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## Karika 82, 83] Devagam
75. "If only external objects are considered real, and no ultimate reality is attributed to knowledge, then this leads to the elimination of false knowledge, such as doubt arising from apparent evidence. With the elimination of apparent evidence, the arguments of those who advocate contradictory views will be validated. This would mean that those who hold views like *sanvedana-advaita* (non-duality of perception), *brahma-advaita* (non-duality of Brahman), or any other monistic view, or those who contradict direct perception, would not be considered as holding false views or being dishonest. This would be a flaw."
The above-mentioned duality and non-expressible monism are flawed due to their contradiction. Both are one and the same for those who hate the Syadvada logic. Even in the case of non-expressible monism, the statement "it is non-expressible" is not valid, as it contradicts the non-expressible monism. || 82 ||
"The unity (mutual acceptance) of both internal and external objects of knowledge, as monism, is against the Syadvada logic and therefore does not constitute a valid theory. Considering both internal and external objects of knowledge as non-expressible monism, the statement "it is non-expressible" also becomes invalid, as it contradicts the non-expressible monism."
In the above-mentioned two monisms, there is a harmony due to the difference in their respective objects. In the case of internal objects, the evidence is self-awareness, while in the case of external objects, the evidence is sensory perception. Both evidence and apparent evidence arise, where there is a contradiction or obstacle, apparent evidence arises, and where there is no contradiction,