Dignagas Criticism Of Mimamsaka Theory Of Perception

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

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Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory (M. Hattori)
ception (pratyakṣa) as the means of cognition consists, as the term itself signifies, in the contact of the sense with its object, and the contact of the mind with the sense as well as that of the self with the mind are not to be regarded as the means of perceptual knowledge.
(Against this criticism the Vșttikāra may raise the following objection: even when) the sense-object contact alone is thought to be the perception, that contact, (although) being effective to apprehend the object, rests on the basis of two factors, (i. e., the sense and the object,) and does not take place on the foundation of the sense alone; (hence the sense-object contact does neither befit the term 'praty.akşa'. This dissenting) opinion, (however,) should not be admitted. (As we have already stated, the sense. object contact can be properly called 'praty-akşa' on the ground that the sense is the specific factor of perception while the object is common to other
27) means of cognition.) (K, 107b. 5-7; V, 26. 3-4 (26b. 1-3))
(Dc] (In order to vindicate the sūtra, the Vșttikāra construes the term 'cognition' (buddhi) as the immediate awareness of an object and its determinant, and distinguishes it from the determinate cognition to be resulted: therethrough.) The perception, she explains,) is that through the instrumentality of which the determination (niscaya) of a certain (object, which is expressible in the form of a judgement) 'this is a cow', 'this is a horse' or the like, is produced. (As the determinate cognition is resulted by conjoin. ing the object with its determinant, the immediate awareness of these two factors must be the instrument of the determination. Therefore, he concludes, the term 'cognition in the sūtra is not unnecssary in sofar as it is taken in the above sense.) . (This interpretation) again is not tenable.
Granting it to be true that one recognizes an object as a cow when it is conjoined with the cow-ness (gotva), the sensory apprehension (akşabuddhi) is devoid of the faculty (sakti) of conjoining (tht determinant)
27) PS, I, k. 4a-b: asadharaṇa-hetutvād akşais tad vyapadiśyate. cf. PSV, ad
I, 4a-b, DTDK, p. 11.
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