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The statement that a substance, while undergoing decay, produces a subsequent substance, is not justified. If we accept this, it is clear that both substances would exist simultaneously, which contradicts the principle of क्षणभंगवाद (Kṣaṇabhanga). The decay of a substance is not separate from the substance itself; it is inseparable. Similarly, the state of being produced (उत्पन्नमान) is inseparable from the substance being produced.
It is important to consider that accepting both production and decay simultaneously would imply that the previous substance and the subsequent substance, along with their inherent qualities, would exist simultaneously. If production and decay are not considered inherent qualities of substances, then they would not be considered objects at all; their existence as objects would not occur.
The statement that the production of substances is the cause of their destruction can be refuted as follows: If the production of substances were the cause of their destruction, then no substance should ever be produced, because the cause of their destruction (production) is already present. If we say that destruction occurs after production, then it would occur at the time of production, or at the very next moment after production. It would not occur after a long time. Why is this? How can this be refuted? If we say that the cause of destruction does not exist, then destruction would not occur after a long time, because it has been said that destruction occurs without a cause; it is inherent. This statement is also not justified, because we see in the world that the destruction of a pot, etc., occurs only after being struck by a hammer, etc. If you say that we have already stated that a hammer, etc., cannot destroy a pot, etc., then this is not factual. You may have said this, but simply saying it does not make it true. Your statement is not based on logic, because according to the meaning of नय (naya) in the context of absence (अभाव), based on पर्युदास (paryudāsa) and प्रसज्जप्रतिषेध (prasajjapratiṣedha), a hammer, etc., produces pieces of the pot in the form of shards, etc., separate from the pot. The pot is impermanent (अनित्य) and subject to change (परिणमनशील), so it transforms into shards. Therefore, how can a hammer, etc., not destroy a pot? प्रसज्जप्रतिषेध prohibits action, which cannot be accepted here. However, among the different types of absence (अभाव) – प्राग्भाव (prāgabhāva), प्रध्वंसाभाव (pradhvaṃsābhāva), अत्यंताभाव (atyantābhāva), and अन्योन्याभाव (anyonyābhāva) – प्रध्वंसाभाव is accepted here. In प्रध्वंसाभाव, the action of the cause is involved. In fact, it is a synonym for a substance, a particular state or condition of the substance, not just absence. That state or condition is भाव (bhāva) – a state of being. Therefore, it arises by destroying the previous state. Thus, the production of shards, etc., is the destruction of the pot. This proves that destruction is caused by a cause. It is produced by a cause. It is कादाचित्क (kādaचितka) – it happens sometimes, not always. Therefore, it is also proven that it is caused by a cause.
To maintain the proper order of substances, it is necessary to accept four types of absence. It has been said that if we reject प्राग्भाव (prāgabhāva), then there will be no substance, etc., in the form of an effect. There will be no beginning or origin of any effect. If we do not accept प्रध्वंसाभाव (pradhvaṃsābhāva), then there will be no end (प्रच्यव) of a substance; it will become infinite. If we contradict अन्योन्याभाव (anyonyābhāva), then its existence will be accepted.