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276
NOTRS
P. 57, H. 10-11
former, the negative is connected with the verb: in the latter, it is generally compounded with some other word; as, for example, (a) Not & drum wag heard, not a funeral note. (b) Unwatched the garden bough shall sway. The former corresponds to the logiciars' atyantābhāva, the latter to anyonyabhāva or bheda".
Both the forms of negation occur in Mahābhäşya on Astādhyāyī (I, 4, 50) and in Vākyapadiya (II, 86). Verses defining the two are quoted in Sahityadarpana (ch. VII, p. 214) as under:
"347age HST U TOTI 'प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधो ऽसौ क्रियया सह यत्र नम् ॥" "प्रधानत्वं विधेयंत्र प्रतिषेधेऽप्रधानता।
fogata:' = fanget alatida tal?" The word 'prasajya-pratişedha' occurs on p. 207, 1. 6 and in Vol. II, p. 217, 16 & p. 218, 1. 4, too.
The word 'paryudāsa' oecurs on p. 208, 1. 3 and in Vol. II, p. 218, 1. 4 and in Sabara-blāsya.
P. 58, 1. 9. Arhan-mata' means Jainism--a system propounded by az Arhat, a Jaina Tirthankara.
P. 59, 11, 6 ff. Every thing is both existing and non-existing.
P. 60 II. 7–8. augfah alat means put forward by one whose intelligence is as sharp as the point of the blade of the kus'a' grass. Kus'āgrabuddhi' hence means having a penetrating-sharp intellect. On p. 128, I. 26 and in Vol. II on p. 175, 1, 10; & p. 176, 1. 13 we have f ragt which, too, means the same. Kusa'a Pāîya equivalent of 'kus'a' occurs in Vivāgasuya (1, 6; para 121).
P. 60, I. 14. Mecaka' is a homonym. Here it means a kind of gem. It has five colours (vide“ Notes" p. 378 on SM).
The word 'mecaka' occurs on p. 130, 1. 9; p. 159, 11. 7 &24; p. 160, I. 11; and p. 302, II. 4 & 16.
P. 62, 11. 7-8. These lines form an answer to the objection raised on p. 11, II. 4-6. The existence does not reside by totally avoiding nonexistence. But they somehow co-reside.
P. 65, 11. 4-5. This verse differs very little from one on p. 11. The slight variation introduced here turns the allegation into refutation! It is thus & pūrva-paksa-śloka-parāvartanā. For parallel examples see infra,
P. 65, I. 10. As already mentioned here in “Notes" (p. 260) the Jainas do not look upon dharmin as absolutely distinct from dharma, but they look upon them as distinct from one viow-point and non-distinct from another view-point. They do not deny the distinction in a certain sense between dharmin and dharma, but they do deny absolute distinction between them. If there was absolute distinction there can be no such
1 Quoted from Laukikanyāyāñjali (pt. II, p. 60).