Jain Journal 1971 10

SR No.: 520024
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 45
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, India_Jain Journal, & India
File Size: 3 MB

Page 18

OCTOBER, 1971
55
(B) 2.
self-con
Since, the real is free from self-contradiction ; And, the (phenomenal) world is not free from tradiction ; Hence, the world is not real.
(B) 3.
Since, the real is free from self-contradiction ;
or
What is free from self-contradiction is real ; (By simple conversion, granting that the subject and predicate are equal denotatively) And, Brahman is what is free from self-contradiction ; Hence, Brahman is real.
Now let us compare the tripartite arguments in group 'B') in regard to the Brahman with the same in group 'A') in regard to the rope-snake illusion :
With regard to the syllogism No. 1 in both the groups we find, that the syllogism No. (A)1 consists of two obvious fallacies : the first is formal, i.e., the undistributed middle which is not visible in the syllogism No. (B)1 ; the second is material in the sense, that the predicate in major premise does not express the essential attribute of the reality in subject, while it does in (B)1, due to which the proposition of major premise can be turned into simple-converse in the syllogism (B)1, but not so in (A)1. Consequently, the syllogism (B)1 is valid in all respects, while the (A)1 is not. In order to contradict the argument embodied in (A)1 no other argument, save its own one, is needed. It can be refuted for its own constitutional demerit. For it is invalid on account of its own inherent fallacy lying in the universal concommitance between the middle and the major terms, whereas no such fallacy is discoverable in syllogism (B)1. With respect to the conclusions of first syllogisms in both the groups we may observe that both of them carry the material truth, but the conclusion of (A)1 appears to be unproved (asiddha) merely on the basis of logical analysis of the construction of syllogism, without seeking help of any counter-balancing syllogism. Still it is counterbalanced by the contradictory conclusion of (A)2, thus being refuted by double weight ; whereas in group (B) syllogisms No. 2 and 3 do not counterbalance the syllogism No 1 in that way. The latter is, in no way, unproved.
After reviewing the minor premises we find, that all the minor premises in group (A) reveal uniformly the same subject predicated diversely in different syllogisms, which is clear from the following: