Siddhi Vinischay Tika Part 01

SR No.: 004038
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Anantviryacharya
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1944
Total Pages: 686
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 15 MB

Page 126

3. A CRITICAL STUDY OF SV, SVV AND SVT
105 1. Smrti, memory involves the knowledge of the past; it presupposes a chain of experiences which result in precipitation of samskāras ; these very sam skāras give rise to recollection of the past. It is valid knowledge because of its non-discrepancy1.
According to Vedic school, smrti is valid only in conformity with the dictates of śruti ; in other words, śruti is self-evident knowledge itself, while smrti is dependent upon it; it has no validity of its own.
Though Jayanta Bhatta believes in invalidity of Smrti, he explains differently. According to him, smrti is invalid, because it is not produced by the object. Smộti is valid because it is just opposite to vismarana, samsaya and viparyaya. It cannot be invalid even if it is dependent on previo experience ; for, the validity is not necessarily conditioned by the dependence or independence of experience; otherwise even the inference will not be valid ; therefore, smrti is pramāna, since there is non-discrepancy involved in it.
2. Pratyabhijñāna or Recognition is the synthetic result of perception and recollection ;3 it is of nature of 'that necessarily is it—tadevedam (judgment of identity), “it is like that '—tatsadrśam (judgment of similarity) 'that is dissimilar to that'-tad-vilaksanaṁ (judgment of dissimilarity), this is different from that’-tatpratiyogi (judgment of difference), and so on. "That necessarily is it' or tadevedam and others are discussed in detail elsewhere.4 All these types of recognition when they do not admit of discrepancy or contradiction, are pramānas by themselves.
Now an attempt will be made to meet the objections of other schools of Indian philosophy who deny it as pramāna.
The Buddhists observe that it is not a unique knowledge, but two cognitions are taken to be one viz., recollection indicated by the word that and perception indicated by 'this’5.
This objection of Buddhists is on a slippery ground. They raise this objection in conformity and consistency with their position of the philosophy of flux or momentariness; naturally any cognition involving 'sa evāyamiti' is illusory.
1 SV, III. 2. * Nyāyamanjari (Vijayanagaram), p. 23. 3 SVV. III. 4-5, LTV v. 10 & 21, PMS, III. 5. • See the author's Jaina- Darśana, pp. 322ff. • PVB, p. 51; PVVT, p. 78.
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