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understood, as it is generally done, to mean that the existence of colour in the Ghata is doubtful. In other words, certainty of colour along with the manifoldness of characteristics is indicated by the word 'Syāt'.
The word 'Syāt' can also be understood differently, though the difference is of expression and not of meaning already discussed. As already pointed out, a thing is the repository of infinite attribute. Hence the apprehension of it from a particular angle of vision or point of view, technically called Naya, does not exhaust the whole of the multiphase thing. It is important to note that the Naya is objectively given and not subjectively contemplated. So in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding that a thing is exhausted by a particular Naya, every predication should be preceded by the word 'Syāt' thus making us aware of the possibility of other predications in regard to that thing. Thus Syādvāda is the custodian of clarity, certainty and non-ambiguity in the field of philosophy. It is by no means the doctrine of doubt and uncertainty.
Although an existence is possessed of infinite attribute yet the knowledge of it is not a simple affair. The question is what is it to know a thing? And how many propositions are requisite to express the content knowledge? The conviction of the Jaina is that seven distinct propositions, neither more or less, are needed to express the content of knowledge in regard to an existent. The significant point to be noted here is that each proposition is not the result of mere subjective necessity possesses attributes as an ontological truth. All this implies that since the existents or their characteristics are infinite in number, seven propositions can be expressed with reference to each. Consequently, their will be infinitely seven - fold propositions without any inconsistency.
Let us now illustrate the doctrine of seven - fold propositions by taking an example of the attribute existence or permanence or oneness etc. in respect of pen.
1. The first proposition is: Syāt pen exists. This means that the existence of pen is
contextual, the context being its own Dravya (substance), Kşetra (Space), Kāla (time) and Bhāva (state). It is by virtue of this context that the pen derives its individuality and becomes meaningful. In fact this context is interwoven into the constitution of the pen itself, so it cannot be separated from the object. This proposition controverts the possibility of unqualified existence of a thing without the consideration of substance, space, time and state.
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