Hetubindu Tika

Author(s): Dharmakirti Mahaswami, Archatt Bhatt, Durvek Mishra Pandit, Sukhlal Sanghavi, Jinvijay, B Bhattacharya
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

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ed before Dignaga and Prasastapāda, although we are not definitely sure about the exact time and authorship of the work. Dignaga also has accepted these three characteristics.1 These have been enumerated in the Matharavṛtti of the Sankhyakarika as well. Paramartha translated both the Tarkasastra and the Matharavṛtti into Chinese. Although the Nyayasutra and its Bhasya have not enumerated.explicitly these three characteristics, yet the nature of probans, described in them, implies that those characteristics were accepted by them, It is not possible to ascertain exactly as to when and by whom was the number of characteristics increased to five or six, but from the fact that Dharmakirtti has refuted the conceptions of five and six characteristics, it appears that they originated in between the time of Prasastapāda and Dharmakirtti. The Jaina system accepts 'logical impossibility in the absence of the other' (anyathanupapalti) as the unitary characteristic of the probans-this can be traced in the Nyāyāvatāra.2
Dharmakirtti has not refuted this Jaina position. Whatever might be the reason for this, but, in later times, Santarakṣita and Karnagomin, the commentator of Dharmakirtti, have refuted the unitary characteristic of 'logical impossibility in the absence of the other' upheld by the] aina logicians.3
"
A number of inferences of the type illustrated by the instance of smoke-fire, which prove the existence of the cause from the existence of the effect are unanimously recognized by all the systems. But in view of the fact that different systems upheld different conceptions of reality, it was but natural that each system had some such types of inference which were not unanimously accepted as valid. When the Buddhist system establishes momentariness of all entities, it accepts 'existence as a valid probans. But the other systems do not accept the validity of this inference. 5 Similarly the non-Jaina systems do not agree when the Jaina system accepts existence as valid probans for proving 'persistence through change' (parināmitva) of all entities. We can easily give such instances of inference for every system of thought. It is because of this, as also due to the peculiar nature of entity in some cases that the types of probans become manifold. In some cases, it, is not possible to illustrate the concomitance-in-agreement of a probans with reference to entities other than the subject (paksa), but it is possible to illustrate only the concomitancein-difference. Such probans which is possessed of only concomitancein-difference (kevala-vyatirekin) has also been regarded as a valid probans. There are some probantia which do not have concomitance
1 Vide Nyāyavārttika p 136; Tātparyaṭikā, p. 198.
2 Kārikā 22.
3 Tattvasamgraha, 1364; Karṇagomin p, 9.
4 See p. 62, 145.
5 Nyayakumudacandra pp. 379.
6 lbid p. 398 and see p. 146 of the Hetubinduṭikā
7 Nyayavarttika Tatbaryatikā p. 193
iv--tg.