Dignagas Criticism Of Mimamsaka Theory Of Perception

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269373/1

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Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory of Perception
Masaaki Hattori
When dealing with problems of perception in the first chapter of the Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga makes an attempt to refute various theories maintained by different schools. The Mimāṁsakas is exposed, no less than other schools, to the severe criticism of Dignaga. This paper is intended for tracing main arguments developed therein by Dignaga with the purpose of repudiating the Mimamsaka theory of perception.
At the outset, Dignaga makes reference to the Mimāmsaka definition of perception.
[A] The Mimāmsakas maintain as follows: 'When man's senses are in contact with existence (sat), there is the origination of a cognition; that [cognition] is the perception.' (K, 106b. 2-4; V, 25a. 3 (25a. 7-8))
The Mimāmsaka statement herein referred to is the first half of the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra, I, i, 4, the latter half of which runs as follows: 'And it is not the means of knowing Dharma, because its function consists in apprehending what is actually present.' According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's interpretation, this sūtra is meant for just explaining the incompetency of perception as the means of knowing Dharma and not for giving the definition of
2)
Abbrev. MS: Mīmāṁsā-sūtra, NR: Nyāyaratnākara, PS(V): Pramāņasamuccaya (-vṛtti), SV: Ślokavārttika, ŚVK: Ślokavārttika-kāśikā.
1) K Kanakavarman's version, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5702. V: Vasudhararakṣita's version, Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku, No. 4204, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5701. The folio number of V is indicated first according to Sde-dge edition, and then to Peking edition in parentheses. Explanatory words placed in brackets are mostly taken from Jinendrabuddhi's Visalamalavati-nama Pramanasamuccayatika (J).
2) MS, I, i, 4: sat-samprayoge puruṣasyêndriyāṇām buddhi-janma tat pratyakşam animittam vidyamanô palambhanatvāt.
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(41) Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāmsaka Theory (M. Hattori)
3) perception. On this point he contradicts the Vịttikāra who, dividing the sūtra into two parts, construes the first half thereof as the definition of perception. If the perception, Kumārila observes, is characterized merely as the origination of a cognition following from the contact of sense with existence, then there will be no way to distinguish an erroneous perception from the valid one, because even such cognition as of silver for really a white conch-shell is found to be a product of the contact of sense with what exists. As the term 'sat-samprayoga' (the contact of sense with existence) is effective only to set aside the perception in a dream, it is untenable to take the sūtra in question as the definion of perception.
Kumārila, in his construction of the sūtra, is in agreement with Śa· barasvāmin, who takes the import of the compound 'sat-samprayoga' as 'sati samprayoge (=satîndriyârtha-sambandhe)', viz., when there is the sense-object contact, and not as 'sata samprayogaḥ’, viz., the contact (of sense) with existence. There are some who, against Sabarasvāmin's interpretation, assert that the locative 'samprayoge' is, by itself, well expressive of the condition under which the perception arises. Kumārila hereupon lays emphasis on that the sense-object contact takes place at the present time: the object which comes into contact with sense must be actually present (sat=vidya
5)
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3)
Kumārila's interprétation of the sūtra is reduced by Sucarita Miśra to the following formulae : a) pratyakşam animittam, vidyamānôpalambhanatvát. b) pratyakşam vidyamānôpalambhanatvam, sat-samprayoga-jatvāt. c) pratyakşam
sat-samprayoga-jatvam, pratyakşatvat, cf. ŚVK, ad IV, 21 (p. 210). 4) ŚVK, ad IV, 1: tad idam vrtty-antare 'nimittad avacchidya tat pratyakşam
ity evam antam lakṣaṇa-param vyākhyātam. This Vịttikāra is, according to Pārthasārathi Miśra, named Bhavadāsa, cf. NR, Chowkhamba Ed., p. 133 : Bhavadasenaitat sūtram dvidha křtvā sat-samprayoge ity evam adi tat praty
akşam ity evam antam pratyakşa-lakṣaṇa-param...... 5) SV, IV, 10–11:
na câpy anena sūtrena pratyakşam lakṣyate sphuţam / tad-abhase 'pi tulyatvāt svapna-jñānaika-varjanät // tad dhîndriyârtha-samyoga-vyāpāreņa vina bhavet 1
kenacit samprayoga tu bhranty-adiḥ syān niyogataḥ 11 6) cf. Sabarabhāșya, ad MS, I, i, 4.
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Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori)
(42) māna). Thus, according to Kumārila, the compound 'sat-samprayoga' is significant of denying the possibility of the perception of Yogins, which is thought to be operative upon the past or future object.
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Now, judging from that Dignaga regards the first half of the sūtra as a definion of perception, it is conjectured that his attack is turned against the predecessors of Sabarasvamin including the Vṛttikära. He is unconscious of Śabarasvamin's view, to say nothing of Kumārila's. Special mention is made of the Vṛttikāra, but no other particular name is referred to in his discourse.
With twelve verses and the commentary thereupon, Dignaga passes strictures upon every term used in the above Mimaṁsaka definition. He treats the term 'existence' (sat) in verses 1-4, 'contact' (samprayoga) in verse 5, 'origination of a cognition' (buddhi-janman) in verses 6-11 and 'man' or 'soul' (puruşa) in verse 12. First of all, the superfluity of the term 'existence' is pointed out as follows:
(Ba) Now,
if [the Mimamsakas are of the opinion that the term] 'existence' (sat) is [used in the sutra] with the purpose of excluding 'non-existence' (dsat), [then their opinion does not hold good, because] it is naturally comprehended [by the effect of the term 'contact' that the 'non-existence' is excluded]. Under any circumstance, a sense comes into contact with 'existence' only [and never with 'non-existence']. [Therefore,] it is improper to mention [the term] 'existence' with the
9)
7) cf. SV, IV, 26-36.
8) It seems that Sabarasvamin puts his interpretation upon the sutra without bearing Dignaga's opinion in mind. From this we infer that Sabarasvamin is not much younger than Dignaga, whose date may be settled at ca. 470-530 A. D., cf. my article, ディグナーガ及びその周邊の年代 (塚本博士頌勝 **) I hereupon propose to assign Sabarasvamin to ca. 490-550 A. D. 4
9) k. 1: sad ity asad-vyudasaya na niyogat sa gamsyate /
samprayogo hi niyamat sata evô papadyate ||
cf. SVK, NR, ad IV, 36.
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(43) Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory (M. Hattori) view to negating (the contact of senses with) ‘non-existence”. (K, 106b. 3-4; V, 25a.3-4. (252.8 -25b.1))
Evidently Dignāga takes the compound 'sat-samprayoga' as implying ‘sata samprayogaḥ', and the view that the term 'sať is effective to reject the perception of Yogins is not taken into consideration by him. It is ob. vious that Kumārila, being conscious of this criticism, put a new interpretation upon the sūtra.
Now the Mimāṁsakas try to vindicate the sūtra by asserting that the term 'sat stands for the object of sense in general. This view, however, is not traced in any extant literature of the Mīmāṁsakas. Anyway, Dig. nāga assails this view through the following argument.
(Bb) If (it should be maintained that the term 'existence') implies the
counterparts (of senses),.
As the mere statement that 'senses are in contact' would induce man to query as to what are (the objects) with which senses come into contact, it should be made clear that (senses) come into contact with their coun. terparts. (Thus) the term 'existence is employed (in the sūtra) for the purpose of indicating the counterparts of senses. Even if [the Mimāṁsakas) assert in this way, (the infelicity of expression of the sūtra is not excused at all, because) (the couterparts of senses) should be expressed (clearly]by (the names
11) of) those which are determined (višeşya) by the senses. . Only those things which are determined by the senses, (i. e., colour, taste etc.) are deservedly called the counterparts of senses. (Therefore the sūtra should have mentioned definitely that man's senses are in contact with colour etc. instead of implying the counterparts of senses ambiguously by the term 'existence'.) (K, 106b. 4-6; V, 25.4–5 (25b.1-2)]
The Mīmāṁsakas do not maintain that the sense-object contact is the only necessary condition of the perceptual knowledge. The sense-organs
10) 11)
k. 2a :/ ci ste zla po bstan phyir yin/ k. 2b:/ dban po (hi) khyad par can brjod kyis /
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12)
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Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory (M. Hattori) (44) must be connected with the mind, and the mind with the soul, so that the knowledge may be produced in the soul. Accordingly, the 'existence', the contact with which is productive of a knowledge, is not confined to the object of sense. The senses and the mind are as well connoted by the term'existence'. This view of the Mimāṁsakas is now examined by Dignāga.
(Bc) (The Mimāṁsakas may try to justify the term 'existence', arguing as follows: - ) Here, (in the sūtra,) not merely the contact of senses with such objects as colour and the like, but also that of the mind (manas) with the senses and that of the soul (atman) with the mind are implied by the term 'contacť. (Although the mention is made of 'senses' only, it must be taken as synecdoche (upalaksana). Accordingly, the composer of the sūtra) used the term 'existence', thereby implying all-inclusively (those with which either of the mind and the soul come into contact).
Even if the above interpretation is put (upon the sūtra by the Mimāṁ. 'sakas, we observe that) it again is untenable, (because) • it is never inadmissible, that (the senses, the mind and the the soul can
be) in contact with 'existence only.
It has already been proved that the soul (puruşa), (the mind and the senses). come into contact solely with 'existence' because they can never operate upon 'non-existence'.
(The Mimāṁsakas may oppose our argument, citing an instance of see. ing a mirage. The fact that a traveller in the desert sometimes sees the water, which really does not exist, shows undeniably that a sense is able to come into contact with non-existence as well as with existence. Ac.
14)
12). cf. ŚV, IV, 60: yad vêndriyam pramānam syāt tasya va'rthena sangatih/
manaso vêndriyair yoga atmanā sarva eva va // 13) J, 74a. 4 (85b. 6–7): dban po rnams kyi (indriyāņām) ses paḥi tshig ni ñe
bar mtshon pahi don du ste / bya rog rnams las so sruns sig ces pa ji lta
ba bșin no șes sems na ....... 14) k. 2c-d: (K) / yod tsam ldan pas mi rtogs pa // ma yin gan sig sgrub
par byed / (V) / yod pa tsam dan phrad pa run // ma yin min te gan gis brjod /

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Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory (M. Hattori)
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cordingly, it is inadmissible to say that the soul operates merely upon 'existence and never upon ‘non-existence'. However, we are ready to reply to this Mimāṁsaka objection.) When a mirage and the like, which really do not exist, are cognized through the apparent perception, nothing, in fact, is in contact with ‘non-existence'. Nevertheless the apparent perception is produced through the following process: - A certain spot (in the desert) is, at a certain time, in a peculiar condition owing to the heat of the sun. When eyes are in contact with this spot, what is seen is) indescribable (in itself, but) the illusory mind, which functions of its own accord, constructs gradually (the determinate knowledge that the object seen is the water, despite that there is no real water. It thus is the mind that produces an apparent perception. Such being the case, there is no contact of the visual sense with ‘non-existence' even in the case of seeing a mirage.) Consequently, we can hardly approve of the Mimāṁsaka interpretation that the term 'existence in the sūtra is meant for) excluding ‘non-existence'. (K, 1061.6 - 107a.1; V, 25a.5 - 25b.1 (25b.2-6)]
Leaving out Dignāga's further arguments against the Mimāṁsaka interpretation of 'sať, we proceed to trace his critique of the concept of 'contact.
(C) (Now the meaning of the term 'contacť (samprayoga) in the sūtra will be examined.)
If (the term 'contact implies that the sensés come into) direct contact with their respective objects in all cases, then it is improper to employ
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J, 76b. 2 (86a. 5-6): bstan par bya ba ma yin pa şes pas ran gi mtshan ñid ni bstan par bya ba ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir ro /
J, 76b. 2-3 (86a. 6-7): rim gyis şes pa snar dban pohi ses pa ste / de nas ḥdra ba ñid du nes par byed paḥi yid rnam par rtog paḥoll de nas chu la sogs pa dan hdra baḥi dños po dran paḥo // deņi bar ma chad par de kho na ḥdiḥo șes paḥi ḥkhrul pa yid kyi rnam par ses pa spyi la dmigs par hgyur ro / cf. PSV, I, ad Nyāya Section k. la-b: mano-bhránti-vişayatvät, see my paper, Fragments of Pramānasamuccaya, JIBS, Vol. VII, No. 1, Frag. 2.
(Bd-a): K, 107a. 1-5; V, 25b. 1-3 (25b. 6-26a. 1). (Bd-b): K, 1072. 5-8; V, 25b. 3-5 (26a. 1-4) have been omitted.
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this term in the definition of perception.] In the cases of [seeing]) colour (rupa) [through the visual sense] and [hearing] sound (sabda) [through the auditory sense], the objects which are distant (sântara) [from] or larger (adhika) [than the sense] are found apprehended. The apprehension in these cases is at variance with [the apprehension of the object
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through] the immediate [contact of the sense with it).
If it should be maintained that the sense must come into direct contact in every case with its object, there would be no [possibility of the] apprehension of colour and that of sound [being caused, for their contact with the senses are not direct.] Both visual and auditory senses apprehend colour and sound together with intervenig space and also apprehend those objects which are larger than themselves. These two senses are never found to apprehend their objects directly with no interveing space, as is the case with apprehending smell (gandha) through the olfactory sense. [K, 107a. 8107b.2; V, 25b. 5-7 (26a. 4-5)]
There is a divergence of opinion among schools in regard to the senseobject contact as a condition of perceptual knowledge. The Buddhists establish the theory that the senses of sight and hearing function without actual contact with the objects. In other words, both visual and auditory senses are 'distance receptors' (aprapyakarin), while other senses requires immediate contact with their objects (prapyakarin). Again, they hold that the eye and the ear, unlike the senses of smell, taste and touch, can perceive objects much larger than themselves. On the other hand, the Mimāmsakas are in concert with the Naiyayikas in holding that all senses act in actual contact with their objects. The visual sense reaches out to its object, and the auditory sense comes into contact with the sound-waves sent by the object. As to the rest, there may be no question. Thus the Mimaṁsaka theory
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18) k.5: kun tu don dan phrad gran na // gzugs sgra bar du chod pa dan / /chen pohan ḥdsin par mthon bas na // bar du ma chod pa la gnod / (V) 19) cf. Abhidharmakośa, I, k. 44:
caksu-śrotra-mano 'prapta-visayam trayam anyatha
tribhir ghran' adibhis tulya-viṣaya-grahanam matam ||
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20)
21)
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(47) Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory(M. Hattori) is not acceptable from the Buddhist viewpoint. Dignāga offers the same criticism to the Naiyāyikas too.
(Da) According to a certain Mimamsa advocate, the assemblage (samagri) of the factors of cognition is the means of cognition (pramāņa), because the cognition as the resulted content is produced through the
instrumentality of it.
The Vţttikāra holds the opinion that the cognition as the resulted con. tent is different (from the means of cognition). As there is, he maintains, no other result than the origination of a cognition (buddhi-janman), what gives rise to a cognition must be regarded as the means of cognition. And, at the time (of the origination of a cognition), nothing can be its cause but the abovesaid conjunction (samprayoga) of the soul and other (factors, viz., mind, sense-organ and object), which has been defined as the perception (pratyakşa), together with the impulse (to produce a cognition, which is given to the soul by that conjunction. Therefore, it is the assemblage of above-mentioned four factors that should be recognized as the means of perception.)
(This argument, is not free from being exposed to our criticism.)
Should it and none other be (the perception),
In case the assemblage of factors and none other should be called the perception,
what would be the use of the term 'origination of a cognition' (bud.
dhi-janman) (in the sūtra)?
If (the perception as the means of cognition should be taken in the sense) as has been explained (by the Vșttikāra), then the sūtra should
23)
23)
20) PSV, I, Nyāya Section k. 2a-b: sântara-grahanam na syat praptau jnane
dhikasya ca / cf. SVK, ad IV, 41, Nyayavārttika-tatparya-ţikā, p. 118, Randle, Fragments from Dinnaga, p. 14, HJU, E VRO
+ # # # ( #*#ORART XXI) p. 63 ff. 21) Owing to limited space, the explanations will be omitted henceforward. 22) k. 6a-b:/ blo yi rgyu yi tshogs pa dag // brjod las hgrol bahi tshad ma gan / 23) k. 6c-d :/ gan las ci ste hdi ñid na ll de blo skye ba ci şig bya /
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24)
Dignāga’s Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory(M. Hattori) (48) have (simply) stated that man's sense which is in contact with existence is the perception. In such case, what is the use of the term ‘origination of a cognition', which has been explained above as being resulted from that (sense-object contact ? The cognition as the resulted content being assumed by him to be different from the means of cognition, the sūtra which is intended for giving the definition of the perception as the means, should have omitted the unnecessry term implying the result.)
(It may be argued that the term origination of a cognition' is necessary so that such sense-object contact that is not productive of any result may be excluded. However, there is no need of such consideration, as the sense-object contact does never fail to produce the perceptul knowledge.) (K, 107b. 2-5; V, 25b.7 – 26a.3 (262.6 – 26b. 1)]
(Db) Further, the above argument involves the following difficulty).
Inasmuch as (the Vsttikāra maintains that the object, the sense, the mind and the self, which are conjoined with each other, along with the impulse (to produce cognition should be considered as the means of cognition, he must be asked) why the assemblage (of these factors) of the origination of a cognition should be called “praty-akşa' (being direct to the sense) (instead of being called 'prati-sāmagri (being direct to the assemblage) or otherwise).
The assemblage of all these (factors) is not fit to be called 'praty. akşa', which literally means what functions in direct connecton with each sense (akşam akşam prati vartate). The characteristic feature of the per
25)
26)
24) cf. J, 78a. 2-3 (875.8-88a.1). 25). k. 7:/ gan tshe don dan dban po yid // skyes bu sbyor ba ḥdu byed Idan/
/blo skye ba yi tshogs pa la ll, mňon sum brjod pa de ci ltar / 26) This is Dignāga's etymological explanation of 'pratyakşa', cf. Nyayamukha
(Chin. version), Taisho, XXXI, p. 3b: S h i, Prasannapada, p. 72, Dharmottarapradipa, p. 38, Tattvasamgraha-Panjika, ad k. 1237. cf. also my paper, Dignāga's Theory of Direct Knowledge (henceforth referred to as DTDK), Bulletin of the Unio. of Osaka Phefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7, p. 6, note 13.
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Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory (M. Hattori)
ception (pratyakṣa) as the means of cognition consists, as the term itself signifies, in the contact of the sense with its object, and the contact of the mind with the sense as well as that of the self with the mind are not to be regarded as the means of perceptual knowledge.
(Against this criticism the Vșttikāra may raise the following objection: even when) the sense-object contact alone is thought to be the perception, that contact, (although) being effective to apprehend the object, rests on the basis of two factors, (i. e., the sense and the object,) and does not take place on the foundation of the sense alone; (hence the sense-object contact does neither befit the term 'praty.akşa'. This dissenting) opinion, (however,) should not be admitted. (As we have already stated, the sense. object contact can be properly called 'praty-akşa' on the ground that the sense is the specific factor of perception while the object is common to other
27) means of cognition.) (K, 107b. 5-7; V, 26. 3-4 (26b. 1-3))
(Dc] (In order to vindicate the sūtra, the Vșttikāra construes the term 'cognition' (buddhi) as the immediate awareness of an object and its determinant, and distinguishes it from the determinate cognition to be resulted: therethrough.) The perception, she explains,) is that through the instrumentality of which the determination (niscaya) of a certain (object, which is expressible in the form of a judgement) 'this is a cow', 'this is a horse' or the like, is produced. (As the determinate cognition is resulted by conjoin. ing the object with its determinant, the immediate awareness of these two factors must be the instrument of the determination. Therefore, he concludes, the term 'cognition in the sūtra is not unnecssary in sofar as it is taken in the above sense.) . (This interpretation) again is not tenable.
Granting it to be true that one recognizes an object as a cow when it is conjoined with the cow-ness (gotva), the sensory apprehension (akşabuddhi) is devoid of the faculty (sakti) of conjoining (tht determinant)
27) PS, I, k. 4a-b: asadharaṇa-hetutvād akşais tad vyapadiśyate. cf. PSV, ad
I, 4a-b, DTDK, p. 11.
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Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory (M. Hattori)
with the thing (perceived by itself. Therefore the determinate cog
28) nition cannot be resulted by the sensory apprehension.)
According to the opponent's view, the sensory apprehension is competent to get an immediate awareness (alocana) of a cow itself shorn of any determinant as well as of that upon which it depends (aśraya), (i. e., its determinant 'cow-ness”). Admitting that this view is right so far, it is impossible (for the sensory apprehension) to conjoin these two factors
her. And where there is no conjunction of a bare thing with its determinant, there can be no means of determining that thing to be, for instance, a cow. In conclusion, we consider that all sorts of conceptual knowledge concerning the relation of the determinant and the determined (višeșaņa-viseșya) or of the name and the named (abhidhana-abhidheya) are but the subjective construction (upacāra) of the mind, and they are not within the range of sensory apprehension. For,
it is the self-cognizable, inexpressible form that becomes the object of . . sense.
Although the thing to be apprehended by the sense is composed of many elements, what presents itself to the sense is a particular (asadhāraņa) form, which causes the cognition thereof to originate. (This particular form pre
29)
28) k. 8:, ba lan ñid sogs ldan las don // ba lan la sogs hjal bar byed // don dan
yan dag hbrel pa la // dban pohi blo ni nus yod min / The same argument is found in PSV, I, ad Vaisesika Section k. la-b. cf. my paper, 7,-
TOMT 12 +-### t BECAME). Jinendrabuddhi, in the course of his comment on Dignāga's Vștti annexed to this verse, says as follows :/ ho na gzegs zan brtag par don ḥdi / yul la lta don can ñid kyi phyir, khyad par rnams kyis mtshams sbyor min/ (PS ,1, Vaiseșika Section k. la-b) șes pa bsad zin pa kho na stel de slar yan brjod pa ci șe na / de kho na/ ran gi rigs bya ses pa la sogs pas bar ma chad par hgyur
baḥi rigs pas / sin tu gsal bar byas paḥi don duḥo / J. 79a. 2-3 (89a. 2-3). 29) k. 9a-b:/ rig bya ran ñid bstan med pal/ gzugs don dban pohi spyod yul
lo/ This verse exactly coincides with PS, I, k. 5c-d: svasamved yam anir. deśyam rūpam indriya-gocaraḥ/ cf. DTDK, p. 13, note 34. cf. also J, 79a. 5-6 (89a. 7): ran gis rig bya ni şes pa la sogs pas......hdi yan du maņi no bohi chos can ni (dharmiņo 'neka-rūpasya......PS, I, k. 5) ses pa ḥdiņi nan du bśad zin to /
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30)
31)
(51) Dignāga's Criticism of the Mimāṁsaka Theory(M. Hartori) sented to the sense is deemed, from another point of view, to be the ob. jective side of the cognition itself and, therefore,] is self-cognizable or self-luminous like the cognition itself. (That is to say, the cognition of this particular form does not connote any subject-object relation in its constitution.) As such, (the object of the sense) is inexpressible, because what is expressible is only the universal properties of the object. (K, 107b. 7-108a. 4; V, 26a.4 - 26b.2 (26b.3 - 27a.1))
(De) If it should be maintained that the means of cognition consists
in) the origination of a cognition (buddhi-janman),
(Now the Mimāṁsakas may harbor), a doubt (against our argument, asserting) that the perception is learnt universally to be the origination of a cognition concerning a certain thing. Confronting this doubt, we answer as follows: (if the origination of a cognition should be considered to be the means of cognition (pramaņa),]
those who maintain that the result is different from the means would get into self-contradiction, for it) would then be impossible to find
the result other (than the means). Why is it impossible ?
Now that the very cognition has originated, (there is) no (need of any)
other result being produced.
The result to be produced through the means of cognition is the appre. hension (adhigama) (of an object), which, however, is nothing else than the cognition (buddhi). Accordingly, should the cognition (itself) be regard. ed as the means of cognition, there could be no result (to be distinguished from that means, and the Mīmāṁsakas would inevitably be led to the disaffirmance of the theory that the means and the result of cognition are different from each other). (K, 108a. 1-3 ; V, 26b. 6–27a. 1 (27a. 6-8)]
(Df) In case the origination' (janman) is distinguished from the cog.
32)
33)
30) (Dd) K, 108a. 4-108b. 1; V. 26b. 2-6 (27a, 1-6) has been omitted. 31) k. 10a :/ ci ste blo skye bar ḥdod na / 32) k. 10b :/ hbras bu gşan ni rñed ma yin/ 33) k. 10c-d :/ blo ñid skye ba yin na ni // de las gşan pa hbras bu med //
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Dignāga’s Criticism of the Mimāņsaka Theory(M. Hattori)
(52)
34)
35)
nition' (buddhi), (then it must be recognized that the former is the effect (kärya) of the latter. As the relation of an effect to its cause (kāraṇa) is thought to be the intimate relation (samavāya), it follows that the 'origination') is intimately related to its own cause, (namely the 'cognition'. Accordingly, it may well be conceived here that the origination' is resulted through the instrumentality of the intimate relation, which, in this respect,) is deemed to be) the means (pramāņa) (in regard to the origination of a cognition). Even so, however, how can (the
35) intimate relation, which is perpetually present (nitya),] be the means
[of the origination' which naturally is limited in time) ?
The Vaišeșikas hold the view that the ‘origination' as the effect [of a cognition) is intimately related either to its own cause, viz., the cognition, or to the universal existence (satta), [attribute-ness (guņatva), cognition. hood (buddhitva)) and so on, (which are the universals related to the cognition. On this point the Mīmaņsakas are in concert with them.)
· There, if we admit, in accordance with their view, that the ‘origination of a sensory apprehension is resulted through that intimate relation, then it follows as a necessary consequence that the intimate relation is the means in regard to the origination) of a perceptual knowledge. In fact, however, the intimate relation, being perpetually present, has no concern with the ‘origination'. Accordingly, it hardly stands to reason to presume that the origination of a sensory apprehension is resulted through
37)
38)
34) cf. Kanādasūtra-vivști, ad VII, ii, 26 : karya-kāraṇayor avayavåvayavinor
yataḥ samband hat ihêdam iti pratyayaḥ sa samavāyaḥ. 35) Regarding the nityatva of samavāya, cf. Vaisesikasūtrô paskāra, ad VII, ii,
26, Athalye, Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatta, Bombay Skt. Ser., p. 97. 36) k. lla-c:/ gal te blo las skye gşan
ma yin yan gan las der / cf. NR, ad IV, 53: yadi buddher arthåtaran janma, tat kis vaišesikoktah karane karyasya samavaya iti cen na. tasya
nityatvenâkşånadhinatvāt pratyakşatvánupapatteh. cf. also ŚVK, ad IV, 53. 37) cf. J, 80b. 1 (906. 5) 38) J, 80b. 2 (90b. 5): dpyod pa pa rnams kyis kyan deņi (=ka na bhu dzā
yi) lugs kho na la brten to /
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(53) Dignaga's Criticism of the Mimamsaka Theory (M. Hattori) 39) 40) the instrumentality of the intimate relation in either case (when the origination is intimately related to the cognition or to the universal existence and so on). If, (on the other hand, the origination' is) not distinguished (from the cognition), then the term "origination' will be meaningless. In case the origination does not differ from the cognition, then the purport of the sutra will be well conveyed by the term 'cognition' alone.) As the term 'cognition' is expressive of that the cognition is the means of perceptual knowledge, it does not make any sense to reiterate the import by the term 'origination'. (K, 108.3-6 ; V, 27.1-3 (27a.8 - 27b.3)] (E) If the soul should come to be modified at the time when a cognition originates, then it would be non-eternal. If it be maintained that the soul (purusa) operates upon the object, changing its previous state due to the origination of a cognition, the soul must be recognized as transient (anitya). This assumption, however, is inadmissible (for the Mimamsakas who maintain the eternity of the soul). If, on the other hand, the soul should remain unmodified even when a cognition originates, it cannot be a cognizer (pramats). It again is inconsistent to maintain that the unchangeable soul, which, even at the moment of the origination of a cognition, does not alter its previous state of non-cognizerhood, is nevertheless presumed to be a cognizer. (K, 1082.6 - 109a.1 ; V, 27a.3-4 (27b.3-6)] The theories of perception set forth by others do not, as have been examined above, establish that the very perception is the means of valid cognition, as many faulty expressions are found therein. 40) 39) k. 11d: ci ste gsan min brjod don med / cf. NR, SVK, ad IV, 53. 40) k. 12: buddhi-janmani putsas ca vikrtir yady anityata / athavikftir atmayam pramateti na yujyate // cf. SVK, ad IV, 53, Tattvasarngraha-panjika, introd. to k. 273 (p. 108). NR, ad IV, 53: kah punah purusah, na taval laukikah kayah, tasyacetanatvat. atha atma, sa yadi buddhi-janmana vikriyate, ksiravad anityah syat, avikriyatve va purvavad apramatstvad asat-tulyah syat, yatha'ha-buddhi-janmani...... - 711 -