ISJS Jainism Study Notes E5 Vol 02

SR No.: 007712
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: International School for Jain Studies
Publisher: International School for Jain Studies
Publication Year: 2012
Total Pages: 404
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 13 MB

Page 148

2. The second proposition is: Syāt pen does not exist. The proposition does not, as it
seems, negate the existence of pen referred to in the first propositions, but it states the non-existence of pen in respect of other Dravya, Ksetra, Kāla, and Bhāva. Thus it strengthens the first propositions rather than cancels it. The pen is pen only because it is not pen. In other words the existence of pen in respect of its own Dravya, Ksetra, Kāla, and Bhāva cannot maintain its identity, if non-existence of pen in respect of other Dravya, Ksetra, Kāla, and Bhāva is not considered the concomitant aspect of pen. Thus both existence and non-existence is co-present in the pen without any contradiction. According to the Jaina, non-existence is as much constitutive of the nature of thing as existence. The critics fail to see that contradictory statement can be made about a thing, if context is changed. The conviction of the Jaina is that if this proposition is denied, it shall be difficult for us to account for the differences of things. Hence, by asserting this proposition. We come across a new aspect of thing, which is not given in the first
proposition. 3. The third proposition is: Syāt pen exists and does not exist. In this proposition the two
attributes of existence and non-existence in their relevant contexts are successively predicated of the pen. Thus this proposition, which appears merely the summation of the first two propositions is not really so. It expresses a new aspect of pen under consideration. This aspect is not present either in the first or in the second proposition considered separately. If mathematics is our guide, the third proposition is nothing but a summation of the first two. But according to the Jaina experience, which is our sole guide, tells us that the combination or separate units give rise to a distinctive meaning, not apprehended in any of its constituent elements. The fourth proposition is: Syāt pen is inexpressible. In this proposition the two attributes of existence and non-existence instead of being asserted successively as in the third proposition, are asserted simultaneously. The need for simultaneous assertion of these appositive attributes is man's desire to express in words the apprehension of pen as such. Since words are incapable of expressing this apprehension of pen the pen is inexpressible. It may be noted here that inexpressibility is a novel and factual characteristics of pen. The distinction between the third and fourth propositions is that in the former the novel attribute is the result of consecutive togetherness of the elements of existence and non-existence, whereas in the latter it is the result of simultaneous presentation of the two elements in question. It goes without saying that this inexpressibility is not absolute, it is only so in the context of the two opposite attributes
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