Jain Journal 1971 10

SR No.: 520024
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 45
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, India_Jain Journal, & India
File Size: 3 MB

Page 17

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out, that when such analogy was employed to prove the existence of Brahman, we have to accept, for the sake of discovering argumental parity between rope-knowledge and Brahman-knowledge, certain facts as hitherto deduced in the factual analysis of the rope-snake illusion.
JAIN JOURNAL
On the basis of the deduction No. 1 it is proved that the propositions concerning Brahman and Māyā are objective. By having accepted objectivity Sankara distinguished himself from the school of SubjectiveIdealism of Vijñāna-vādins, and thus he polemized Vijñāna-vādins with no reservation.
When the fact regarding objectivity was acceded to, its corrolary automatically came to view. The corrolary is, that the object, which was denoted as snake and later as rope remained unaffected existentially. Change took place only in the form of cognition, not in the substance of the object cognized. Hence from the viewpoint of the existence the cognizer and the cognized-cognized either in the form of snake or rope -emerged as two absolute entities. Now, if on the basis of this analogy, Sankara-vādin proves the world-knowledge as real and also the substantial existence of the world as unreal, then he denies the premises established by himself. Till the Brahma-jñāna (knowledge of the Ultimate) persists as jñāna (knowledge) like rope-jñāna, Brahman can not be other than a thing cognized duly distinguished from the existence of cognizer. In this way, on the basis of this analogy dualism cannot be reconciled. It is for this perennial fault, Sankara shifts to another analogy of 'dream' (svapna), through which he, in order to prove the non-dualism of the Ultimate, tries to maintain, that the snakeknowledge is dreamy, which is contradicted subsequently in the waking reality. But this analogy is entailed by an automatic conclusion that the knowledge of snake was not based on any objective reality, but like subjective existence it was mere imaginary. Then, is this position some way different from that of Vijñāna-vādins ? Moreover, how is this analogy of dream-illusion consistent with that of snake-illusion?
Advaita-vādins, in order to prove their verdict: "The Brahman is real and the world is unreal' (Brahma satyam jaganmithya) appear to proceed with the following train of arguments :
(B) 1. Since, for all the circumstances, the world is multiphased and phenomenal ;
or
What is multiphased and phenomenal is the world (Granting that the subject and predicate are equal denotatively); And, this (reality) is so;
Hence, this is the world.