________________
31.
Problem of Philosophy, Chin. 6
The justification of Induction. The concept of Inductive evidence by Wesley, c. Salmon, Ox Induction, Chap. 3. p. 4.
33.
The tank o€ Inductive Philosophy is not the Just 14h. cation of Induction but the reformulation of our Iwuctive Intentions ....... In any case ultimate appel for the justification Inductive rules is our intutive sense for the concept of Inductive evidence.
Ihia, p. 52.
34,
The problem is can be give reasons for preferring our unage intutions and behaviour to the alternatives ? It we can that will be the justification of Induction.
Ibid. p. 56.
35.
.... I fully agree with him that it it to conceivable
that Induction might be less successful than some other way of reasoning, this is conceivable, and it is a logicni possibility, but it 1.not proble that any Inductive practice will be as muccessful in the long run as Induction will be.
Ibia, (Is there a problem Induction, second part of SyRiposiwn on Inductive evidence), Chap. 3.
36,
Problem is why is the fact that Induction is probably relimblo any real mason for relying upon Induction. Why should we prefer probable conclusion to improbable ones,
Ibid. p. 59.
