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CONTEMPORARY VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY, CONTINUED
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by the not-self and so become an object. Reality cannot be found in a unity of self and not-self (such as knowledge or will)—for the unity would be apprehended and consequently objective and consequently not-self, since the subject which includes all objects cannot itself be included in any possible whole. Reality cannot be found in the not-self alone--for this as objective must always be object for a subject, the object being constituted an object by the subject which knows it and so being necessarily related to the subject, apart from which it is nothing. Ergo, reality can be found in the self alone. There is no similar necessity for the subject to be subject for an object, for the subject, which is not known, has being in itself, not through knowledge, and so is free, not necessarily related. The self, consequently, is the only reality-"one without a second” (advaita), tolerating only an illusory, not a real, other.
The epistemological argument is based on the usual arguments for subjective idealism derived from the conditions of experience. Whether we approach the problem through the physiological conditions of sensation, the form of the conscious field, or the categories of thought, we conclude that the objects of knowledge are at least partly determined by the knowing self and so are a priori or subjective. Some objects are conceded by all to be completely illusory—including both percepts (objective illusion, especially dreams) and mental events (subjective illusion, especially false memory). But there is no ground for distinguishing true from illusory perception, either in the object, which in the case of illusory perception does not exist, or in the structure of the perception, else we would be able to distinguish them and so never suffer illusion." But even supposedly real objects are determined at least partly, by the subject's contribution to their knowledge. Knowledge of objects is thus an internal relation, but this is opposed to the very concept of knowledge, which is awareness of something really existing prior to and independent of the knowl
17 Both dreaming and dreamless sleep have metaphysical significance. The former proves that appearance of the object does not signify its reality; the latter, that non-appearance of the object does not signify non-being of the subject.
