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OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
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TEXTS (1681–1683). THEN AGAIN, BEING DEVOID OF THE FORM OF COGNITION, HOW WOULD
THE NEGATION' BE APPREHENDED ?-IF IT WERE HELD TO BE APPREHENDED BY THE ABSENCE-L.E. NEGATION OF THE COGNITION RELATING TO IT, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO END TO THE ASSUMPTION OF SUCH NEGATIONS).-IF, TEEN, THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE Cognition WERE APPREHENDED THROUGH THE ABSENCE OF THE cognised thing,-AND THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE cognised thing WERE APPREHENDED THROUGH THE absence of Cognition, THERE WOULD BE MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE.HENCE THE FACT IS THAT WHAT IS THE Perception OF ONE THING IS CALLED THE Non-perception OF ANOTHER AND THE SAID Perception COMES ABOUT BY ITSELF, BECAUSE BY ITS VERY NATURE IT IS not-dark (SELF-LUMINOUS). (1681-1683)
COMMENTARY.
Then again, what is itself not known cannot bring about the Cognition of anything else ;-if it did, it would lead to absurdities; this has been already explained ; so it has to be explained in what way Negation' itself is known. It cannot be cognised by itself; as if it were so, then the negation, or absence, of the object also would be cognised by itself, and there would be no need for postulating a Means of Cognition in the shape of 'Negation'; as this is meant only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the negation of the object, and this negation of the object will have been cognised by itself, like the negation of the Means of Cognition.-Nor can it be regarded as cognised by its own Cognition, because, ex hypothesi, it is 'devoid of the form of Cognition ';-how then could it be cognised by its own Cognition ? It is only what is of the nature of Cognition that can be so cognised.
It might be argued that it could be known from another negation of the Means of Cognition bearing upon itself.-But then there arises the question
-how is this latter Negation known - If it were held to be due to yet another Negation,-then there would be an infinite regress. This has been thus declared : Otherwise the non-existence of the Object is known through Non-apprehension, and the non-existence of the Apprehension is known by another Non-apprehension ; so there is an infinite regress'.
In order to avoid this Infinite Regress, it may be held that the Cognition of Negation is due to the absence (Negation of the Object. But in that case there is mutual interdependence. For instance, the Negation of the Means of Cognition is cognised through the cognition of the Negation of the Object, and the negation of the Object is cognised through the Cognition of the negation of the Means of Cognition; thus the defect of mutual interdependence is quite clear.Thus you are reduced to that condition where the thrust of the Javelin throws out the Eye-ball !
From all this it follows that the Non-apprehension of one thing consists only in the apprehension of another thing, and Negation' need not be a Means of Cognition different from Perception.