On Asrayasiddha

Author(s): Toru Funayama
Publisher: Toru Funayama
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269540/1

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On Asrayasiddha Toru Funayama The aim of this paper is to clarify how the fallacy of unestablished locus or substratum (abrayasiddha, dharmyas iddha)) was discussed in the post-Dharmakirtion period of Buddhist logic in India. Among the three kinds of fallacious reasons (het vbh&sas: aniddha, viruddha, and ana ikantiko), asiddha is concerned with the minor premise of the syllogism. Dignaga, the founder of this system, further subdivided it into four kinds (i.e. ubhayas idha, anyatordo', sopdagelii", and abrayso), which were followed by Dharmakirti and also by his successors with different terminologies." However, this well-known context of formal logic prohibits a Buddhist proponent of the syllogism from employing an unreal entity as its locus. For if an unreal entity, e. 8. A "self" (atman), a "whole" (avayavin) or a "universality" (samanya), is employed in the minor premise of a svatontrasadhana, then the reason connected with the unreal locus is judged to be false. This could lead to the curious conclusion that one cannot demonstrate the non-existence of any falsely imputed entity, as long as one remains in the field of formal logic. 'How did Buddhist logicians avoid this problem? In this paper, I will historically trace some developments of this problem and some of its traditional solutions. Another point to be noted at the beginning is that there were some other asiddhas which were sometimes mentioned in actual disputations in the post-Dharmakirtian period, 6.8. svarupisiddha and visesapasiddha. Svarupas iddha or "non-establishment of its own nature") means a reason which is not connected with the concerned locus in terms of the reason's own nature. Substantially it means the incompatibility between the reason and the locus. The other asiddha, vibepapasiddha or visesapam asiddham), means the non-establishment of the qualifying element of the reason. Later, these asiddhas along with others were systematically

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classified by logicans of the Navyanyaya school." (1) Before entering into each problem, we need to make some general remarks concerning the types of syllogisms on related to our problem. Firstly, syllogisms concerning the problem are roughly divided into two classes: one is the anupalabdhi-type of syllogism, by means of which the proponent intends to refute an entity, e.g. a "whole", which is supposed to be real only by the other party; and the other is the vyatireka-type, i.e. the contraposition of the major premise of the syllogism in the case of svabhavahetu, by means of which the proponent excludes the possiblity of an eternal entity (nityo) to be really existent (not). In the latter case, a "sky-flower" employed as an example of an eternal thing is held to be existent neither by the proponent nor the opponent. These two kinds of syllogism should be distinguished, though they contain the same problem in abrayasiddha: in the Pramapavarttika, Dharmakirti expresses a radical standpoint that the subject of the syllogism is not necessary when the major premise is in the form of contraposition (vyatireka) concerning the demonstration of womentariness of all phenomena. More concretely, he says: "Therefore, as for an example of negative statement, we do not necessarily maintain the substratum in this case (the Pramapavarttika 1, v.26ab)," upon which Sakyamati's comment runs as follows: "Therefore, as for an example of negative statement, we do not necessarily maintain the substratum," i.e. a real locus, "in this case." "In this case" means in the case of svabhavahetu and karyahetu. (On the other hand,] in the case of svabhavanupa labdhi, (the real locus) should be maintained. In this way, Dharmak Trti and his followers think that the subject of a syllogism do not have to be existent, if it has a contrapositional statement (vyatireka) as its major premise in the case of svabladva- and karyahetu; while in the case of a statement of anupalabdh i-type, the subject must be real. However, as is widely known, this contains a more subtle problem, especially in the case of prasahgavi paryaya, as is . 2

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repeatedly discussed by the later Buddhist philosophers. One more point to be noted is that the problem of abrayas iddha cannot occur in the anupalabdhi inference which is in the form of "Here there is no X (e.g. simanya/ avayavin), because of Y (6.8. anupalabdheb)." simply because the locus of the inference is not "X" but "here (utra)"1) which denotes a place devoid of the object in question. 111 these show that the problem of Ohraytimiddha in remarkable especially in the cases of (a) the demonstration of non-momentariness by means of svabhuvahetu and (b) the anupalobdhi inference in which an unreal entity is employed as its locus. (11) Devendrabuddhi. Dhormak Trti ets about the refutation of the oneness (ekatva) of a whole in his Pramapavarttika 11, v.84-85, and then in the Pramanaviniscaya (ed. T. Vetter, pp. 84-85). He does not present any syllogism, while his disciple Dovendrnbuddhi comments on the passages, making use of various syllogisms. Above all, he uses the svabhavahetu inference in which the whole is employed as its locus, as well as its viparyaya form.") Substantially the syllogism is judged to be a prasangasadhana. But from a formal point of view, it remains uncertain whether it is a prasanga or not in the strict sense of the word, because the minor premise he advances, 6.8. "A whole (as a locus) trembles when its parts tremble," will never be admitted by his opponents. We may say that Devendrabuddhi in this context was only vaguely aware of the notion of prasanga. santaraksita, Kamalasila, & Dharmottara. Kamalasila in his Tattvasangrahapan jika (abbrev. as TSP, hereafter) shows the following syllogism: -- atha va yad ekan tad ekadravyabritam, yathaikal paramapuh. ekam cavayavisamjnitam dravyam iti vypakaviruddhopalabdhi prasangah. prasahgasadhanam caitat." Here, setting forth a syllogism with the whole as its locus, he clearly says that it is a prasanga. That is to say, at the time writing of the TSP lie thought that an unreal entity can be a locus only if the syllogism is a prabanga. This was the first clear

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answer to the problem of abrayasiddha. It is interesting that this solution was not his final standpoint on this problem; he added a new dimension to the discussion of the ekanekaviyognlietu in his inter mognum opus, the Madhyamakaloka, where he expressed his radical ideo that an unreal entity can be a locus even if the syllogism if svatantrasadhana, because each term of a proposition is no more than a product of differentiation (vyavacchedamatra). However, this epoch-making solution which is far earlier than the similar one by Jnannkrimitra, does not seem to have influenced later Buddhist logicians of India, since the work was written in Tibet. Going back to the TSP again, we see Kamalasfla explaining another way that Sontaraksita employed to refute a whole, i.e. the usage of a gros object (sthula) as its locus: yat parasparaviruddhadharmadhyasitam na tad ekor bhavati, yatha gomahisam. upalabhyamananupalabhyamanarupam pihitudirlpepoca viruddhadhormodhyanitor thulom iti vyapolaviruddhopalabdhih. Here the problem of abrayas idilho cannot occur, since the locus is a gross object which is admitted by Buddhists. At the same time, the locus of the syllogism alludes to the whole which in the same meaning as the gross object for the Nyaya and Vaibes ika schools. Dharmottara, too, made a similar syllogism in respect to the employment of a gross object.'2) However, Santarakpitn and Dharmottara do not clearly express whether their syllogisms should be considered svatantrasidhanas or prasangas. The following are the specific features of this type of syllogisms as used by such masters: The locus, a gross object, is admitted not only by the proponent, but also by the opponent to mean the whole in an indirect way; however, it is likely that the minor premise itself is admitted only by the proponent. This kind of syllogism - which was constituted without any explanntion of its validity and which could be called "A hypothetical sylloginm" was Rocond solution in a transitional period of Buddhist logic. Bhisarvajna, Vacospati & Vyomasiva. On the other hand, the Na iyayikas such as Bhasarvajna, who criticized Dharmakirti, and Vacanpatimikro, who

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refuted a syllogism made by Dharmottara, as well as the Vaiknyikas such as Vyomabiva severely censured each Buddhist syllogism. They said that if it is not a prasanga - but rather #vatantronudhona, it commits the fallacy of non-establishment of the locus. An Inr nr we con now survey the extant texts, Sankarasvimin, who is mentioned in the TSP, seems to be the earliest Naiyyika commentator who criticized Buddhist syllogisma, dividing them into prasn'ga- and Avatantrosidhanas. As referred to above, this problem of abrayis idella arose at different stage in the discussion, i.e. in the trentment of the vyatircka in the demonstration of momentariness. As I discussed in a previous paper,' ) we can safely say that the asrayasiddha was variously and repeatedly discussed in the contexts of refuting unreal objects and establishing momentariness of phenomena in the last half of the 9th century (i.e. by Bhasarva jna) and the 10th century (i.e. by Vyomobiva and Vacaspati). Asoka. Asoka in his Avayavinirakarapa introduces the refutation of a whole with a syllogism in the form of vytipokaviruddhopalnbdhi: "What in wrongly connected with contradictory propertion, is not a unity, as for example a jor. A gross and 2.8. blue object is wrongly connected with contradictory properties." In this connection, he clearly says that the locus of this syllogism is not the whole, but a gross blue object which is grasped through direct perception (pratyaksa), 80 that the syllogism does not commit the fallocy of non-establishment of the locus.5) in that case, however, another question ariser: Does not the locus in question have anything to do with the whole? Thin question is answered through the following statement : (Opponent:) "In that case (viz., if the locus is not the whole but the gross blue object,] the oneness of the whole would not be denied through (the reason) 'false connection with contradictory properties.'" (Author:) If you say so, then what do you mean by "the whole"? (Opponent:) "It is the object which is one and inherent in many parts." (Author:) 1s it different from the manifesting gross and e.g. blue object, or not? Firstly, it cannot be different, because you admit (its perceptibility, and nothing manifests as different --5

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from the manifesting gross and e.g. blue object. [Then,] you might say that the whole is different [from the gross object. But this cannot hold, for] why is not the unitary whole denied, as the oneness of the gross object] has already been negated?!") Asoka means that the proponent can duly refute the oneness of the whole without making use of that whole itself as the locus of the syllogism, when a gross object is employed instead of the whole, because the latter is none other than the former. In this most interesting solution, which was derived from Dharmottara's and Santaraksita-Kamalasfla's second solution stated above, he is very sensitive to the problem of abray siddha and thinks that the locus of the syllogism should not be an unreal entity in accordance with the traditional standpoint. In this sense, the syllogism he presents is judged to be a svatantrasadhana. Here in Asoka's explanation we can trace the development of the second solution to the problem of asray siddha which took the discussion one step further than ever before. It is a pity that we have no evidence na to when and how this scholar flourished. 17) whole or Falsely imputed entities such as a a universality, though they are not admitted by Buddhists, each have a corresponding entity, viz., the atoms or the individuals, as admitted by themselves, while purely fictitious entities such as a "sky-flower" or "hare's horn" do not correspond to any reality. Asoka's solution stated above effective for the former case, but not for the latter. In this sense, it is applied to limited cases. We may surmise that the Buddhist logicians of that period felt the need for other solutions which could be applied to the "sky-flower" employed a8 0 locus in the demonstration of momentariness, until the appearance of JanarTmitra and Ratnakirti!") in the last period of Buddhist logic, who finally declared that an unreal locus such as a "sky-flower" could be duly employed if the concerned proposition had a negative and contrapositional major premise. OF.14 But for the more details we will need further research. was 1) The word asrayasiddha indicates the reason attributed of the fallacy, 6

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darn while the fallacy itself is meant by asrnyos idehotvo. The latter was in a later period meant also by osrayasiddhi with the same connotation. 2) ubhayasiddha, prativadyas" & vodino's", sopdehdi", dharmyas" in Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu. The problem of an unreal locus was discussed with another word "anyatoras idda", because of redundancy of the fourfold classification. Jitori's tenfold classification in his letutattvopadesa is also essentially the same as Dhormakirti's. 3) For examples of the fallacy, see TBh (- Moksdkaragupta's Tarkabhasa, Mysore 1952), 51,13-14; SD (= Asoka's Samanyadusana in Asokanibandhau, ed. A. Thakur, Patna 1974), 13,1013. We con also trace Kumarila's earlier usage of "svarupatoh" to mean the concerned asiddha. See S. Yamakami, T. Tokenaka, H. Kuroda & A.Akamatsu, "Slokavarttiko, anumana sho no Kenkyu (11) - Wayaku to Kaisetsu-," Indo Shiroshi Kenkyu 3, 1985, pp. 26-31. A) This fallacy is mentioned in the TBh, 64,14--19; SI, 13,11; ibid. 19,1. It is mentioned as early as in the TSP, ed. 'S.D. Shastri, Voronasi, 1981, 142,11. 5) Kebavomibra's Torkabhoso (eds. D.R.Bhandarkar & Kisaliitya blusage, Bombay, 1937, pp.85-87), enumerates three kinds of abiddhas (i.e. osroyas ideha, svarupu", ond vyupyotvao), and says that visesapa', visesya" as well as other asiddhas should belong to svarupu' . 6) Pvt, P. Je, 471,8-180'; 11.400' a, which was followed by Karpokagomin's PVSV-Tika, 76,18-19. 7) Cf. Dhormottora's Nyayabindutika (ed. D. Molvania, Patna, 1955), 125, 1-2. 8) Pramanavarttikavstti, P. Che, 4364-5; D. 386.5.-. 9 TSP, 250, 21-22. 10) T.Tillemons, "Two Tibetan Texts on the 'Neither One Nor Many' Argument for Sunyata," Journal of Indian Philosophy 12, 1984, pp.357-388; M. Kobayashi, "Mujishdsho Ronsho to Shoefu jo (asrayasiddha) no Mondai - Kamalaslla no Chukonmyo wo Chubhin to shite," Buoka 50-3.4, 1987, pp.41-60. 11) TSP, 246,18-21. 122 Pramdpaviniscayatika, P. Ise, 16988-b'; D. 14567 ^. 13) TSP, 253, 13-16. Cf. S. Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Calcutta, 1935 (reprint: Delhi, 1975), p.406. 14) See T. Funayama, "Bubun to Zentai - Indo Bukkyo Chishikiron'ni okeru Gaiyo to Koki no Mondaiten," TOho Gakuho 62, 1990, pp.621-630. 15) Avayavinirakarapa (ed. A. Thakur, n.4), 1,8-11. 16) Ibid., 1,15-19. Jap. tr., Funayama, op.cit., pp. 627-630. 17) For the problem of his date, see Funayama op.cit., n.25. Cf. Abhayadevosuri's Tattvabodhavidhuyini, 658, 14-22. 180 Cf. Y.Ka jiyama, "Ratnakirti no Kibyu Ronsho to Naihen ju Ron no Seisei," Tsukamoto Hakase Shoju Kinen Bukkyo Shigoku Ronshu, Kyoto, 1961, pp. 265-266.