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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIX.
The following might be urged :-" How is that apprehension of one thing known? What has been urged against the Cognition of Negation would apply to that also ".
The answer to this is that the said Perception, etc. etc.'-That is, the Perception of the one thing becomes cognised by itself.- not through anything else; hence in this case there is no Infinite Regress.-"Why ? "Because, by its very nature, -in its own form, it is nol-dark, -i.e. it is of the
ture of Light (which is self-luminous). Nor would cognition through mere presence lead to incongruities, as nothing else (except Cognition) is of the nature of Light (i.e. self-luminous).-(1681-1683)
Question :-"Why should there be this hostility towards the apprehension of Cognition through something else ?"
Answers
TEXTS (1684-1686).
As A MATTER OF FACT, THE APPREHENSION OF COGNITION THROUGH
SOMETHING ELSE IS NOT POSSIBLE IN ANYWAY,-EITHER (a) THROUGH THE INYERENTIAL INDICATIVE, -OR (6) THROUGH ANOTHER COGNITION (PERCEPTION).-OR (C) THROUGH PRESUMPTION-THERE BEING A POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIONS BEING RAISED AGAINST ALL THESE THREE, THERE WOULD BE SEVERAL INFINITE REGRESSES CREEPING IN FOR YOU. IT MUST BE ADMITTED THEREFORE THAT] AS AMONG THINGS EQUALLY CAPABLE OF BEING APPREHENDED, THE APPREHENSION OF ONE LEADS TO THE DEFINITE COGNITION THAT THE OTHERS ARE non-existent.-(1684–1686)
COMMENTARY.
(1) Some people hold that Cognition is cognisable through the Inferential Indicative this Inferential Indicative being either in the form of the idea of a thing, or in that of an Action, or in that of a thing perceptible by the senses, or some manifest object, and so forth.
(2) Others hold that Cognition is perceived through another Cognition, and not self-cognised, because the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity.
(3) Others again hold that it is cognised through Presumption based upon the inexplicability (otherwise) of what is duly known ; i.e. the idea of a thing being known would be inexplicable if the Cognition of the thing were not there, the Cognition itself being by its nature dull (non-intelligent, dark).
Thus these three theories have been put forward.
Now there being a possibility of objections being brought up against each of these three theories relating to the Inferential Indicative and the rest, -Buch as—How is the Inferential Indicative itself known ?', and so forth, --there will be several Infinite Regresses creeping in :-For instance, the Inferential Indicative and the rest could not be cognised until Cognition