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820
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIX.
to what is entirely featureless; this is what is meant; and this same idea is going to be put forward again (in the following Text).-(1678)
This same idea is further explained
TEXT (1679).
THE OBJECT THAT IS FEATURELESS BEING DEVOID OF THE FORM OF COGNITION, CANNOT BE A Means or Form of Cognition ; AS THIS
IS ALWAYS OF THE NATURE OF Cognition.-(1679)
COMMENTARY.
This'-i.e. Means or Form of Cognition.
That which is not of the nature of the cognition of things cannot be a Means or Form of Cognition', -e.g. the Jar and such things;- and Negation is devoid of the nature of the cognition of things ;-hence there is nonapprehension of the wider character (which must mean the absence of the less wide character).-(1679)
The following might be urged :-"The Eye and the other organs are not of the nature of the cognition of things,—and yet, as they serve as causes bringing about the cognition of things, they are called 'Means of Cognition'; the same would be the case with 'Negation' also ; so that the Reason adduced is not true (Inconclusive)”.
This is the argument anticipated and answered in the following
TEXT (1680).
IF IT IS URGED THAT"NEGATION IS A Means of Cognition BECAUSELIKE THE EYE, ETC.-IT SERVES AS THE CAUSE OF COGNITION”, --THEN (OUR ANSWER IS THAT) WHAT IS ENTIRELY FEATURELESS CAN NEVER SERVE AS THE
CAUSE OF ANYTHING.—(1680)
COMMENTARY.
It is not right to make assumptions on the basis of the figurative idea of being the cause of cognition '; because what is entirely featureless and hence devoid of all capacity, cannot be rightly regarded as a Cause. If it were so regarded, it would cease to be featureless; and further, as what is featureless cannot be specially related to any particular time or place, if & cognition were brought about by it, it would never cease at all.-- (1680)