________________
44
FAITH KNOWLEDGE AND CONDUCT
only be in the nature of an indivisible nucleus of sensation. It cannot be an image; for in that case it will become particularized. Even a general idea of the nonvisual type must not be particularized. The general idea of the taste of the mango fruit is not the same thing as the taste of a particular mango. But it is not a part or portion of a concrete idea or sensation. For no sensation is capable of being broken up into fragments or bits, and no sensation is a compounded mixture of more than one elements or component parts.
The desire for an object, e.g., an orange, is thus a special form of the mental agitation that corresponds to the general idea of an orange, that is of as much of the orange sensation as is common to all oranges. In other words, it is a form of sensation--a kind of stock sensation if such a phrase be permissible with reference to a psychological state--which will correspond to, fit in, or harmonise with the sensations of all members of the orange species but nothing else.
A general idea may now be defined with greater precision. In respect of its substantive basis it is an indivisible aspect of the soul; in its character of knowledge it is unanalysable and beyond the senses, and felt rather than known by the finite mind; as the moving force behind an active impulse it is the mental counterpart—the better-half-of a sensation, owing its being to the combination of spirit and matter; and generally
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
