Book Title: Emptiness
Author(s): J W De Jong
Publisher: J W De Jong

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Page 4
________________ 10 J. W. DE JONG paradigmatic force of words, forming the religious truth through the use of special words or a myth. The intuitive structure presumes an absolute essence or "universal" which can be known only through a unique means of perception unlimited by particular forms (p. 151). Elsewhere, Streng says that in the intuitive structure the "real" is apprehended as the totality of all particular phenomena, which requires a mode of apprehension different from mental apprehension (p. 106). Both the intuitive and mythical structures of apprehension use words in a descriptive way, for they presume that there is a referent having static ultimate ontological status as a correlate to the descriptive term (p. 105). Nāgārjuna's negative dialectic provides a positive apprehension, not of "a thing”, but of the insight that there is no independent and absolute thing which exists externally, nor a "thing" which can be constructed (p. 148). In it the power of reason is an efficient force for realising Ultimate Truth (p. 149). In using the term "emptiness" together with his critical dialectic, Nāgārjuna expresses a religious vision which must be distinguished from the "intuition of Ultimate Reality” that denies the phenomenal world as real, and from the notion that there is Ultimate Reality which is activated to take material forms by the creative force of sacred words or sounds (p. 105). Using Streng's own words we have tried to elucidate his conception of Nāgārjuna's negative dialectic as opposed to the mythical and intuitive apprehensions. Streng attributes to the negative dialectic the insight that there is no absolute reality. How is this insight, obtained through negative dialectic, related to the activity of “wisdom” (prajñā) and to intuition? Streng devotes a special chapter to the discussion of wisdom but does not deal specifically with intuition. In this chapter wisdom is described as a means to dissipate any absolute notion about something (p. 83). It seems therefore to fulfil the same function as the negative dialectic. However, elsewhere wisdom is said to be, in part, a concentrative exercise which dissolves the mental and emotional attachment of the apparent mind to "things" (including ideas and assertions), for it is the awareness that all "things” are empty (p. 91). Wisdom and negative dialectic are clearly separated in the following passage: “The dialectical activity of the Madhyamakakārikās, informed by the wisdom (prajñā) of indifference to logical proof or refutation, is reality-being-realized” (p. 156). One has the impression that Streng has not succeeded in explaining the difference

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