Bauddh Dharm Darshan Sanskruti aur Kala

SR No.: 004152
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dharmchand Jain, Shweta Jain
Publisher: Bauddh Adhyayan Kendra
Publication Year: 2013
Total Pages: 212
Language: Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 17 MB

Page 201

Dharmakirti, The Advocate of Bāhyārtha-Astitva-Vāda • 199
true that the Yogācāra school of Buddhism accepts only the conciousness (Vijñāna) and not the existence of external objects. However Yogācāra school does accept the existence of external objects through implication (upacāra/lakṣaṇa). Even if for the sake of argument we accept Dharmakirti as a follower of Vijñānavāda, We are left with no other choice, but to accept all the words of Nyaya-bindu denoting the existence of external objects as implied ones, but from all the four statements mentioned above, it does not so appear. In the whole text of Nyayabindu we do not find a single reference to the word upacāra. Therefore it does not seem reasonable to accept that Dharmakīrti was a Vijñānavādin.
The Satement about perceptual cognition given by Dharmkīrti in Nyayabindu clearly indicates that perceptual cognition is free from the impact of Kalpanā or ākāra or pratīti and it is reliable "Tatra pratyaksm kalpanāpoďhamabhrāntam”.4 Without accepting objects as real and external, perceptual cognition mentioned here cannot be reliable and free from the impact of Kalpanā. If the object perceived is taken as only vijñānākāraviśeșa and not real external by Dharmakīrti, he would not have stated as above.
When one perceives a jar then awareness of a jar object as well as awareness of one self (adhyavasāya) remains there; he experiences ‘ghațamaham jānāmi'. Therefore svasmvitti also culminates to the dvaita of subject and object's different entity :
'Yatra hi vyavahartsņām arthādhyavasāyaḥ so'rtham svalaksaņam sāmānyam vā syāt.' .. The definition of valid cognition as 'Pramāņam avisamvādi jñānam's, stated in pramāņavārttika text proves that Dharmakīrti was a follower of external objects' existence, because without accepting the existence of external objects the non-inconsistency of objects remains an impossibility.
‘pramāṇamavisamvādi-jñānam' this definition is famous and sāmvyavahārika (not pāramārthika) in Bauddha Pramāņaśāstra. Avisamvādi does not mean ‘abhrānta'. In Dharmakirti's opinion
4. NB 1.4, p. 325. PV I.1. p. 3