Siddhi Vinischay Tika Part 01

SR No.: 004038
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Anantviryacharya
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1944
Total Pages: 686
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 15 MB

Page 125

104
Accepting the fact that knowledge is an essential characteristic of atman, there is hardly any doubt to hold that the omniscience will be the result of total destruction of the veil of Karmas; whatever may be the empirical tests of omniscience, the intrinsic purity and capability of perfection of the soul are unquentionable.
(vii) Parokṣa Pramāṇa:
Indirect valid knowledge is of two kinds: (1) mati and (2) śruti1. It is believed that smrti, samjņā (pratyabhijñāna), cinta (tarka), abhinibodha (anumāna) and śrutu (agama) are to be held as paroksa, the only difficulty was with mati, because of its sensuous nature; this difficulty was solved by calling it as an empirical perception (sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa).
INTRODUCTION
Akalanka regards anumana as manomati in LTv. 67, and as śruta in TV, I. 20; anumana is for one self which has the verbal designation (anakşaraśruta) and the inference for others which is designated by words (akṣaraśruta).
Akalanka puts smṛti (memory), pratyabhijñāna (recognition), cintā (discursive thought) and abhinibodha (perceptual cognition) under mental perception (manomati)1 when they are not associated with words; and all these when associated with words, are brought under śruta3.
The problem arises regarding the exact line of demarcation between pratyakṣa and paroksa. Akalanka himself makes it sufficiently clear. The problem is solved by the definition of paroksa-parokṣa is non-distinct knowledge; distinct knowledge is independent of other knowledge; sensuous and mental perceptions are distinct, because they do not depend upon other knowledge, while smrti etc. are dependent on other knowledge and hence indistinct or paroksa1.
Cārvāka philosophy believes only in pratyakṣa derived from the senseorgans; hence paroksa has no place in this materialistic system; naturally, non-discrepancy is not beyond the verification of sense-organ.
While rejecting this view, Akalanka states that establishment of validity or invalidity is not possible without accepting the validity of anu
māna.
1 TSu, 1-10.
2 LT, v. 67.
3 LT, v. 10; SVV, 1. 27.
4 LT, v. 4.