ISJS Jainism Study Notes E5 Vol 02

SR No.: 007712
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: International School for Jain Studies
Publisher: International School for Jain Studies
Publication Year: 2012
Total Pages: 404
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 13 MB

Page 149

being together synchronically. "The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single
positive concept". The fifth, sixth, and seventh propositions are: 5. Syāt pen exists and in inexpressible. 6. Syāt pen does not exist and is inexpressible. 7. Syāt pen exists and does not exist and is inexpressible.
All these propositions according to the Jaina represent a new aspect of the real. It may be noted here that the Jaina texts have not discussed these propositions clearly. Now the question arises: What is the basis of regarding the number of propositions as seven, neither more nor less than this? The answer of the Jaina is that since affirmation and negation are possible in regard to the real, there are only seven questions possible in regard to the real. These questions know a thing, which in turn is dependent on the seven objective aspects of the real. In fact, the enquiry starts upon the initial doubt, for example does a pen exist or not? Or is a thing permanent or changing? And the answer is seven distinct propositions or Bhangas.
What I feel here is that the Jainas in propounding the seven propositions are making use of mathematical knowledge, which necessarily leads to these seven Bhangas. Out of these the first four are empirically verifiable or understandable and the last three are mathematical possibilities. That is why the Jaina texts have not explained the first four ones. But there is nothing wrong in saying that they are possibilities confirmed by mathematics. So if one speaks of more than seven Bhangas, there will either be duplicated or assertion of propositions neither confirmed by mathematics nor by experience, if one speaks of less number of propositions, there will either be omission or suppression of the aspect of the real given to us either mathematically or experientially.
It may now be argued that since Jaina philosophy is known as Anekāntavāda (nonextremism and non-absolutism) does the seven-fold prediction apply to Anekāntavāda itself? The answer of Jaina is in the affirmative. Syāt Anekantavāda, Syāt Ekāntavāda and so one will be the seven propositions (Saptabhargi). Knowledge which takes into account the nature of the real as consisting of an infinite plurality of attributes is called pramāna and this is non-absolutism, knowledge which takes into account one attribute without negating the order attributes present in the real is called, Nyāya and this is Ekāntavāda. In other words
Page 136 of 385
STUDY NOTES version 5.0