and Naiyayikas, respectively. Sthānanga clearly mentions three types of Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), i.e., Pratyakṣa (perception), Prätyika and Anugāmika (inference ) whereas Bhagavati mentions four types of Vyavasaya, i.e., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna (comparison) and Agama (verbal testimony). Similarly, in Sthäninga four types of pramāṇas called Hetu are mentioned.
In this way Sthānanga mentions both, threefold and four-fold classification of Pramana in the form of Vyavasaya and Hetu, respectively. Anuyogadvarasutra not only clearly mentions four types of Pramāṇa but also elaborately discusses each of them. The details about the four Pramāņas given by Anuyogadvārasūtra is very much similar to that of Nyaya school. As I have stated earlier, Bhagavati refers to the Anuyogadvara for more details about the Pramāņas. It indicates that at the time of Valabhi council (c. 5th A. D. ) the concept of four types of Pramana had already been accepted by Jaina philosophers but when Pramāṇavāda got synthesized with the conception of five-fold knowledge, the Upamana (comparison) had no place in it.
Later, Siddhasena Divakara in his Nyāyāvatāra and Haribhadrasuri in his Anekāntajayapatākā

mentioned only three types of Pramāņas. Umāsvāti (c. 3rd-4th A. D.) for the first time declared five-fold knowledge as Pramāņa and divided it into two classes Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. Later on, Nandisūtra divided Pratyakṣa in two sub-classes Sāmvyāvahārika and Paramarthika, including sensory perception into the first one and Avadhi, Manah-paryaya and Kevala into the second, respectively. The four Agamic divisions of Matijñāna -Avagraha (the cognition of an object as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, etc.); Tha (the thought process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertain the general object that has been grasped by avagraha ); Avaya (when further attentiveness to final ascertainment takes place regarding the particular feature grasped at the stage of Ïhā) and Dharaṇā (the constant stream of the ascertainment, the impression left behind it and the memory made possible by this impression, all these operations or the form of matijñana are called dharaṇā) were accepted as the two classes of sensory perception. The indirect knowledge (Paroksa-jñāna) enumerated the cognition originated from mind ( manasajanya jñāna) and Verbal testimony ( Śrutajñāna) with a view that Inference (Anumāna) etc. are the forms of Manasajanya-jana.
Thus, the attempt to synthesize the concept of Pramana with the theory of five-fold knowledge in the true sense begins from the period of Umāsvāti. Acārya Umāsvāti maintains that these five types of cognition (knowledge) are five pramāņas and divides these five cognition into two Pramāņas direct and indirect. Pt. Malvania has observed that the first attempt of this synthesis was made in Anuyogadvarasutra, the only text accommodating Naiyayika's four-fold division of Pramana into knowledge. But this attempt not being in accordance with the Jaina view, the later scholars tried to solve this problem and ultimately succeeded in doing so. They discussed the

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concept of Pramānas on the base of five-fold knowledge of Jaina Āgamas. According to Nyāya- śāstra, the cognition originated from Mind (mānasa- janya jñāna) is of two types — Pratyaksa and Parokşa. The knowledge originated from mind which experiences pleasure and pain, is Direct knowledge (pratyakşa) whereas the inference (anumāna ) and comparison (upamāna ) are Indirect forms of know- ledge (paroksa ). So having considered sensory-per- ception of Matijñāna as Sāmvyāvahārika Pratyakşa (perception according to common usage ), cognition based on intellect ( Bauddhika Jñāna ) as inference ( anumāna ) and verbal testimony Śrutajñāna ) as Agama pramâna. Jainas synthesized the conception of five-fold knowledge with the Pramānaśāstra of the other schools of Indian philosophy. In Anuyogadvārasutra, Pratyakṣa is divided in two heads, i. e., (1) perception originated from sense-organs (indriya- janya ) and (2) perception originated from quasisense-organs (no-indriya ). Quasi-sense originated perception included avadhi, manah-paryaya and kevalajñāna. This concept of knowledge carries the same meaning as the one, conveyed by the transcendental knowledge in other philosophical traditions. The distinction between ordinary perception (Laukika Pratyakşa ) and Transcendental perception (Alaukika Pratyakşa ) of Vaiseșikas is accepted by the Jainas under the name of Sāṁvyāvahārika and Päramärthika Pratyaksa and was synthesized later on with their conception of five-fold knowledge (pañcajñānavāda).
). According to Pt. Dalasukha Malvania the Āgamic period (c. 5th A. D. ) has no trace of any independent discussion over Pramāņa. Till that period Jainācāryas have collected the opinions of other philo- sophical schools in their treatises. In the correspon- ding period a number of traditions on the types of Pramāṇa were prevalent. Jaina Agamas refer tradi- tions of three and four types of Pramānas. The mention of three types of Pramānas — Pratyaksa
(perception ), Anumāna ( inference ) and Agama (verbal testimony ), refers to the old Sankhya System. While mention of four pramāṇas including Upamāna (comparison ) belongs to Naiyāyikas. It clearly shows that by the end of c. 5th A. D. the concept of Pramāna as an independent concept was not developed in Jainism. The first work which elaborately deals with the Pramānaśāstra is Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra. The period of Siddhasena Divākara is fixed as c. 4th-5th A.D. Nyāyāvatāra mentions three Āgamic divisions of Pramāņa, i.e., perception, inference and verbal testimony (Agama ). Though Siddhasena has expressed briefly the Jaina opinion on the Nyāya-śāstra of Sankhya and Nyaya but he has followed mostly the old tradition, accepted by Jaina Agamas. At some places he has only revised the definitions of Pramāna of other schools on the basis of Jaina theory of Nonabsolutism (Anekantavāda ).
Nyāyāvatāra clearly follows the Agamic tradition, as far as the description of Pramāņa is concerned. It, no where, mentions the later developed concept of Smrti (memory ), Pratyabhijña (recognition) and Tarka ( indirect proof : tarka is not by itself, a source of valid knowledge, though it is valuable in suggesting hypothesis which leads indirectly to right knowledge ) as Pramāņa. This proves that Nyāyavatāra is undoubtedly an ancient text compiled by Siddhasena Divākara. After Nyāyāvatāra, the literary works which discuss the concept of Pramāņa are Pujyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi ( c. 6th A. D. ) of Digambara tradition, Siddhasenagani's commentary on Tattvārtha-bhāsya (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra's Anekāntajayapatākā (c. 8th A. D. ) of Svetāmbara tradition. In these works there is no trace of Pramāņa like Smrti etc. This concept is discussed for the first time in the works of Akalanka ( c. 8th A. D.) and Siddharşi's commentary on Nyāyāvatāra (c. 9th A. D.) of Digambara and Svetāmbara traditions, respectively. The independent development of Jaina Nyāya

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commences from the period of Akalanka, who for the first time expounded Smrti, Pratyabhijña and Tarka as independent Pramānas. The Jaina theory of Nyāya was given a new direction in the c. 8th A. D. Akalanka not only established Smrti, Pratyabhijña and Tarka as independent Pramāņa but also revised the definitions or meanings of Perception, Inference and Āgama, given by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. In his definition of Pramāņa, he introduced a new term avisamvădi in place of svapara-avabhāşaka. Most probably, this characteristic of changing defini- tions was borrowed from the Buddhist tradition. It was an especiality of Akalarka that he logically evaluated even the pre-established conceptions, hence rightly called the father of Jaina Nyāya. His works Laghiyastraya, Nyāyaviniscaya, Siddhi- viniscaya and Pramāṇasangraha are related to the Jaina Nyāya. Pramāṇasangraha is the Akalanka's last work in which matured Jaina Nyāya, especially Pramāņa-sastra, is elaborately discussed. Though in his earlier works he mentioned Smsti, Pratyabhijñā and Tarka as Pramāna yet as independent Pramānas, these are established only in this work. As such from the point of view of the history of Jaina Pramāņaśāstra this is a valuable work giving new dimension to the concept of pramana.
In the history of Indian logic the Jaina logicians, in the c. 8th A. D., for the first time accepted memory (Smrti ), recognition (Pratyabhijña ) and induction ( Tarka ) as a Pramāna. This is Jaina's special contribution to the field of Indian Pramāņaśästra. Not even a single tradition of Indian logic accepts memory (smrti ) as an independent Pramāņa. Only Vedanta-paribhasa, a work of c. 16th A. D., mentions Smrti as Pramāņa. Though Naiyāyikas had accepted recognition (pratyabhijña ) as a kind of perception (pratyaksa pramāna ) yet neither they regarded it as an independent Pramāņa nor accepted Smrti as its cause (hetu ). Jainas maintained, in case
Smrti is not Pramāna, how recognition (Pratyabhijña ) can be accepted as Pramāna because in absence of memory (Smrti ), Pratyabhijña is not possible. If memory (Smrti ) is not Pramāna, Pratyabhijñā also a combination of past memory and present perception can not be considered as Pramāņa, because Pratyabhijña is based on Smrti. Similarly, Jainas established Tarka as independent pramāna because in the absence of Tarka Pramāņa, Vyāpti ( universal relation ) is not possible and without Vyāpti, inference (Anumāna) is quite impossible. To solve this problem Naiyāyikas accepted Sāmānya Lakşaņa Pratyāsatti (generic nature of individuals ). Jainas accepted Tarka Pramāņa at the place of Naiyāyika's Sāmānya Laksana Pratyāsatti which is more extensive than that and may be called Inductive leap ( āgamana). Jainas maintained induction (āgamana ) and deduction (nigamana ) of Western Logic and introduced them in the name of Tarka and Anumāna as an independent Pramāna, respectively. An independent Tarka Pramāna was needed because acquisition of Samanya (generality) through perception is not possible and without Samānya, Vyāpti is not possible. Similarly in absence of Vyāpti, Inference (anumāna ) is impossible. Since in Jainism, Sāmānya Laksana Pratyāsatti is no where mentioned as a kind of perception, Jainas established Tarka as independent Pramāņa to solve the problem of Vyāpti. As Pratyabhijña was needed for Tarka and Smrti for Pratyabhijña, Jainas accepted all these three as independent Pramāņa.
It was Akalanka (c. 8th A. D. ) who for the first time referred these three types of independent Pramāņa in Digambara tradition. Before Akalanka, his predecessors Samantabhadra (c. 5th A. D. ) and Pūjyapāda (c. 6th A.D.) do not make any mention of it. In Svetambara tradition, Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4th A. D. ), Jinabhadra (c. 6th A. D. ), Siddhasena Gani (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.)

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mention nothing about these three independent c. 12th A.D. It was Yaśovijaya who followed the style Pramāņas. In Svetāmbara tradition, as per my know- of Navyanyāya and for the first time composed ledge, only Siddharşi (c. 9th A. D. ), in his commen- Tarkabhāsā and Nyāyabindu in Navyanyāya style, in tary of Nyāyāvatāra has mentioned the validity of the latter part of c. 17th A.D. In Digambara tradition, these three independent Pramāņas.
Saptabhangitarangani was written by Vimaladas Thus, in Digambara tradition from c. 8th A.D. onowing the same style. and in Svetāmbara tradition by the end of c. 9th A.D.
Thus, we can conclude that it is only from c. memory (smrti). recognition (pratyabhijña) and 3rd A. D.-12th A. D. when Jaina logic made its proinduction (tarka ) were established as independent gress and opened a new vistas for its further developPramāņa. Earliest works on Jaina logic were in brief ment, and mainly concerned with the Jaina concept of Development of the Theory of Non-absolutism Pramāna. Works on Jaina logic, composed later on (Anekāntavāda ) and Syādvāda were a healthy review of the conceptions of Pramāņa
Non-violence in practice, non-absolutistic prevalent in other philosophical traditions. Pātra- approach in thought and conditional predication or svāmi's Trilaksanakadarthana was the first one to qualified assertion (Syavāda ) in speech are the refute the Hetulakṣaṇa of Dinnāga. Vidyānandi pillars upon which the splendid palace of Jainism is (c. 9th A. D.) wrote Pramānaparikṣā to evaluate the erected. Theory of non-absolutism (Anekāntavāda ) characteristics of Pramāna, their divisions and sub- is the central philosophy of Jainism. So far as the divisions, prevalent in other philosophical traditions. historical development of this theory of AnekāntaIn this period some more works pertaining to Jaina vāda is concerned, its historical development can be logic (Pramānaśāstra ) had been composed but seem divided into three phases. Its first phase begins with to be destroyed. In Digambara tradition, Prabhā- the preachings of Mahavira, i. e., c. 6th B. C. and is candra's Nyāyakumudacandra and Prameyakamala- extended upto the composition of Umāsvāti's mārtanda are two of some prominent works Tattvārthasūtra ( first half of the c. 4th A. D.). It was composed in c. 10th-11th A. D. Both of the works are the period of origination of Anekāntavāda. Basically, the commentaries on Akalanka's Laghiyastrayi and in the non-violent and tolerant attitude of Mahāvira helSvetāmbara tradition, Vadidevasüri's Pramāṇanaya- ped much in the development of the non-absolutistic tattvāloka and its commentary Syādvādaratnākara (c. principle of Anekāntavāda. In Sūtrakrtānga, he clearly 11th A. D. ) are well known works on Jaina logic. opines, "one who praises one's own view-point and After that Hemcandra's Pramāna-mimāṁsā (c. 12th discards other's view as a false-one and thus, distorts A. D.) is an important work which mainly deals with the truth will remain confined to the cycle of birth and the concept of pramana though it is incomplete. The death." development of Navya-nyāya (Neo-logistic system)
It follows that Mahavira preached the utterbegins with the entry of Gangesh Upadhyāya in the most carefulness regarding one's speech. In his field of Indian Nyāya in c. 13th A. D. But for four opinion speech should be unassaulting as well as true. centuries the Jaina logicians were unacquainted with He warned his disciple monks against making unwarthis new literary genre and continued to follow the ranted.categorical assertions or negations. He instrucstyle of Vädidevasüri. Thus, the development of Jaina ted them to make only a conditional statement Logic ( Nyāyaśāstra ) remained interrupted after (Vibhajjavāya Vagarejja ). It is the Vibhajjavāda

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from which the theory of non-absolutism (Anekantavada) emerged. Sütrakṛtänga, in its first chapter records various contemporary one-sided doctrines regarding the nature of soul and creation of the universe. Mahāvira's approach to all these doctrines is non-absolutistic or relative. In every case, whether it was the problem of eternalism (Śāśvatavāda) and nihilism (Ucchedavāda) about the soul or that of finiteness and infiniteness of the world or that identity and difference of body and soul or also that of monism and pluralism, Mahavira's approach was never absolutistc but relativistic. It was firmly maintained in Jaina canons that the nature of reality is complex and multi-dimensional as well as confluence of many self-contradictory attributes, so it can be approached and explained from various angles or view-points. It is believed that Tirthankara Mahavira while explaining the reality uttered first sentence as tripod (tripadi), i.e., Uppannei, Vigamei, Dhuvei Va. Accordingly in Jainism Reality / 'Sat' is defined as possessing origination, decay and permanence (Utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat: Tattvärtha, 5.29). This three-fold nature of Reality is the base of the Jaina theory of Non-absolutism. On the one hand, the nature of Reality is complex, i. e., a synthesis of opposites identity and difference, permanence and change, oneness and manyness and so on, and on the other hand scope of our experience, knowledge and even expression is limited and relative, so we can not know the Reality as a whole from any particular angle. Our every knowledge about the Reality will always be partial and relative only and in that position our expression or statement about the Reality will be always relative and not categorical ( arpita närpite siddhe: Tattvärtha, 5). In canonical age we have an account of only this much discussion about Anekantavāda.
Thus, in the first phase of its development, this theory was evolved from the theory of Vibhajja

vāda. Though the theory of Vibhajjavāda was common to both Jainism and Buddhism but so far as Buddhist approach to the metaphysical doctrine is concerned, it was a negative one, while Mahavira's was a positive one. Lord Buddha maintained that whether it is eternalism or nihilism, none of these can be regarded as true because any one-sided approach neither represents a right vision regarding Reality nor it explains our practical problems of sorrow and sufferings. That is why he kept mum while answering the questions related to the metaphysics. It is due to this negative approach that Buddha's theory of Nihilism came into existence later on in Buddhism. On the other hand, Mahavira's approach towards these onesided views was positive. He tried to synthesize these different views on the basis of his theory of Anekantavāda.
The synthesis is found for the first time in Bhagavatisutra, wherein, on the basis of two main divisions of Nayas - substantial standpoint (Dravyarthika Naya) and modal standpoint (Paryayarthika Naya) as well as Niscaya Naya, Vyavahara Naya and different Nikṣepas (Positing) and Gateways of investigations (Anuyogadvāras ) such as Substance (dravya ), space (deśa ), time (kāla), mode (bhāva ), name (nama ), symbol (sthapana ), potentiality (dravya ), actuality (bhava ) etc. He has synthesised the various opposite view-points. So it is clear that in the first phase, i. e., before c. 3rd A. D. Vibhajjavāda of Lord Mahavira was fully developed in the positive and synthesising theory of Anekantavāda along with its subsidiary doctrines such as the doctrine of standpoint (Nayavada) etc. Thus, along with the origination of Anekāntavāda, the doctrines of Naya, Nikṣepa and Anuyogadvāra came into existence.
The second phase of the development of Nonabsolutism / Anekantavāda began with Siddhasena Divakara's Sanmatitarka (c. 4th A. D.), continue till the Haribhadra's works such as Saddarśana

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samuccaya, Sāstravārtāsamuccaya (c. 8th A. D.) etc. Mallavādi are some what different in their names and This second phase has three main characteristics — presentation. Though the author showed the relationfirstly, apart from the Āgamic Nayas, i. e., ship between the traditional seven Nayas and his Dravyārthika (Substantial) and Paryāyārthika twelve Nayas ( See : Malvania D., Āgama Yuga kā (modal ) or Niscaya ( Ideal ) and Vyavahāra (pra- Jaina Darśana, p. 312. ) though doctrine of Anuyogactical view-point), the doctrine of Seven-fold Nayas, dvāras (gateways of the investigation ) can be traced i.e., Naigama ( considering both the general and in some of the Āgamas of later period as Bhagavati, particular properties of the thing ), Sangraha ( consi- Samavāyānga, Prajñāpanā and Anuyogadvārasutra dering general properties of an object ), Vyavahāra yet the number of these gateways of investigation (considering specific properties of an object ), never remained constant. In Tattvārthasūtra, it was Rjusūtra ( confined only to the present mode of an only eight while in Dhavala tika of Satkhandāgama object), Sabda (treating with synonyms ), Samabhi- its numbers were increased upto eighty. This doctrine rūdha ( taking into cosideration only etymological of gateways of investigation is nothing but viewing, meaning of word. According to this Naya, even word understanding and explaining the nature of the things has a different meaning ) and Evambhūta Naya with their multiple facets or aspects and thus it can (denoting object in its actual state of performing its also be considered as a development of Vibhajyavāda natural function ) was developed. Though the Āgamic and Anekāntavāda. Here, it is noteworthy that this Nayas remained in vogue till the Kundakunda's increase in the number of the Nayas (view-points ) or period (c. 6th A. D.).
the Anuyogadvāras was well received by later Jaina
thinkers because the earlier Ācāryas kept the door It is to be noted that in earlier Agamas such as Acaränga, Sūtrakrtānga, Uttarādhyayana etc., this
open in this regard. Siddhasena Divākara clearly
mentions in his work Sanmatitarka ( second half of concept of seven-fold view-point (Nayas ) is absent. Only in Anuyogadvārasūtra and Nandisutra this
thec. 4th A. D.) that number of view-points can be as
much as the way of linguistic expressions. (Sanmaticoncept of seven-fold view-point is found but these are the works of thec. 2nd-4th A.D. In Samavāyānga,
tarka, 3/47) it is an interpolation. Secondly, in Tattvārthasūtra Doctrine of Seven-fold Predication (Saptabhangi) (first half of c. 4th A. D.) the number of basic view
The second main characteristic of this second points are five. The Samabhirūdha and Evambhūta phase of the development of Anekāntavāda, is the are accepted as sub-types of Sabdanaya. Siddhasena doctrine of seven-fold predications or the seven ways Divākara (c. 4th A. D. ) in his Sanmatitarka has of expressions (Saptabhangi ). The concept, regardaccepted six Nayas, he does not mention Naigama ing the ways of expressions, dates back to the Vedic Naya. Thus, we may conclude that the number of period. The two forms of expressions / predications - Nayas, as seven, was finalised later on but prior to the affirmation and negation, are accepted by all. These end of c. 5th A. D. Only with one exception of two depend on existence or non-existence. By negaMallavādi (c. 5th ), who mentions twelve Nayas in ting both the existence and non-existence, we have a his work 'Dvāśāranayacakra, development in the third way of expression Avyaktavyatā, i.e., inexpresnumber of Nayas became stagnant because of the sibility. By accepting the both a fourth way of expresdevelopment of the doctrine of Anuyogadvāras, i, e., sion was emerged, comprising both affirmation and the gateways of investigation. These twelve Nayas of negation. These four ways of expression are well

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accepted in Upanişadas and Buddhism. So far as Jain- ism is concerned it is in the Bhagavatisūtra where for the first time these different ways of expressions (Bhangas ) are found. In Bhagavatisatra (9/5 ) while dealing with the concept of Hell, Heaven and abode of Siddhas, Lord Mahāvira mentioned only three ways of expression, i. e., affirmation, negation and in- expressibility but while dealing with the aggregates of the different numbers of atom, he mentioned more than twenty-three ways of expressions. Pt. Dalsukha Malvania is right when he says that of course we have seven predications or Saptabhangi in Bhagavatisütra, but in my humble opinion these different ways of expressions (Bhangas ) do not represent the doctrine of seven-fold predications rather it is only a prior state. Here, these ways of expressions are framed on the number of atoms in aggregates. Secondly, this discussion may be a later interpolation because in Tattvārthasutra and its auto-commentary, this concept of seven-fold predication is absent. Thirdly, it is also clear that neither in Bhagavatisutra nor in the Tattvārthasūtra and it's auto-commentary, the theory of seven-fold predication is systematically presented in its logical form, with number of predications as seven and only seven. For the first time in Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmatitarka, this theory of seven-fold predication is logically presented. After that in Āpta- mimāmsā of Samantabhadra (c. 5th ), Sarvärthasiddhi of Pujyapāda (c. 6th ), Pañcāstikāya ( 14 ) and Pravacanasāra (2/23 ) of Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) and some other later works of this period this doctrine of seven-fold conditional predication has been discu- ssed in detail. In general, there are only three types of our linguistic expression - affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. On the basis of these three funda- mental ways of linguistic expressions and their combinations mathematically only seven predications are possible neither more nor less. In order to show the conditionality or relativity of these seven-fold predi-
cations Jaina ācāryas put a qualifying mark before each of the predication / statement, so that the affirmation or negation or even in-expressibility of predication may not be taken as absolute. This qualifying mark is the word 'Syāt' (RTC), which being put before every predication, removes the every possibility of uncertainity and indefiniteness of the predication and make the predication conditional as well as relative. The seven-fold conditional predications are as follows:
1. Conditional affirmation (RIT afta) 2. Conditional negation ( PTL ifta) 3. Conditional inexpressibility (RIT 3Tama)
4. Conditional affirmation and negation respectively ( RITG 31 anita a)
5. Conditional affirmation and inexpressibility ( RTG 31 7 379Tel 7)
6. Conditional negation and inexpressibility ( RUG Ta 3athai 7 )
7. Conditional affirmation, negation and inexpressibility (स्यात् अस्ति च नास्ति च अवक्तव्यं च)
It is noteworthy that for Jainas inexpressibility (anirvacaniyatā or avyaktavyata ) does not denote absolute inexpressibility as Vedānta means. It is only conditional inexpressibility because simultaneous affirmation and negation are not possible in our linguistic expressions.
The Jaina doctrines of non-absolutism, conditional predication and view-points yielded good results particularly in that age of philosophical disputation as well as religious and social conflicts. Though the Jaina thinkers made optical estimation of the philosophical assumptions of other schools of thought yet they paid proper respect to them and accepted their Truth value on the basis of different Nayas. In this regard the views of Siddhasena Divākara and Haribhadra are commendable. Siddhasena tried to establish the truth value of other schools of thought on different view-points. He said Sankhya school is

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true from substantial view-point, while Buddhist view is true from the view-point which is confined to only present mode of an object (Rjusūtra Naya ).
He further remarks that all schools of thought are true when they are understood from their own standpoint and so far as they do not reject the truth- value of others. A non-absolutist does not divide them into the category of true and false. The same spirit is also followed by Haribhadra in his works such as sastravārtāsamuccaya and Şaddarśana- samuccaya. It is only Haribhadra, who in his Şad darśanasamuccaya, presented all the six schools of thought in their true spirit and without condemning them. No other work in the history of Indian philo- sophy has been written till date in such a noble spirit. In this period, Jaina ācāryas tried to syn-thesize the different conflicting views and thus tried to establish harmony and peace in the society. Historical Development of Jaina Metaphysics Astikāya
The doctrine of pañcāstikāya which refers to the five constituents of the universe is regarded as the most original theory of Jainism. There is, of course, no mention of pañcāstikāya in Ācārānga, but it is found in the Parśva chapter of Rşibhāşita (c. 4th B. C. ). This shows that this concept belongs to the tradition of Pärśva (c. 8th B. C.). In the tradition of Mahavira, however, we find its first reference in Bhagavatisutra (about c. 1st B. C.).
In Jaina philosophy the word astikāya means the substance which exists ( asti ) with an extension in the space, i.e., constituent component ( kāya ). In Jaina philosophy jiva, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and pudgala - these five are regarded as astikāyas from the very ancient times, and there is no change in this concept, even today. They can be translated as the living beings (jiva ), Space (akaśa ), Medium of motion and rest (dharma-adharma taken together) and Matter (pudgala ).
Among these five astikāyas, three of them - dharma, adharma and akāśa are thought of as unitary and remaining two - jiva and pudgala as infinite in number. From the c. 3rd-10th A. D. there is no major change in the concept execpt that, with the development of the concept of saddravya (the six-fold theory of substance ), time (kala ) was also accepted as an unextended substance (anastikāya ). The debate whether time can be regarded as an independent substance or not begins with thec. 3rd 4th A. D. or even before the composition of Tattvārthasutra; and the difference of opinion in this regard continues upto the time of Viśeşāvaśyakabhāşya (c. 7th A. D. ). Some of the Jaina philosophers regarded time as an independent substance while the others did not. But subsequently Digambara and Svetāmbara both the traditions synthesized the concept of astikaya and dravya and both of them agreed to accept time asanastikaya, i.e., an independent unextended substance.
The idea of Pancastikaya is, distinctly, an original concept of the Jainas. We do not find it in any other ancient philosophical system, except that in the ancient times astikāya has a broad and general meaning, denoting anything that exists (asti ); but in due course of time there developed a distinction between astikāya and anastikāya and the former was taken to be an extended substance in space. Technically speaking astikāya is a multi-spatial substance ( bahupradesi-dravya ), i.e., a substance which is extended in space. Pañcāstikāya
The Jaina concept of Şaddravya ( theory of six substances ) has developed from this very idea of pañcastikāya by adding time as an independent substance in the earlier concept of pañcāstikāya. The concept of Şaddravya came into existence during the c. 1st-2nd A. D. Thus the concept of pañcāstikāya is definitely a very old concept because we find its reference in the Pārśva chapter of Isibhāsiyaim, one

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of the oldest scriptures. Till the period of Ācārānga move his hands. Thus, the concept of dharma and and the first Śrutaskandha of Sutrakrtanga we donot adharma as the respective medium of motion and rest, find any reference to this concept so far as the seems to be a later concept. This idea has arrived by Mahāvira's tradition is concerned. Thus, we can say the time of the composition of Tattvārthasūtra (i.e. in that the concept basically belongs to Pārsva tradition. the second half of the c. 3rd or first half of the When tire followers of Pārsva were included in the c. fourth ). The allusions made in Bhagavati and other Mahāvira's order, their concept of pañcāstikāya, along scriptures clearly show that the meanings of with some other concepts, was also accepted in the dharmāstikāya and adharmāstikāya in those days Mahavira's tradition. Bhagavatisutra for the first time were identical to the meaning of the terms dharma mentions that the world is made of dharma, adharma, and adharma as pious and sinful respectively. Thus, akaśa, jiva and pudgala. Isibhāsiyāim only refers to the concept of dharma andadharma as the medium of the five astikāyas but has not mentioned their names. motion and rest, respectively, seems to be a latter Even, if the names were decided, we find no descri- concept, but this idea has arrived by the time of the ption as to their exact nature and function. Further, composition of Tattvårthasūtra (i.e., c. 3rd A.D.). In the meaning that we understand of the pañcastikāya, Uttarādhyayana, chapter 28th also dharma and today, is gradually ascribed to them in due course of adharma are mentioned as the medium of motion and time. We find atleast two references in the Bhagavati- rest respectively, but according to scholars this sūtra which clarify that the dharma-astikāya and the chapter is a later addition of the c. 1st or 2nd A. D. adharma-astikāya at that time did not mean media of
Seven Categories motion and rest, respectively. In the 20th śataka of Bhagavatisatra, it is mentioned that abstinence from
In SatrakȚtănga (2/5-765-782 ) we find two the eighteen places of sin and observance of the five
categories of being (asti ) and not-being (năsti). The
elements which are classified under being category vigilances (samitis ) alongwith three controls (guptis ) is dharmăstikāya, while indulging in the eighteen
are — loka (universe), aloka ( space beyond places of sin and not following the five vigilances
universe ) jiva ( the living-being ), dharma, adharma, (samitis ) and the three controls (guptis ) is, called
bandha, mokşa, punya, pāpa, āsrava, samvara,
vedana, nirjarā, kriyā, akriyā, krodha, māna, lobha, adharmāstikāya. In the 16th śataka of Bhagavati
prema, dveșa, caturanta, samsāra, deva, devi, siddhi, sutra, the question is raised whether a deity (deva ) standing at the end of the universe (unoccupied space)
asiddhi, siddhanijasthāna, aādhu, asādhu and kalyana. can move his hands outside the universe (aloka ) ?
This detailed list is abridged in the second The answer given to this question is not only negative part ( śrutaskandha ) of Sūtrakıtārga. Here we find but is also explanatory. It says that as the movement the mention of jiva-ajiva, punya-pāpa, āsravaof Jiva and Ajiva is possible only through matter samvara, vedanā-nirjarā, kriyā-adhikarana, bandha (pudgala ) and as there is complete absence ofjivas and mokşa. It is an earlier stage, as Pt. Dalsukha and the pudgalas in the aloka, the movement of the Malvania observes, the concept of nine-fold elements hands of the diety is impossible there. If dharma is developed from this very list after deleting vedanā, dravya was considered as a medium of motion, at that kriya and adhikaraņa from it. This is alluded, in time the answer would have been in different way, Samavāyārga and Uttarādhyayana, approximately c. i.e., due to the absence of dharma-dravya he can not 2nd or 3rd A. D. Out of these nine-fold elements

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Umāsvāti presents, the concept of seven elements (tattvas) including punya and papa under asrava, in the c. 3rd-4th. We find discussions of the seven-fold or nine-fold categories (tattva) in the later composed scriptures of both the Svetambara and the Digambara traditions. This shows that the concept of seven categories (tattva) has also its origin in Sutrakṛtänga and has taken final shape in due course of time and got finalised in c. 3rd or 4th A. D. During the c. 7th10th A.D. these ideas had properly conceptualised as it is described in details with their various classes and sub-classes.
We find that at the root of the formulation of the concepts of seven or nine-fold categories, six-fold substances and the six-fold jivanikaya, is the basic idea of Pañcāstikaya. The Jaina thinkers, of course, have developed the concept of six substances by synthesizing their conception of Pañcästikäya and the idea of substance as it is found in the other philosophical systems. In the following pages we will try to
see as to how it has worked out.
Substance
What is known as substance is the fundamental constituent of the universe. The sat, of the ancient Indian philosophical traditions, has taken the form of dravya (substance) later on. As a matter of fact, the philosophical traditions which regard the ultimate reality as one and unchangeable have adopted the world 'Sat' and those which consider the reality as many and changeable have used the word substance (dravya ), instead of 'sat'. In the systems of Indian thought like Nyaya and Vaiseṣika etc. the use of the word substance (dravya ) or padartha remains in vogue. So far as the Jaina philosophy is concerned though we find the term dravya in Acaranga yet the word is not used in any technical sense.
In Uttaradhyayana, the word 'dravya' is mentioned for the first time. That particular chapter of Uttaradhyayana, where indravya is discussed, is reg

43
arded as relatively later, ofc. 2nd or 3rd A. D., by the scholars. There we find that not only the word dravya (substance) is used, but the mutual relation among the substance, attributes and modes are also discussed. Substance is defined as substratum of attributes (guṇāṇām āsavo davvo ). In my opinion, this definition of substance, given in Uttaradhyayana, seems to be influenced by the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika school. Pujyapada Devanandi defined substance as an aggregate of attributes in his commentary on Tattvärthasutra, known as Sarvarthasiddhi (c. 5th or 6th A. D. ). This definition seems to be influenced by the Buddhist Skandhavāda. In favour of this view Pujyapāda has quoted 'gunaṇām samuo davvo' from the scriptures. This shows that this concept should have been prior to the c. 6th. Both the definition of substance as 'substratum of attributes' and 'aggregate of attributes' should have been in my opinion, prevalent before the c. 3rd. By synthesizing these two views through Jaina theory of Anekantavāda (non-absolutism) the substance is defined for the first time, as that which possesses attributes and modes in Umāsvāti's Tattvarthasutra.
Six-substances (Şaḍdravya)
We have already stated that the concept of saddravya (six substances) has been developed from the idea of pañcastikāya. By adding 'time' as an independent substance in pañcastikaya, the concept of six substances (şaḍdravya ) is formulated. Though from c. 2nd-7th A. D., 'Time' was always a matter of discu ssion whether it is an independent substance or not (as it is indicated in several works from Tattvärthasutra to Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya ), yet finally it was accepted as an independent substance. It was c. 7th A. D. when both the Svetambara and Digambara traditions agreed to accept the idea of saddravya and no change occurred in the theory afterwards. The six substances are now classified into the following three main divisions-astikaya-anastikaya, jiva (living),

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ajiva (non-living) and murta-amūrta. In the first classification - dharma, adharma, ākāśa, jiva and pudgala - these five are regarded as astikaya and 'Time' as anastikāya ( unextended substance ). In the second classification dharma, adharma, ākāśa, pudgala and kāla are regarded as Ajiva (Non-living beings) and the Jiva is considered as living being. In the last classification jiva, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kāla are regarded as amurta (abstract) and pudgala (matter) as marta (concrete). We have already stated that the development of the concept of substance in the Jaina philosophy is almost influenced by the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika philosophy. Jainācāryas have synthesised the Vaiseșika idea of substance with their own concept of pañcastikāya. As such while in Vaiseṣika there are nine substances, the Jainas, by adding time to pañcāstikāya have made them six in all. Jiva, ākāśa and kāla remained common in both. Prthvi, ap, tejas and marut - the four, out of the five mahābhūtas which are regarded as substances in the Vaśeşika are not recognised by the Jainas as independent substances. They are only considered as varieties of jiva-dravya. The Jainas have also not accepted
'dik' and 'mana' as independent substances, instead they have included three others - dharma, adharma and pudgala in their scheme of substances. It may also be noted that while the other traditions have treated pṛthvi, ap, vayu and agni as jada (nonliving), the Jainas regard them as living. Thus, the Jaina concept of six substances (saddravya ) seems to be quite original. We can only find its partial similarity with other traditions. The main reason behind this is that the Jainas have developed their idea of six substances (saḍdravya ) on the line of their own theory of pañcästikäya.
Şadjivanikāya
Along with pañcāstikāya, we also find the concept of sadjivanikaya (six-fold living beings) in Jaina canons. This concept has developed from

jivāstikāya, one of the kāyas in pañcāstikāya. The six kinds of jivāstikāya are — earth (pṛthvikaya), water (apkaya), air (vayukaya ), fire (tejas-kaya). vegitation (vanaspatikāya) and mobile beings (trasakāya ). The use of the word kaya (body) for earth etc. is found since remote past. In Palitripitaka Ajitakeśa-kambali, calls pṛthvi, ap, tejas and vāyu the four bhutas as kaya but Pakudhakaccayana adds three more to the list, i.e., happiness (sukha ), sufferings (duḥkha) and the living being (jiva) and make them seven in number. The Jainas position is a little different. First they regard the five-jiva, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and pudgala as kaya (astikāya) and then include pṛthvi, ap, tejas, vāyu, vanaspati and trasa, six in all, underjīvanikāya. Thus, there are two concepts-pañcāstikāya and ṣadjivanikāya and both of them have been prevalent in Jainism in thec. 4th-3rd B. C. in their crude form, but were developed and systematised in c. 3rd-5th A. D.
Distinct references of ṣadjivanikaya are available in the first chapter of Acaranga and in Sūtrakṛtānga also. It is accepted by all the scholars that all these scriptures are of the c. 4th B. C. and are conte
mporary to the older part of Pali Tripitaka and earlier Upanisadas. It is likely that these concepts might have belonged to Mahavira.
The concept of pañcāstikāya basically belongs to the Parsva tradition. It is recoginsed in the tradition of the Mahavira also while interpreting the world. There is a reference in the Bhagavatisūtra to the effect that Mahavira has accepted the Parsva ideas that the universe is made of Pañcāstikāya.
I do not agree with Pt. Malvania's opinion that the concept of pañcāstikāya is a later developed concept. It is true, of course, that in the earlier works of Mahavira's tradition there is mention of only sadjivanikaya and not of pañcästikäya. But when the Parsva tradition merged with that of the Mahavira,

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the philosophical ideas of the former also got their which they transmigrate from one Yoni to another and way in the latter. As such, the idea of pañcāstikāya the manner in which they take their food etc. A type was basically of Pārsva tradition, so it could find its ofjivas are called anasyata there. From this, we can place in Bhagavatisātra after its merging in conclude that the idea of anantakäya ( infinite jiva in Māhāvira's tradition.
one body) and pratyekakāya (Onejiva in one body)
came into existence in c. 3rd 4th. The decision as to other living beings but even earth, water, fire and air which of the creatures (jivas ) are to be included in too, as living beings. This is a very typical Jaina con
the two, three or the four sensed jiva, respectively is cept. In the other systems, such as Nyāya -Vaisesika also finalised afterwards. In Bhagavati, it takes the etc. these four elements are considered as mahā- form ofjiva-ajiva division, however, the concept has bhutas and as such jada (unconscious, inanimate). fully developed by the time of Prajnapanā because Among the mahābhūtas, akāśa (space) is the only there we have detailed discussions on indriya, ahāra, element, regarded as non-living (ajiva ) in both the paryapti etc. traditions (Jainism as well as Nyāya-Vaiseșika ).
After the c. 3rd an important change occurred That is whyākāśa is included in pañcāstikāya but has in the classification of mobile and immobile being no place in sadjivanikāya in which only the other (trasa and sthāvara ). Right from Ācāranga to four, viz., earth, water, fire and air are included. The
Tattvărthasūtra, earth, water and vegetation are Jaina thinkers accept not only the life as dependent on regarded as immobile (sthāvara ) and fire, air and the earth, water and the like but also as living too. That is
two, three, four and five-sensed living creatures as why the abstinence from violence towards earth,
mobile (trasa ). The last chapter of Uttaradhyayana, water, air, fire and vegetation is so prominently pres
Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāyasăra and Umāsvāti's cribed in the Jaina Sadhanā, parti-cularly for the Tattvārthasutra confirm it. Afterwards not only earth, Muni's. The subtleness and the extre-me that we find
water and vegetation but all the one-sensed beings are in the observance of non-violence (Ahimsa ) in the regarded as immobile. However, due to the moveJainism have their roots in the idea ofşadjivanikaya. ment seen in fire and air it becomes difficult to regard If we regard earth etc. under the category of the living them as immobile. The root cause of the problem was beings, it is but natural to abstain from their violence. that in those days the two or more sensed beings were
The conception ofşadjivanikāya in Jainism is called trasa, hence it was thought that other than two the oldest one. It is accepted as such from its origin to or more sensed beings all the one sensed beings are date. It is difficult to say that it has undergone any considered as sthāvara ( immobile ). This shows the fundamental change between c. 3rd-10th except that change which had taken place in the c. 5th-6th in the some important issues regarding their classification trasa-sthāvara classification, approximately. After have been raised and some detailed informations that in both the Svetambara and Digambara sects, the about their body, their way of taking food, their concept of pañcasthāvara has found firm footings. It language, their classes, sub-classes etc. are depicted is noteworthy here that when air and fire are regarded in Prajñāpanā and Jivājivābhigama. According to Pt. as trasa, there is the use of the term udara (urala ) for Malvania there is a description in the second chapter trasa. In the beginning the criterion of classification of Sūtrakrtānga, known as Ahāraparijña, regarding of trasa-sthāvara is made from the point of view of the yonis in which jivas take the birth and the way in moveability of things, and as air and fire are

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moveable in nature they are thought of as trasa. The moveable nature of vayu is so apparent that it is called trasa, first of all out of five one sensed beings. By minute observations, it is seen that fire too has a tendency of gradual expansion through fuel so it is also included into trasa (mobile). But the move-ment of water is regarded as possible only due to the low level of the earth so movement is not its own nature. Therefore, water, like the vegetation is also taken as sthāvara (immobile ). As the movement in air and fire is inherent so these two are considered as trasa and other as sthavaras. Further when the two or more sensed jivas are recognised as immobile (sthavara) the problem of reconciling this view with Agamic statements arose. In the Svetambara schools this reconciliation is marked as the basis of the distinction of labdhi and gati. From the standpoint of the labdhi, air and fire are viewed as immobile (sthavara) but viewed from the angle of movement (gati) they remain mobile (trasa). In the Dhavala commentary of Digambara tradition (c. 10th) the problem is solved differently. It is said that the basis of calling air and fire as sthavara, is not their movement but their Nama-karma origin. Jayasenācārya, the commentator of pañcastikāya of Kundakunda, solves the problem by making a distinction between niscayanaya and vyavahara-naya. According to him, the earth, water and vegetation are included into pañca sthavara because of their Nama-karma origin, but air and fire classification under pañcasthavars are only from the practical point of view (vyavahāra). From niścayanaya they are trasa as they actually appear to be mobile. All these excercises really are worthwhile
attempts to reconcile the differences, cropped of during respective contentions of the ancient and the later scriptures.
So far as the question of different classifications of jivas are concerned they are crystalised during the c. 3rd-10th. In that period the concepts of

Jivasthana, Märgaṇāsthāna, Guṇasthāna have also developed. Wherever these topics have been discussed in the Anga-Agamas such as Bhagavati etc. the reference has been made to Anga-bahya Agamas (External authorities) such as Prajñāpanā etc. It confirms that these theories are developed after the c. 2nd. First they are discussed in the Anga-bahya Agamas and afterwards at the time of Valabhi-vācanā they are included in Anga-agamas with the note that for detailed discussions relevant Anga-bahya scriptures are to be seen.
Jaina Theory of Guṇasthäna and its Developement The doctrine of fourteen stages of spiritual development (Gunasthana) is one of the most popular theories of Jainism. Except Samaväyänga, none of the canonical work refers to this theory. Scholars are of the strong opinion that the reference relating to Gunasthana found in Samavāyānga is an interpolation incorporated at the time of second Valabhi Council (c. 5th A. D. ). The Niryuktis are also silent about this theory, except the present edition of Avasakaniryukti wherein, two gathās mention the names of these fourteen Gunasthanas. This is remarkable that till the time of Haribhadra's commentary on Avasyaka Niryukti, these two gathās were not accepted as Niryukti gāthās as in his commentary, he has clearly mentioned that these gathās has been quoted by him from the Sangrahani-sutra.
It seems that till the c. 4th A. D. the concept of these fourteen stages of spiritual development has not come into existence. Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra throwing light on almost every aspect of Jaina philosophy and religion including various stages of spiritual development does not mention the fourteen Gunasthanas as such. The same is the case with its auto-commentary. Though in the ninth chapter of the Tattvärthasutra the author has mentioned four, seven and ten stages of spiritual development, yet he does not make any mention of these fourteen stages in it.

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false attitudes like the taste of curd mixed with sugar, which is neither sweet nor sour. This is the stage of doubt. In this stage soul accepts neither the perverse attitude nor the right one. It remains in dilemma.
Thus, we may conclude that the theory of the fourteen stages of spiritual development was not prevalent at the time of compilation of Tattvārthasūtra, otherwise, Umāsvāti would have mentioned it.
These evidences show that the theory of fourteen Guņasthānas came into existence after Tattvārthasutra, i.e., c. 4th A. D. For the first time, this theory was introduced along with all its details, in Puspadanta and Bhutabali's Satkhandagama (c. 5th A. D.). After that it is discussed in Pujyapada's Sarvārthasiddhi ( c. 6th A. D.) and Tattvārthabhāsya-tika of Siddhsenagani (c. 7th-8th ) in detail, however, its pre-concept in the form of ten stages was already present in Ācārānganiryukti ( 22-23 ) and Tattvārthasūtra ( 9/47 ). From these ten stages of spiritual development the theory of fourteen Gunasthāna was conceptualised in c. 5th A. D.
These fourteen stages are as follows:
1. The first stage is called mithyādrsti, i.e., perversity of attitude. It is the lowest stage from where the spiritual journey of soul starts. It is considered as a stage of spiritual development only be- cause in this very state the efforts for the attainment of the right vision are made. The process of granthibheda occurs at the end of this stage. At this stage the soul, is in the grip of extreme passions (ananta- nubhandhi kaşaya ).
2. The second stage is known as sāsvādana- samyagdrsti, i.e., to have a momentary taste of the right vision. This is an intermediate stage and it occurs when soul falls from the right attitude towards the false attitude. This stage is called sāsvādanasamyagdrsti because in this stage soul has a taste of right attitude or right version just as a person after eating delicious dishes vomits and has a taste of those dishes in that state of vomiting.
3. The third stage is technically known as samyag-mithyadrsti. It is mixed stage of the right and
4. The fourth stage is aviratasamyagdrsti, a stage of right attitude without right conduct. Though in this scheme of Gunasthāna it is considered to be the fourth stage, but in reality it is the first stage in the upward journey of the soul towards its spiritual heights. It is the stage in which the soul gets the glimpse of truth for the first time. At this stage the self knows right as a right and wrong as a wrong but due to the lack of spiritual strength, inspite of the knowledge and the will, he cannot abstain himself from the wrong path of immorality.
5. The fifth stage is known as deśavirata samyagdrsti. This is the stage of right attitude with partial observance and partial non-observance of moral code. A house-holder, who possesses right vision and observes five anuvratas, three gunavratas and four śikṣāvratas, comes in this category. In this stage one knows what is right and also tries to practise it, but one cannot have full control over one's passions. At this stage there is only partial expression of the energy of self-control. After attaining the fourth stage, if one develops spiritual strength and has control over the second set of four passions, i.e. apratyākhyāni-kaṣāya-catuṣka, one is able to attain this stage.
6. In spiritual journey of the soul, the sixth stage is called pramatta-samyata-gunasthāna. It is the stage in which the self observes right conduct fully. He observes five mahāvratas and other rules of fully moral conduct of a monk, yet he has an attachment towards his body and due to this attachement the spiritual inertia is still there. This is the stage of selfcontrol with spiritual inertia. At the end of this stage the aspirant tries to subside or annihilate the third set

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of four passions and spiritual inertia and climbs the seventh ladder.
7. The seventh stage is the stage of selfcontrol and self awareness alongwith freedom from spiritual inertia, which is technically known as apramatta-samyata-guṇasthāna. At this stage the self has full control over his passions and observes the moral code without any negligence. This stage can be attained by overcoming the nine types of pramadas or unawareness and the three sets of four types of passions. From this stage there are two ways open for the upward spiritual journey of the soul. They are technically known as upasama-śreņi and kṣapakaśreni. Upasama-dreni is the path of suppression or subsidence while the Kaṣapaka-śreņi is the path of annihilation. The person, who climbs the ladder of spiritual progress by suppressing his passions, is bound to fall from spiritual heights but the person who climbs up the ladder of spiritual heights through the annihilation of his passions ultimately attains nirvana or emancipation.
8. The eighth stage of spiritual development
is called apurvakaraṇa. In this stage self attains a special purification and spiritual strength, and thus becomes capable of reducing the duration and the intensity of the previously bonded karmas. At this stage soul performs the four processes of the karma sthitighāta (destruction of the duration of karmas ), rasaghāta (destruction of the intensity of karmas ), guṇa-sankramaṇa (transformation of the quality of karmic matter) and apurva-sthitibandha (bondage of an unprecedented kind of duration). This total process is technically known as apurva-karana. In this stage the soul for the first time experiences the spiritual bliss and tranquility and emotional disturbances do not effect it much. At this stage the three sets of four passions alongwith anger and pride of the fourth set disappear, only subtle deceit and greed alongwith nine sub-passions (instincts) remain.

—
9. The ninth stage is named as anivṛttikaraṇa, because the process of anivṛttikarana operates in this stage. It is also known as badara-samparaya gunasthana, because in this stage there is occasional possibility of the soul being effected by gross passions (bādara-samparāya ), although it has a power of control over them. At this stage, out of nine sub-passions, three types of sexual instinct subside and only six instincts and subtle greed remain, but due to the presence of sub-passions and subtle greed, a fear of attack by gross passions remain. At the end of this stage struggle for spiritual progress comes to an end and the soul climbs the tenth ladder.
10. This stage is named as sūkṣmasamparāyaguṇasthāna, because at this stage only the subtle form of greed remains. This greed can be interpreted as the subconscious attachment of the soul with the body. When this subtle attachment alongwith remaining sub-passions is subsided or annihilated, the soul ascends to the next stage. The soul, who has made his spiritual progress through the ladder of subsidence (upasama-śreņi) ascends to the eleventh gunasthāna
and the soul, which take up the ladder of annihilation (kṣapaka-śreni), climbs directly to the twelfth stage.
11. This stage is known as upasantamohaniyagunasthana; because in this stage deluding karma remains in the subsided form. It is the highest stage for those who ascend through the ladder of subsidence or suppression. But ultimately the suppressed passions arise and disturb the tranquility of mind. The soul invariably descends from this stage either to the sixth, fifth or fourth or even first stage. This is noteworthy that Jainism does not advocate the process of suppression of the passions for the spiritual progress. This view of Jainism is further supported by the modern psychologists such as Freud etc.
12. The twelfth stage in the spiritual development of the soul is called kṣinamoha-guṇasthāna. In this stage deluding karma, which is the main obstruc

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tion in the spiritual progress, is completely destroyed. At the end of this stage the rest three ghati-karma, jñānāvaraṇa, darśanavaraṇa and antaraya are also destroyed and the soul ascends to the thirteenth stage.
13. This stage is known as sayogi-kevaligunasthana. In this stage soul attains the four infinites, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss, infinite power and thus becomes omniscient. It is the highest stage of spiritual development. It is the stage of jivana-mukti of other systems of Indian philosophy. Only due to the existence of four non-destructive karmas, i.e., ayu (age), nāma, gotra and vedaniya, soul remains in the body till the span of age determining karma is not exhausted.
14. This stage is named as ayogikevali-gunasthana, because in this stage the omniscient soul controls its activities of mind, body and speech and thus prepares itself for the final emancipation. In this stage the remaining four non-destructive karmas are destroyed and the soul, after leaving the body, proceeds for its heavenly abode at the top of the universe
and lives their for time-infinite.
Three Stages of Spiritual Quest
There are two classifications of spiritual quest in Jainism Theory of fourteen gunasthānas already discussed and the theory of three stages of spiritual developments. This second classification is based on Upanisadic classification of the soul. The Upanisadas have two, three and four-fold classification of the soul. In two-fold classification, the soul is of two kinds - antaḥprajñāna and bahiṣprajñana (Mandukyopaniṣad, 7) and in four-fold classification, four stages of the soul, are: (i) sleeping state, (ii) dreaming state, (iii) awakened state and (iv) transcendental state (Mandukyopaniṣad, 2/12). Similarly, in Jainism spiritual quest has been summarised in three stages (i) the extrovert self (bahirātmā), (ii) the introvert self (antarātmā) and

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(iii) transcendental self (paramātmā). It is clear that in Jainism these three stages of spiritual quest are a later developed concept, because neither the canonical works nor the earlier works of Jaina philosophy of Umasvati, Siddhasena Divakara etc. refer it. In Digamabara tradition, for the first time we have a mention of these classification in Acarya Kundakunda's Mokṣaprabhṛta (4) then in the Pujyapăda's Samadhitantra (4), Sväāmikumāra's Kārtikeyānuprekṣā (192) and Yogindu's Paramatmaprakāśa (13). In Svetambara tradition, Haribhadra has mentioned these three states of spiritual quest in his work:
These three stages are as under:
1. The extrovert self (bahirātmā): Possesses
perverse attitude hence consequently does not discri
minates soul from body, regards the external thing as mine and takes keen interest in the worldly enjoyment.
2. The introvert self (antarātmā): The self, which possessess the right attitude and therefore, clearly distinguishes the soul from the body and the other external belongings is called an introvert self. It does not take interest in the worldly enjoyments, but meditates on one's own real nature and regards external belongings as alien to it. This has been further subdivided into three states (i) lower, (ii) middle and (iii) higher. The soul belonging to fourth stage of gunasthana is called lower introvert self. The soul belonging to the fifth or the sixth stage of gunasthāna is called middle introvert self and the soul belonging to the seventh to twelfth guṇasthāna is called higher introvert self.
3. The transcendental self (paramātmā): The self, completely free from all sorts of impurities and passions such as aversion, attachment, pride, anger, deceit, greed, sexual desire and other sub-passions. According to Jaina tradition this type of self possesses four infinities, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinte power. There are

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two categories of transcendental Self-(i) Arhatas caritra ), (three jewels of Jainism ) which are equally and (ii) Siddhas.
recognised and well received in both of the sects of Three-fold Path of Liberation
Jainism - Svetāmbara and Digamabara alongwith The Jaina theory of bondage and liberation of
their sub-sects. the soul is unique in Indian philosophy. Jainism holds
In c. 4th-5th the meaning of the constituents that jiva is bound by its own karmas. With every
of this three-fold path was reinterpreted. For example activity mental or physical and, however, subtle that
the term darśana used in Ācārānga, connoting the may be, the karma particles veils the soul and this is
meaning as 'to see' or 'to observe' got its new interprethe bondage of the jiva. Thus, the cause of the
tation in Uttarădhyayana as 'to believe' or 'to have bondage of the jiva is its own passionate activity of
faith' in categories ( tattvas ), Tattvārthastra also mind, body and speech. As the cause of the bondage supports this meaning. Later on, this meaning of is the union of karma-matter with the soul, the libera
samyak-darśana was replaced by the meaning as to tion means the separation or complete annihilation of
have faith in Arhanta as a 'Deva', i.e., the object of these karma-particles, Jainism prescribes three-fold
worship, Nirgrantha as a teacher ( guru ) and religion path for attainment of liberation. This three-fold
as non-violence or being benevolent to others. This concept witnessed gradual changes in it between
meaning is still in vouge. c. 3rd-10th A. D. Ācāranga for the first time in its 6th
Similarly, the meaning of samyak-jflana or chapter, mentions triyama, but as this term is used right knowledge also got some new interpretation. In there vaguely, it is quite difficult to derive any definite the earlier times Jaina thinkers held that the right meaning from it. That is why the commentators knowledge consists in knowing the things in its real explained it in different ways. Some explained it as nature alongwith its infinite facets. This right knowthree yamas, i.e., non-violence, truth and non- ledge is classified into five types in earlier Agamas possession, while some took it as Right knowledge, as — (i) Matijñana – the knowledge obtained Right faith and Right conduct. In my opinion, this through five senses and the mind. It includes both term connotes the meaning of non-violence (nikhitta- sense perception as well as rational and inferential danda ), reasonableness (prajna) and composure or knowledge, (ii) Srutajplana- the knowledge acquired equanimity of mind. Apart from this three-fold con- through language or through symbols and expresscept we find mention of four-fold path of liberation in ions or scriptural knowledge, (iii) Avadhijñana - Uttaradhyayana and Kundakunda's Pancāstikāya. extra-sensory perception akin to clairvoyance, (iv) This four-fold path includes – Right attitude, Right Manahparyayajñana -- reading the thought-waves of knowledge, Right conduct and Right penance. In others mind and (v) Kevalajñāna - perfect knowSamavāyanga and Sthananga, we find different out- ledge. The detailed description about the developlook as the both of the works mention two-fold, three- ment of these types of knowledge has already been fold, four-fold and five-fold path of liberation. Thus, discussed in the present article under the heading of till the canonical age the number of constituents of 'Jaina Theory of Knowledge'. the path of liberation was not fixed. For the first time Later on, Right knowledge was considered as in the Umāsvāti's Tattvarthasatra it was fixed as the knowledge of the seven categories (tattvas ), i.e., three-right knowledge (samyak-jñana ), right faith jiva (living subtance), ajiva (non-living substance ), (samyak-darśana ) and right conduct ( samyak- asrava (influx of karmic matter ), saṁvara ( stoppage

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is so due to its absence (Samayasarakalasa, 132). Thus, in Jainism during c. 6th-10th A. D., the right knowledge is equated with this science of discrimination of self and not-self which as a right knowledge was well accepted in Jainism as well as in Gita, Sankhya-Yoga system and Sankara-Vedanta also.
rightness of an action is to be decided in relation with
other living beings. In other words, external rightness of an action depends upon its outer social results. If
an action results in the well being of others or cultivates social good from the practical or extrinsic view
study of the science of discrimination in Samayasara (207-210). He says anger, deceit etc. are due to the power of fruition of the karmic matter, hence not the real nature of the self. The self is the pure knower. In Iştopadesa (33) of Pujyapada Devanandi (c. 6th A. D.) it is mentioned that right knowledge is that in which a clear distinction between the self and not-self is made. Amṛtacandra also followed the same meaning of right knowledge in his works. He says 'he who is liberated (siddha) has become so, through discri
of the influx of the karmic matter),nirjară (stoppage of the accumulated karmic matter) and Mokṣa (complete annihilation of the karma and to remain in one's pure nature). But after thec. 3rd A. D. the meaning of right knowledge changed and it was held that right knowledge consisted in the discrimination between the self and not-self. The right knowledge is the knowledge of the pure self but the pure self can be known only through the reference to not-self. Thus, knowing the nature of the not-self and differentiating it from the self is called the science of discrimination (bheda-vijñāna) and this science of discrimination constitutes the real meaning of right knowledge. Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) has made an exhaustive point, it is called good or right. But the intrinsic purity or righteousness of an action depends on the intention or motive of the doer. It is purity of intention or motive and not the external result, that makes an action intrinsically good or bad. In earlier times extrinsic aspect was more important for Jainas. In Sutrakṛtänga the Buddhist view is criticised on the basis that they neglect the external aspect of an action. Later on, stress was given on intrinsic aspect by Jaina themselves. It is considered that an action is wrong if it is actuated by a bad intention, may it lead to the happiness of others. But we must be aware of the fact that Jainism being an integral philosophy does not hold any one-sided view, it gives due importance to the intention as well as the consequences of an action. It adds due imporatnce to the social aspects of morality. Jainas do not believe in the dualism of thought and action. For them a right action is the
mination of self from not-self and who is in bondage,
proof of mental purity and the mental purity is the basis for the righteousness of an action. This outlook about the righteousness of the conduct remained unchanged in the later times also. One should be aware of the fact that the general code of conduct for an house-holder as well as for monks and nuns remained the same from the earliest time to the c. 10th but with the passage of time some changes occurred in the interpretation of such rules.
In Jainism right conduct has been described from two points of view - real and practical. In the earlier agamas from real point of view right conduct is considered in which the soul is completely free from passions and perversities. It is the state of equanimity of mind. In Jainism, it is maintained that conduct is dharma, dharma is equanimity and equanimity means the state of self which is free from the

51
vectors of attachment and aversion. From practical point of view right conduct means the adoption of such rules of disciplines as prescribed by the Jinas.
Later on, right conduct is considered by Jaina thinkers on the basis of its two aspects - external and internal. These two aspects are technically called dravya and bhava respectively. In Jainism external

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Aspects of Jainology : Volume VI
In fact, the canonical works have mere skel- were accepted in earlier code of conduct. Secondly, ton of rules and regulations of conduct, it is only in this period is considered very important as most of the Bhaşya (c. 6th A. D.) and Carnis (c. 7th A. D.). the Jaina sects emerged in this period during c. 4thJaina thinkers tried to robe this skelton. They gave not 5th A. D. This period is known as the period of only the various interpretations to the rules and regu- Schism in Jaina history. Three important Jainalations for the monks and nuns as well as for the lay Sects - Digambara, Svetāmbara and Yapaniya have followers, according to their time and circumstances, their origin in this period. This is also to be noted that but discussed in detail their exceptions and atone- before c. 2nd-3rd A. D., the code of conduct of Jaina ments also. In the earlier times, it was maintained that ascetics was very rigorous but from the c. 3rd 4th instead of breaking the rules prescribed for self- many exceptions-relaxations were accepted in their control, it is better to accept the Samadhimarana, but earlier code of conduct. in those centuries it was maintained that one should
The distinguished feature of this age was that protect one's self by all means. A monk or a nun who by this period Jaina ascetics started living in the protected his life by accepting or resorting to the temples and mathas instead of living in outskirts of exception was not considered the guilty of breaking the cities and secluded places. Not only this but insthe rules if his mind was pure. In Oghaniryukti ( 47- tead of following the vow of non-possession, in its 48), it is said that for the proper following of the path true spirit, Jaina monks became the owner of these of liberaton, protection of body is essential. Thus, in temples, mathas and the properties donated to the these centuries accepting the exceptions was favoured. temples. It was only this period when tradition of
So far as the developments or the changes in Caityaväsa, i.e., living in the Jina temples or mathas the ethical code of conduct of monks and nuns are started. Due to the tendency of Caityavāsa Jaina concerned, the period from c. 3rd-10th A. D. must be monks became liberal to some extent in their code of considered of much importance on the two grounds. conduct. They started leading luxurious life ins-tead Firstly, in the c. 4th-5th A. D. a major diversion took of rigorous one. Inspite of these drawbacks of this place in the code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns. period one thing is very remarkable that most of the Before this said period Jaina sādhanā meant self- important Jaina literature was composed as well as purification, hence exclusively individualistic, but by written in this period. It is noteworthy that in this these centuries, instead of self-purification, stress was period (c. 4th-5th A. D.) writing of the Jaina canons laid on the propagation as well as survival of Jainism as well as other works on palm-leaves was started. in the society. As a result, instead of individual, Jaina The Bhattārakas and Yatis made better efforts to preorder (sargha ) became more important. It was main- serve the treasure trove of Jaina literature. They offertained that at any cost, the image of Jaina order (Jaina ed the medical services not only to Jaina society but society as a whole ) should not be damaged and for to the other people also. Thus, inspite of, some weakthis purpose external behaviour was considered of ness in following the religious code of conduct of much imporance than that of internal purification. A Jaina monks, they got favour of Jaina society at large slogan had been given that an action though pure, if due to their benevolent services to the society. against the general will, should not be followed. Not Development of the Concept of Tirthankara only this, but to maintain the dignity of Jaina sangha and Bhakti Movement in Jainism and propogation of Jaina religion various exceptions
The concept of Tirtharikara is the pivot,

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around which the whole Jaina religion revolves. In Jainism, Tirthankara is regarded as the founder of religion as well as the object of worship. Generally, the Jaina concept of Tirthankara resembles that of incarnation (avatāravāda ) of Hinduism. Both carry the same object as they are propounders of religion but there is a fundamental difference in both of the concepts. According to Gita, the purpose behind the incarnation of God is to propound religion and to destroy the wicked while in Jainism Tirthankara is only regarded as propounder of religion, not the destroyer of wickeds. Not only this, the second fundamental difference between avatara and Tirthankara is that, in former the supreme power or God descends on earth to reincarnate himself in different forms in different ages and in this way, He is the one and only person who reincarnates himself from time to time, on the contrary, in Jainism every Tirthankara is a differ-ent person (Soul) and on account of his special personal efforts (sādhană) made in previous births, attains the supreme position. Though, it is very difficult to say that in this entire hypothesis of twenty-four Tirthankaras and twenty-four Avataras, who has taken to what extent from whom but it is fact that in the
Chronologically, the concept of Tirthankara came into existence betweenc. 3rd-1st B. C. So far as the fully developed concept of Tirthankara is concerned, the first complete list of Tirthankaras is found in the appendix of the Samavayanga which was incorporated at the time of Valabhi council, i.e., c. 5th A.D. Among Jaina agamas the first part of Acaranga, considered as the oldest extant Jaina text (c. 5th B. C.), mentions the ascetic life of Mahavira only. Sutrakṛtänga which describes some special features of Mahavira's life only hints about Parsva's
tradition. Rṣibhāsita mentions Pārsva and Vardhamāna (Mahavira) as Arhat Rși. The second part of Acaranga, for the first time describes Mahavira as Tirthankara alongwith some details of his parents, mentioning them as Pārsvapatya. Uttaradhyayana
process of development of their concepts both have clearly mentions some of the life-incidents of
influenced each other.
The word Tirthankara is being used from time immemorial. It mainly connotes the meaning as one who eastablishes four-fold order (caturvidha sangha). According to the old Buddhist literature, such as, Dighanikaya and Suttanipata (at the time of Buddha and Mahavira) there were flourished several persons who declared themselves as Tirthankaras. Dighanikaya mentions the Jñataputra Mahavira as one of the six Buddha's contemporaneous Tirthankaras. Though, it seems quite amazing because the first Śrutaskandha of Acaranga and Sutrakṛtänga, elaborately describing the life of Mahavira, do not call him as Tirthankara. It shows that these agamic texts are

53
more older than that of Dighanikāya. In the whole Jainaagamic literature, the word 'Tirthankara' is used for the first time in Uttaradhyayana and in second part of Acaranga. Words like Arhat, Jina, Buddha are frequently used in excessive form in the old Āgamas, the synonyms of Tirthankara. Presently, the word Tirthankara has become a specific term of Jaina tradition.
Tirthankara's like Ariṣṭanemi, Pārśva and Mahavira, whereas it indicates only the name of Ṛṣabha, Śānti, Kunthu and Ara. Similarly, the Namipavajja, the 9th chapter of Uttaradhyayana, elaborately describes the facts about Nami but it does not mention Nami as Tirthankara. Even in Kalpasūtra, there are some details about the life of Mahavira, Parsva, Arişțanemi and Rṣabha out of twenty-four Tirthankaras. Remaining names of second to twenty first Tirthankaras, seem to be incorporated in the list of Tirthankaras, later on in c. 4th-5th A. D. In Digambara tradition earliest description about 24 Tirthankaras is found for the first time in Tiloyapannatti, which is supposed to be composed after c. 5th A. D. So far as iconographical

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54
Aspects of Jainology : Volume VI
evidences are concerned only images of the four Tirthankaras - Mahavira, Paráva, Ariştanemi and Rşabha - are found during c. 3rd B. C.-1st A. D. The images of other Tirthankaras are of later period, i.e., after c. 2nd-3rd A. D. This suggests that the concept of 24 Tirtharikaras came into existence only after c. 3rd. With the development of the concept of Tirtharikaras the system of their worship ( Paja- paddhati ) also came into prominence.
Jainism emerged as an ascetic religion. Initia- lly, it laid more stress on austerity and meditation. In the beginning all sorts of ceremonial or sacrificial performances (karmakānda ) were totally absent in it. It was only a religion of self-purification. In Āgamas there are no traces of ceremonial performances or any system of idol worship or religious adoration, asking for the grace of God. In Jaina tradition, for the first time the six essential duties ( sadāvaśyakas), i.e., practice for equanimity ( Sāmāyika ), praising twenty- four Tirtharkaras (Caturvimśati stavana ), paying respect to ācāryas ( vandana ), atonement of blemi- shed activities (pratikramana ), mortification (kayotsarga ) and taking some vow (pratyakhyana ) were introduced
Most probably, in c. 2nd-3rd B. C., these six essentials ( sadāvaśyakas) got ordained and established. Archaeological evidences emphatically show that in Jaina tradition, making of the Jaina images was started in c. 3rd 4th B. C., but no evidence found about the modes of worshipping these idols, particularly in ancient Āgamas. For the first time, Rayapaseniyasutta mentions the rituals of worshipp- ing of Jina-image. A comparative study proves that it was only an adoption of Hindu method of worshipp- ing their dieties. Though, some of the portions of Rayapaseniyasutta are undoubtedly old, but the portion which deals with the art of temple building and rituals relating to the worship is still older and belongs to the c. 3rd 4th A. D. To me, it appears that
the development of devotionalism and ceremonial performances in Jainism, started from c. 3rd 4th A. D. In this period, the Hindu system of ceremonial perfomance and worship was adopted in Jainism with minor changes. Starting from the period of Lord Pārsva and Mahāvira upto the c. 2nd A. D., the śramanic tradition in gene-ral and Jainism in particular joined hands in the development of new spiritualistic Hinduism, through condemning all sorts of ceremonial as well as sacri-ficial performances alongwith Vedic sacerdotalism, but Jainism itself started imitating blindly the Hindu rituals in c. 3rd4th, and thus a variety of ceremonial offerings came into existence in the Jaina religious practices. This blind adoption of Hindu practices occured not only in Śvetambara and Yapaniya tradi-tion of Northern India but in the Digambara sect of South India also. As a result, not only the Vaisnava system of worship and ceremonies started in the Jaina temples but sacrificial offerings and ladles became prevalent. Due to these influences of Hindu caste system and untouchability also paved their way in Jainism. Jaina lay-devotees started wearing brahmanical sacred thread (yajñopavita ) and performing sacrifices and sacrificial ladles. Ācāraya Jinasena (c. 8th A. D.) had adopted all the Hindu sanctifying rites (samskāras ), with some modifications in his work Adipurăņa.
Following blindly, the Hindu mantras of worshipping, Jaina lay devotees started invoking and departing the Tirtharikaras in their Paja ceremonies, while according to the Jaina philosophy the Tirtharikaras neither come nor depart after final emancipation, as well as they may not be adored as the object of worship for the worldly attainment, as they are free from all types of attachment and aversion (vitarāga ). But a lay-devotee always remains in search of such a diety who can save him from worldly calamities and help him in worldly attainments. For this purpose

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Jaina ācāryas accepted several Hindu godesses like Kali, Mahakali, Padmavati, Ambikā, Siddhāyikā, etc. as demi-goddesses (Yaksis). They accepted various rituals and incantations for worshipping these goddesses. Thus, in between c. 5th-8th A. D. several Hindu gods and godesses became part and parcel of Jaina deities. The special feature of this age was that performing arts like Dance, Music etc., which were strongly opposed in earlier agamas, such as Uttaradhyayana strongly expounds all sorts of dances as vexation and songs as lamentation, are cropped in Jaina system of worship, gradually. This description of fine arts in Rayapaseniya, as a part of Jaina way of worship was incorporated in about the c. 5th A. D. at the time of Valabhi-vacana. This depicts a complete picture of gradual development of fine arts like Sculpture, Dance, Music, Drama etc. in Jaina tradition. When the Tantrism and Vamamārga came invogue in c. 5th-6th A. D., Jainism could not save itself from the impact of these traditions. Being an ascetic and spiritual religion, Jainism was not much affected with Vamamarga but Tantrism and ceremonial performances of Hinduism definitely left their impact on it.
Archaeological evidences emphatically show that in Jaina tradition the making of Jaina images strated in c. 4th-3rd B. C. Though, on the basis of Harappan Teracotas and seals some Jaina scholars opine that tradition of making Jaina images is as old as the Harappan culture, yet it is very difficult to prove these teracotas and seals as of Jaina origin. Later, in the Khārvela epigraphs (c. 2nd B. C.) it is clearly mentioned that Nandas (c. 4th B. C.) had taken away the Jaina images from Orissa to Patna which is enough to prove that the making of Jaina

Though the development of various secular arts and sciences was a movement, independent of any religious tradition, yet it may be noted that religious traditions not only contributed in their development, but also decided the direction of development. Jainas believe that various arts and sciences were
Development of Various Arts & Architecture in developed by Lord Ṛṣabha, the first Tirthankara. In Jainism in Early Period
Jaina canonical literature 64 arts of women and 72 arts of men are mentioned. We have a general reference to these arts / sciences in Sūtrakṛtānga, Jñatadharmakatha, Antakṛddaśā, Samavāyānga, Anuttaraupapatikadaśā, Rayapaseniyasutta, Jambudvipaprajñapti, etc. Though in these canonical works we do not find any details about these yet on the basis of these works and their commentaries Dr. N. L. Jain, in his book (Scientific Contents in Prākṛta Canons, P. V., Varanasi, 1996) has presented the following list of various arts and sciences prevalent in c. 2nd-3nd A. D.
55
images was prevalent in c. 4th B. C. The earliest Jaina image, found from Lohanipur, Patna, belongs to Mauryan period (c. 3rd B. C.). Several Jaina images alongwith epigraphs have been found from Mathura and remains of Jaina temples from Kankalitila. Among those, the earliest images date from c. 2nd B. C.-2nd A. D. Many of these images are found with dated epigraphs of Kuṣaṇa period, i. e., c. 1st-2nd A. D. So far as the literary evidences are concerned, we for the first time, find in Rayapaseniyasutta, the details of temple architecture and the rituals related to idol-worship. The Rayapaseniyasutta is undoubtedly an early work, and its portion dealing with temple architecture and various performing arts, by no means, can be of later period than c. 3rd A. D., because its various incarnations (avatāras ) tally with the archaeological remains of c. 1st-2nd of Kankalitila, Mathura.

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Aspects of Jainology: Volume VI
Different Types of Learning Arts and Sciences in Various Canons
56
Number of Learnings
1. Terrestriology (Storms)
2. Meterology
3. Dreamology
4. Astrology
5. Science of Limbal Movement
6. Science of notes (birds)
7. Palmistry
8. Science of Distinctive marks in body
9. Science of Women Studies
10. Science of Men Studies
16. Science of Portridge
17. Science of Quails
18. Science of Young Quails
11. Science of Horses (Training & Management)
12. Science of Elephants (Training & Management)
13. Science of Cows and Oxen
14. Science of Sheep
15. Science of Poultry
19. Science of Royal Wheels
20. Science of Royal Umbrella
21. Science of Royal Sceptre
22. Science of Swords
23. Gemology (Precious Stones)
24. Science of Coinage, Cowries or Special Gems
25. Science of Shieldings
26. Science of Prosperity
27. Science of Fiascos
28. Science of Natural or Acquired Conception
29. Science of Stimulation
30. Atharva-vedic Incantation
31. Science of Jugglery/Magic
32. Science of Oblation with Fire
33. Archery
34. Science of Moon
1
SK

64
2
RP
72

3
AKT
72
4
GDK
72
5
ANU
72
6
JDP
72

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Historical Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion
45
35. Science of Sun 36. Science of Venus 37. Science of Jupiter 38. Meteorology 39. Science of Glow of Horizon 40. Science of Notes of Animals 41. Science of Notes of Special Birds 42. Prognostics of Dust-falls 43. Prognostics of Hair-falls 44. Prognostics of Meat-falls 45. Prognostics of Blood-falls 46. Science of Goblins 47. Science of Semi-goblins 48. Science of Sleeping 49. Science of Unlocking 50. Cāņdālic Learning/Psychotherapy 51. Shabari ( Kiratana ) Language 52. Dravida ( Tamila ) Language 53. Kalingi (Oriya ) Language 54. Gauri (A specific cardiolic) Language 55. Gandhari Language 56. Science of Descending 57. Science of Ascending 58. Science of Yawning 59. Science of Sustainance 60. Science of Embracing/Clinging 61. Science of Dispeptisation 62. Science of Surgery and Medicine 63. Demonology/De-demonology 64. Science of Invisibility/Disappearance 65. Art of Writing 66. Mathematics 67. Dramatics 68. Vocal Music 69. Instrumental Music 70. Science of Musical Notes, Phonetics 71. Science of Percussion Instruments 72. Science of Orchestra
13888888|||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 18618888I|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 1833335xillilll|||||||||||||||||||||| 153555581|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|11||||||||||||||||||||||||||||>>>>>>>>

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Aspects of Jainology : Volume VI
4
*********
73. Art of Gambling 74. Special type of Gambling/Art of Speech 75. Art of Playing by Dice 76. Art of Playing by Special Dice 77. Art of Quick Poetics/Guarding City 78. Water Purification/Ceramics 79. Food Science/Agriculture 80. Art of Soft/Medicated Drinks 81. Textiles and Fabrication 82. Cosmetics and Perfumery 83. Science of Bed-dressing 84. Art of Composing Arya-metrics 85. Art of Riddlery Poetics 86. Magadhan Language Poetics 87. Art of Comp. Non-samsksta 32 Letter Poetics 88. Art of Comp. Gitika-meter Poetics 89. Art of Comp. Anuştup-meter Poetics 90. Chemistry of Silver 91. Chemistry of Gold 92. Art of Goldsmithy 93. Women Cosmetisation 94. Building/Architectural Engineering 95. Town Planning 96. Construction of Army Barracks 97. Science of Measures 98. Astrology/Medicine/Military Science :
Counter movement of Army Art 99. Military Science : Arraying of Army 100. Cyclic Arraying of Army 101. Garudic Arraying of Army 102. Wedge Arraying 103. General Fighting 104. Wrestling 105. Intense Fighting 106. Sight Fighting/Stick Fighting 107. Fist Fighting/Boxing/Pugilistic Fighting 108. Hand-to-Hand Fighting 139. Creeperlike Fighting
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
1933393IIIIIIIIIII3935551SN
*********
3333333333 1333333333333333333333333
sesssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss
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110. Art of Divnie Arrows/Transformation
111. Art of Swordsmanship
112. Silver Digest (Pak)
113. Gold Digest (Pak)
114. Metal Digest
115. Jewel-Gem Digest
116. Rope Tricks
117. Circular Play-tricks/Playing with Fabrics 118. Special Type of Gambling (Nalika-khela )
119. Art of Piercing Leaves
120. Art of Drilling Hard Earth
121. Art of Animation/Inanimation
122. Science of Omens/Omenology
123. Sc. of Dramatic Dressing/Painting 124. Science of Planet Rahu
125. Planetology
126. Town Planning
127. Army Barracking
128. Horses Training
Historical Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion
129. Elephant Training
130. Knowledge of Special Learning
131. Science of Incarnation
132. Science of Knowing Secrets
133. Science of Direct Knowing About Objects
134. Planetory Motion/Science of Military
Movements
135. Chemistry of Perfumes
136. Art of Flowering/Tasting of Foods/ Art of
Wax-technique
137. Counter Arraying of Army
138. Art of Home Construction
139. Powder Technology
140. Art of Inanimation
141. Agriculture
142. Science of Architecture
Total

1
64
2
72

3
4
72
5
༨༨༨「 ༨ 「 │
F[| ༨ ༨༨ [ ༨ ||
[ཅེ]། ༨༨༨「 ༨ །།
72
6
「8|| ༨༨༨ [ ༨. 「| | 」
72
59

Page #39
60 Aspects of Jainology : Volume VI Conclusion To conclude, I would like to mention here some of the specialities of early Jainism. Though early Jainism was much rigorous in its code of conduct yet on the other hand it was very liberal in its approach. The earliest Jaina canonical works, Sutra- krtanga and Rsibhasita not only incorporate the preachings of the various sages of Upanisadic, Buddhists and some other Sramanic traditions, but call them Arhat, Rsis, as acceptable to their own tradition. Furthermore, Sutrakrtanga, propounding this liberalism, says "One who praises one's own views as true and condemns others view as false dis- torts the truth and remains confind to the cycle of birth and death." It was the non-violent, liberal and assimilating approach of early Jaina thinkers which gave birth to the non-absolutism (Anekantavada ), the fundamental principle of Jaina philosophy. On the basis of this principle early Jaina thinkers built their philosophical structure and developed their meta- physical and epistemological theories in which they tried to reconcile beautifully the rival views of Indian philosophy. Whether it was the question of metaphysical theories or the epistemological problems of Philosophy, they always tried for the reconciliation of the opposite conflicting views. Though, some of the basic concepts of Jaina Philosophy such as Pancastikayavada, eight types of karmagranthi and five-fold knowledge were prevalent even before the times of Lord Mahavira or of Lord Parsva, but the concepts such as three-fold nature of reality, six substances, two-fold and seven-fold divi- sion of Nayas, four-foldNiksepas, different Anuyoga dvaras and doctrine of Syadvada and Saptabhangi have developed gradually in due course of time. Barring the concept of Saptabhangi, fourteen Gunasthanas and six types of Pramanas, all other concepts of Jaina metaphysics and epistemology took their shape before c. 2nd-3rd A. D. It is the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati and its auto-commentary (c. 3rd A.D. ) in which Jaina philosophy for the first time, was presented in a systematic form. But it was not the last stage of the development of the Jaina philosophy, since various new definitions and details about these concepts were formulated even after this period which I would like to discuss in the second volume of this project. In developing their own philosophical system, Jaina thinkers while on the one hand, have accomodated various philosophical concepts of other contemporary Indian schools, on the other hand they synthesised the various contradictory theories of Indian schools of thought in such a way that the contradictions are completely dissolved in the non-absolutistic broader perspective. It is the most important contribution of early Jaina thinkers to the Indian philosophy. But in the process of adopting the thoughts and practices of other Indian systems, particularly Hinduism, caste-system, untouchability, wearing of sacred thread and various other rituals also creeped their way in Jainism. As a result spiritualistic Jainism became ritualistic. Though it was a later development (c. 6th-7th A. D.) yet, it no doubt had given some scratches to the ideal spiritualistic image of Jainism. It was necessary, perhaps, for the survival of Jainism in the middle centuries of Indian history,