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GEORGE BURCH
Although Malkani maintains that his theory of the self (ekajivavada) is orthodox Advaita, he concedes that his theory of ignorance is different from that of orthodox Advaita. This, therefore, is the most original part of Malkani's philosophy, and should be distinguished from the corresponding doctrine of traditional Advaita. According to orthodox Advaita, ignorance (ajnana) has two aspects, mere ignorance, the negative power of concealing truth, and illusion, the positive power of creating error. Error occurs, and so has a cause, but ignorance has no beginning (though it may, indeed must, have an end), and so has no cause. Ignorance has no explanation, but exists beside Brahman, not as a second reality, but somehow as a second principle. 'Brahman conditioned by ignorance (which is God according to realism, jiva according to subjectivism) creates the world (including all individuals) by illusion. Ignorance therefore is prior to error, a necessary though not sufficient condition of error, the material cause, as it were, of error. According to Malkani, on the contrary, error is prior to ignorance. Ignorance, which merely conceals truth without offering any alternative, cannot produce any positive error. Error or illusion, however, being false, necessarily produces ignorance of truth. Ignorance, therefore, can be explained. But error or illusion cannot be explained logically. We arrive at illusory experience by superimposing, on the real ground, errors derived from previous errors. Psychologically errors are caused by desires, but desires in turn are caused by errors, in infinite regress. Error has no beginning and so no first cause. Error (maya), not ignorance (ajnana), is the inexplicable first cause of all illusion,
24 In Philosophy of the Self (1939, p. 12), Malkani says: "If there is any ultimate cause for the illusory appearances, it can be no other than our ignorance of reality. ... The illusory is essentially irrational. It should not be. The fact that we do take note of it, cannot be traced to reality, which should be the case with all legitimate explanation; it can only be traced to our ignorance of reality, which is the ultimate principle of irrationality." Malkani's present position seems to involve a repudiation of this statement. Cf. a recent statement (Philosophical Quarterly [January 1956], p. 246): "What is natural to us is error, and error is never pure,- it is always mixed with truth. To get at the truth, all we have to do is to negate the error."
