Anandrushi Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Vijaymuni Shastri, Devendramuni
Publisher: Maharashtra Sthanakwasi Jain Sangh Puna

Page 770

The Jaina Idea of Universe
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It is not maintained these six causes created the world at some particular time ; but they are eternally existing, uncreated and with no beginning in time. As substances, they are eternal and unchanging ; but their modifications are passing through a flux of changes. Their mutual co-operation and inter action explain all that we imply by term 'creation. There are always two causes in any event, namely, the Upādāna (substantial cause) and the Nimitta (instrumental cause). Viz. fire would be the instrumental cause determining water to boil, water being the substantial cause of the event 'boiling'. Each of the above named six substances or realities is both substantial cause and instrumental cause, each act upon the others and is itself acted upon by the others. Each has the power of originating new states, destroying old ones and keeping permanent. The basic substance with its qualities is something that is permanent, while the modes or accidental characters appear and disappear. Viz. the soul is eternal with its inseperable character of consciousness; but at the same time it is subjected to accidental characters like pleasure and pain and super-imposed modes such as body, etc. both of which changing constantly. This power is called 'satta.' It is not a separate entity existing outside these six realities. It is a power inherent in them and inseparable from them.
The modern metaphysics also proved “Nothing new is created, nothing is destroyed, only 'modifications appear. Nothing comes out of nothing, nothing altogether goes out of existance ; but only substances are modified."
As Jainism is a dynamic realism, its doctrine is similar to the views held by the philosophers in the West, especially those belonging to the Realistic School. The Jaina conception of Dravya, Guņa and Paryāya is approximately similar to Spinoza's view of substance, attributes and modes, though he uses the terms 'attribute' with a technical meaning, while in Jaina metaphysics it means qualities. Hegal had a conception of reality similar to the Jaina concep. tion of Dravya. Sattā and Dravya are one and the same as Hegal maintained. Thing-in-itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravyas refer to facts of experience and Sattă refers to existence or reality. The French philosopher Bergson also recognised substance as a permanent thing existing through change.
The position is the same in Jainism and Sānkhya so far as the initial start is concerned. One accepts the thesis and antithesis of Jiva and Ajiva and the other of Purusa and Praksti. Thus, both are dualistic or even pluralistic in view. But in Jaina System, Jiva is an active agent, while in Sänkya system Puruşa is always Udāsina (indifferent) and is only a passive spectator. Jainism is a realistic religion with a philosophical background, while Sankhya remained till the end only a system of intellectual pursuit.
Jainism and Mimāṁsakas agree in holding that Atman is constituted of Caitanya and that there is a multitude of separate souls. But according to Jainism, pleasure and pain come to be experienced because of Karmic association; while Mimāṁsakas simply say that they are changes in the soul. In the condition of liberation, the soul, according to Mimāṁsakas, exists without
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