Hetubindu Tika

Author(s): Dharmakirti Mahaswami, Archatt Bhatt, Durvek Mishra Pandit, Sukhlal Sanghavi, Jinvijay, B Bhattacharya
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

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beginning to a limited number of cases. But when the upholders of external concomitance (bahirvyapti) offered resistance against the view, the upholders of internal concomitance, on the plea that it is not necessary to show the external concomitance to the intelligent even though it is there, attempted at proving the universal futility of external concomitance. And from this attempt there developed a view which recognized 'logical impossibility in the absence of the other' alone as the determinant characteristic of probans and upheld internal concomitance alone as necessary. This view is found recorded in the Jaina system of logic. In the same way the conception of probans with only the positive concomitance and the conception of probans with only the negative concomitance were also established. Beside this process of formation of views a tradition of the triple characteristic of probans was constantly present, which regarded the three characteristics viz. 'existence in subject' (pakṣasattva), 'existence in the homologue' (sapakṣasattva) and 'absence in the heterologue' (vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti) as the necessary constituents of universal concomitance (vyäpti). In the absence of a separate homologue from the subject, this tradition regarded a part of the subject as the homologue; similarly, in the absence of a real heterologue it constructed an imaginary heterologue in order to show the concomitance-in-difference. And many times it regards one characteristic as implied in the other which is more apparent and thus ultimately establishes the triple characteristic. Dignaga strongly upheld this tradition and it has been elaborately defended in the Hetubindu as well. The defence is so thorough that Dharmakirtti and his commentators have refuted all those authors who supported the doctrine of five-fold, or six-fold or unitary characteristic of probans against the view of triple characteristic advanced by Dignaga and his followers. And it is because of this that Dharmakirtti regards the determination of both the positive and the negative concomitance as necessary in all the three types of probans viz. nature (svabhava), effect (karya) and non-perception (anupalambha), and shows how this is possible.
The old conception of threefold fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) was deduced from the triple characteristics viz. 'existence in the subject' and the like of the probans, accepted as the proof of necessary concomitance. Dignaga defended this conception. And Dharmakirtti has very elaborately shown in the Pramaṇavārttika and the Nyayabindu how fallacious reasons origina'e in the absence of any one, two, or all of those characteristics, and has also established that there can be only three types of fallacious reasons. This problem has not been elaborately dealt with in the Hetubindu as has been done in the Pramāṇavārttika or the Nyayabindu. The fallacious reasons have merely been mentioned therein.
Besides these main topics, a number of other important subjects which constitute the peculiarity of Buddhism has also been clearly discussed in the Hetubindu. For instance, the refutation of the doctrine of universals (jāti or samanyavāda); establishment of the doctrine of apoha as the substitute for the doctrine of universals; 1 Akalankagrarthatr aya p. 177