On Asrayasiddha

SR No.: 269540
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Toru Funayama
Publisher: Toru Funayama
Total Pages: 7
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 581 KB

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classified by logicans of the Navyanyaya school."
(1) Before entering into each problem, we need to make some general remarks concerning the types of syllogisms on related to our problem. Firstly, syllogisms concerning the problem are roughly divided into two classes: one is the anupalabdhi-type of syllogism, by means of which the proponent intends to refute an entity, e.g. a "whole", which is supposed to be real only by the other party; and the other is the vyatireka-type, i.e. the contraposition of the major premise of the syllogism in the case of svabhāvahetu, by means of which the proponent excludes the possiblity of an eternal entity (nityo) to be really existent (not). In the latter case, a "sky-flower" employed as an example of an eternal thing is held to be existent neither by the proponent nor the opponent. These two kinds of syllogism should be distinguished, though they contain the same problem in ābrayāsiddha: in the Pramāpavārttika, Dharmakirti expresses a radical standpoint that the subject of the syllogism is not necessary when the major premise is in the form of contraposition (vyatireka) concerning the demonstration of womentariness of all phenomena. More concretely, he says: "Therefore, as for an example of negative statement, we do not necessarily maintain the substratum in this case (the Pramăpavārttika 1, v.26ab)," upon which
Säkyamati's comment runs as follows:
"Therefore, as for an example of negative statement, we do not necessarily maintain the substratum," i.e. a real locus, "in this case." "In this case" means in the case of svabhavahetu and kāryahetu. (On the other hand,] in the case of svabhāvānupa labdhi,
(the real locus) should be maintained. In this way, Dharmak Trti and his followers think that the subject of a syllogism do not have to be existent, if it has a contrapositional statement (vyatireka) as its major premise in the case of svablaðva- and kāryahetu; while in the case of a statement of anupalabdh i-type, the subject must be real. However, as is widely known, this contains a more subtle problem, especially in the case of prasahgavi paryaya, as is
.
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