Medhatithi On Samanyato Drstam

Author(s): Albrecht Wezler
Publisher: Albrecht Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269450/1

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ALBRECHT WEZLER MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM* 1. In the first paragraph of his Manubhasya (henceforth = Bhasya) on Manu (= M.) 1.5,2 Medhatithi (= Me.) deals with a fundamental objection raised, or which at least could be raised, against not just this verse, but rather against almost the whole of the first adhyaya: "Where were [the arrows]4 shot off and where did they fall down? That (Manu), who after having been asked [to expound] the dharmas as taught in the sastra promised that he would expound them and nothing else (viz. in the preceding verse], [now gives] a description of the world in its undifferentiated state does not fit into the context and does not serve the purpose of attaining the goal(s) of man. The well-known proverb 'Being questioned about mangoes he acquaints [one) with the kovidara (trees)' is [evidently] true (i.e. its truth is shown by Manu's procedure). And with regard to this subject (i.e. the description of the world in its undifferentiated state) [this sastra/this text/there] is no authority/valid means of cognition, nor is any purpose [served by it). Therefore the whole of this [first] adhyaya need not be studied [at all].":11 The first two arguments (irrelevancy to the subject under discussion and lack of significance for the purusarthas) of the opponent are refuted by Me. in the immediately following, i.e. second, paragraph; Me. states that this adhyaya as a whole is meant to make one realize that this sastra serves on the contrary a highly important purpose, viz. the complete knowledge of the nature of dharma, the cause of unsurpassable superiority, as also of adharma, its opposite, and he refers to M. 1.4912 and 12.23 (the latter verse he even quotes in full), in order to substantiate his contention that "the (various] conditions [of living beings in the course of their migration) in the cycle of rebirths beginning with Brahman down to the vegetable kingdom13 are caused/brought about by dharma and adharma". 14 Finally he makes, with palpable emphasis, the counterstatement which the reader already expects, viz. that it is the purport of the first adhyaya to show that this sastra has, quite the contrary, by all means to be studied.15 Since Me., as a rule, observes the yathasamkhya-principle in his stylized discussion, his readers expect him now to turn to the third Journal of Indian Philosophy 27: 139-157, 1999. (c) 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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140 ALBRECHT WEZLER argument, the alleged lack of a pramana/pramana(s). And in fact the third paragraph starts with the laconic statement: ... mulam tv atra mantrarthavadah samanyato drstam ca, "the (epistemological) basis 16 for this, however, are mantras and arthavada(s) [in the sruti] as well as the samanyato drstam [type of inference)". The meaning in which the expression pramana was used by the opponent is thus conveniently explained, and at the same time the relevant means of cognition are determined as classifiable as sabda and anumana. As for the first of them, Me. illustrates only the category mantra, viz. by quoting RV 10.129.317 - which, however, closely resembles an arthavada -, yet not without adding a detailed paraphrase and interpretation of this rc. 18 This is followed by a paragraph introduced by the statement "by an [inference of the type called] samanyato drsta the possibility of the universal dissolution is also proved" (samanyato drstena mahapralayo 'pilo sambhavyate). This is clearly meant to resume what was already said at the very beginning of this paragraph, viz. mulam tv atra mantrarthavadah samanyato drstam ca;20 a bit disturbing, however, is the position of the api - one would rather expect to find it after drstena - as is the predicate sambhavyate, with regard to which one wonders whether Jha's translation really captures its meaning. Me. goes on to explain:21 "(1) For, that which is found to be destroyed in one part is also found to be destroyed in its entirety, e.g. at one time 22 a [single] house is found to be burning, at another time the entire village is burning. (2) And all such things as are produced by an agent/creator - such e.g. as houses, palaces and the like - are liable to destruction.. (3) And this world, consisting of rivers, oceans, mountains, etc. is the work of an agent/creator. (4) Hence it follows (sambhavyate) that, like a house, etc., it will come to destruction. If it is argued that the fact [of the world] being the work of an agent/creator is itself not [yet] established (siddha) [then this is not right] because this [fact] also is established (sadhyate) by the fact that [the world) has, like a house and such things, a particular shape. This and similar [logical operations constitute) the samanyato drsta [inference upon which the statements in the present verse are based)."23 It may appear tempting to regard the expressions siddha and sadhyate as contextual explanations of sambhavyate (used twice in the part of this passage preceding them). But the causative of sambhu cannot simply, i.e. without any evidence, be taken to have among others also the meaning "to bring about [in terms of right cognition)"; on the contrary, it must be used, by Me. too, in the well-known meaning "to make [something) possible, to let (something] appear as possible/[a

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 141 cognition) as correct". That is to say Jha's translation ("the possibility of ... is proved")24 is indeed unobjectionable, although it remains to be seen whether it is the possibility of the existence of an external object that is denoted or else the possibility of the validity of an epistemological operation. Conversely, siddha and sadhyate have, in their turn, to be interpreted in the light of the initial, and governing, sambhavyate; or, to be more precise, one has to take into consideration that both expressions are used in the opponent's objection and its refutation. It is equally clear that the use of the future tense naksyati has nothing to do with the particular class of inference explained here by Me., but is employed only due to the temporal relation between the event of universal dissolution and the present time. 25 An attempt has been made by Jha to bring the logical structure into relief by adding after sentence (1) within parenthesis the remark "this is the Major Premise", after the second (i.e. (2)) "this is the second step in the inferential process", after the third (i.e. (3)) "this is the third step" and, finally, after the last (i.e. (4) "this is the final conclusion". 2. Yet, Me. does not rest content with making clear the epistemological foundation of the cosmogony as expounded in the first adhyaya of M.,26 or with illustrating the corresponding two means of valid cognition, but also explicitly justifies the casualness of this his explanation. For he goes on to say: "And we do not [here] make an endeavour either to [show] that the [said] means of cognition are free from defects,27 or to criticize them, 28 because the (present] sastra (i.e. the Manusmrti and my work) does not aim at this [subject] (i.e. the discussion of pramanas) in general; for this (i.e. the validity of the pramanas) is not properly determined until it has been reflected upon and examined; and if all this were done, (my work] would be a tarkasastra and not [any longer] a dharmasastra, and it would [also] by force become too prolix."29 Even though Me. expresses himself in such a manner that one wonders whether he refers to the particular proofs he himself has adduced, or to sabda and samanyato drstam (anumanam) in general, or to both30 -, his additional clarification cannot be denied a high degree of persuasiveness: The implicit claim that he would be capable of himself carrying out the necessary philosophical examination is credible. On the other hand, the reader will share with me the feeling of regret that Me. refused to compromise and did not at least outline his own ideas about the two means of valid cognition at issue here. For, is it not very likely indeed that he himself has carried out this critical examination?

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142 ALBRECHT WEZLER In compensation, as it were, of this decision, the second part of his commentary on M. 1.5, i.e. that in which the words of the mula themselves are finally explained, contains additional information on anumana which has to be noted by all means. The predicate avijneyam of the verse is commented upon thus: sarvaprakaram anumanam nisedhati / na samanyato drstam anumanam asti tadrupakavedakam31 na visesato drstam, atas cavijneyam / (1 9.16f), "[by the next attribute, avijneya] he (i.e. M.) denies [the use] of any kind of inference (with regard to the form/shape/appearance of the world at this cosmogonical moment]: [what he has in mind is that] there is no samanyato drsta inference that would inform [us] about its form/shape/appearance nor any visesato drsta inference, and therefore it is (characterized by, M.] as being 'incognizable'."32 Me. almost immediately afterwards adds that this attribute means that it "cannot be cognized by [those) means of valid cognition which have limited, i.e. differentiated, [entities] as their objects"(atas cavijneyam avacchedavisayaih pramanaih)" (1.9.19f.).33 The question as to the appropriate means of cognition was forseen by Me., for he continues (I 9.20): agamat tadrsad eva gamyate, a clause rendered by Jha as follows: "That this is its condition is known from the scriptures which also are as transcendental in their character as the ante-natal condition of the World". Indeed, gamyate cannot here have the meaning "is inferred", 34 but quite clearly refers to a different method of cognition. The subject can indeed only be the same as that of avijneyam itself, viz. idam of M. 1.5; therefore, Jha's explanatory paraphrase is acceptable. But what about the qualification tadrsad (eva) (the function of the particle being patent)? Does it really, as assumed by Jha, refer to the epistemological, and ontological, status of the agama, and not rather to its contents ("only because of such 'scriptures' (i.e. passages like that quoted by Me. in the preceding sentences, viz. ChU 6.2.1 f.) this (i.e. the world in this particular condition, i.e. before the creation of differentiated things) is known")? Jha does not adduce any reason for his decision or point out a parallel. In my opinion, the term agama itself is clear by itself and does not call for any qualification; in view of the extraordinary manifoldness of the information found in Vedic texts it is, however, useful, if not necessary, to determine the type of statements in the agama which serve as valid means of cognition in this particular case. The agama is the only pramana from which knowledge about things beyond the scope of the other means of valid cognition can be acquired (the operation of which latter is distinguished from that of agama and denoted by vi-jna).35

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 143 My interpretation is, I think, confirmed by the subsequent part of Me.'s commentary on M. 1.5, viz. his explanation of the drstanta "as if merged in deep sleep" (prasuptam iva):36 "just as the atman, in the condition of deep sleep, remains free from [all] conscious thoughts and all defilements, while all conceptualizations have vanished -, and yet it cannot be said to be non-existent because it is in fact recognized by [the sleeping person) on waking [in that he says to himself] 'I slept soundly', in the same manner the world [in this particular cosmogonical state] is determined [as similar to the atman in the condition of deep sleep, i.e. as not non-existent, etc.) with the help of (the) agama (i.e. corresponding passages in authoritative texts) which consists of something (epistemologically already] established37 and [in addition), by (the) logicians, with the help of (various] inferences [all of] which [in reality, however) are [butfallacies."38 Me. cannot be denied absolute consistency when he denounces as "fallacies" (abhasanumana) the inferences of certain logicians who want to prove by way of them the "world [in this particular cosmological state)": with regard to an object which is not only beyond perception "because all products-of-transformation which are by their nature differentiated [things]/particulars 39 have been dissolved in prakrti" but which can also not be cognized by an inference because there is not a characteristic mark, as this [latter] too is dissolved because all productsof-transformation which consist of particulars have been destroyed", 40 the only potential source of reliable information, the only pramana left, is indeed sabda! Now, there cannot be any doubt that the particular state of the world referred to is that of the mahapralaya.41 And this finally makes fully understandable why Me. used, in the preceding passage(s), the causative sambhavayati. In his view an inference such as that mentioned by him by way of illustration is in fact not possible. That is to say, sambhavayati, although it literally means "to make possible", here almost amounts to "to try in vain to make something appear as plausible".42 It thus clearly expresses a criticism; the question, however, is whether the criticism is directed against this particular inference, and similar ones, because of the lack of a linga - or against the class of inferences called by Me. samanyato drsta as such. In the sentence quoted just now (na samanyato drstam anumanam asti tadrupakavedakam na visesato drstam), Me. expresses himself in such a manner that the possibility of a principal refusal can safely be precluded. And in view of the fact that this sentence is evidently meant to explain that immediately preceding it (sarvaprakaram anumanam nisedhati), it is similarly more

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144 ALBRECHT WEZLER than probable that Me. refers to a theory of anumana characterized, at least among other things, by the dichotomy of visesato drsta and samanyato drsta. 3. Before following this trail further and attempting to identify this theory of inference, it is necessary to look for more examples in the Bhasya. Fortunately there is a tool, viz. the indices compiled by Jha;43 however even though they cover the complete Bhasya they can hardly be regarded as absolutely reliable. Nevertheless, that is practically all I can lean on as I have not yet been able to go through the whole of Me.'s commentary in order exhaustively to collect all the passages where he refers to anumana. Apart from the references to the Bhasya on M. 1.5, Jha's indices do not, however, provide information which one could not also find by just looking up all verses of the Smrti itself in which the word anumana occurs. 44 3.1. The first of these verses is, if one keeps to the sequence of the Smrti, M. 8.44.45 What is noteworthy in Me.'s Bhasya is, firstly, his explanation that "by an inference the king should determine the [real] cause of the law-suit with regard to something that is [by its nature] beyond perception or something that is not perceived (although by its nature perceptible]":46 (... rajanumanena parokse pratyakse varthakaranam niscinuyat) and, secondly, his remark that "inference is repeated [here]", although it has already been taught, "in order to emphasize the point (lit. for the purpose of the firmness of remembrance)" (uktasyapy anumanasya punarvacanam smrtidardhyartham). According to Jha47 this is a - veiled - reference to Me. 8.3.48 I don't find this acceptable,49 even though in the Bhasya on this verse the first half of M. 8.44 is quoted. 50 What Me. refers to is rather M. 8.25: bahyair vibhavayed lingair bhavam antargatam nrnam / svaravarnengitakarais caksusa cestitena ca Il. It is true that the term anumana is not used by Manu in this verse. But in its place we have the almost equally unequivocal notion of linga; in addition there cannot be any doubt and there is in fact unanimity among the commentators and translators that what the verse is about is the truthfulness or otherwise of the litigants and of the witnesses. And this is precisely what Me. states at the very beginning of his Bhasya

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 145 on 8.25: "What the verse means is that the veracity or untruthfulness of the two litigants and of the witnesses should be found out by means of inference also (i.e. not only by other means of cognition such as perception)"52 (anumanenapi satyanrtavadita vyavaharatah" saksinam ca niscetavya iti$4 slokarthah). After clarifying that the expressions "voice" (svara) etc., in M. 8.25, are therefore only used by way of illustration (atas ca svaradigrahanam pradarsanartham), he draws the conclusion: "What results [from this verse] is therefore that he (i.e. the king) should ascertain [the veracity or otherwise) by all that which is a sure linga, but not only by the voice etc., because these latter are [sometimes] fallacious" (tena yan niscitalingam tenaiva paricchidyad ity uktam bhavati na punah svaradibhir eva savyabhicaritvat tesam). The reasons Me. adduces for the possibility of vyabhicara are quite remarkable, because they throw further light on his acquaintance with and views on logic: They testify to the experienced and prudent jurist he quite clearly is, a scholar who cannot by any means be accused of naive unworldliness: anucitasabhapravesa hi mahaprakrtidarsanena satyakarino 'pi svabhavato vikriyante / pragalbhas tu samvrtakara bhavanti, "for persons who are not used to appear in an assembly in court naturally get flurried when they see great men such as a king, minister, etc.,55 even though they speak the truth $6 (i.e. they exhibit external signs that a judge would in the case of other persons interpret as pointing to the fact that they don't speak the truth); but those that are sharp57 manage to hide their real feelings (i.e. even though not speaking the truth don't show any of the external signs)." In Me.'s view only such lingas, logical reasons, are conclusive which are anavyabhicarin. Not only a truism, but also trite an observation, in terms of the history of Indian logic. 3.2. The second, and last, of the verses in which the term anumana occurs, viz. M. 12.10558 is comparatively clear by itself. That part of Me.'s Bhasya, however, which contains his explanation of the term anumana, is unfortunately quite corrupt. It reads as follows: evam anumanam api suvivecitam na bharatadigranthapramanopalaksanatvac ca / tena sauryadisastrante karmanyatasiddhih / yena na vivecitam hy anumanam sa paksavipaksayor darsanadarsanamatrenanumanapravsttim manvano vede'pi kartaram kalpayet / yada tu nipunamatir bhavati tattatprayojakasya snatavyalaksanaya tasya kartstvasvakaranasyabhavad apauruseyatvam adhyavasyati 1. Jha avoided the difficulties by simply not addressing them, i.e. by not translating those phrases or sentences which he did not understand - albeit without indicating the gaps in his translations by a series

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146 ALBRECHT WEZLER of dots or another mark. I, too, have no idea how to emend this passage, 59 except for sa paksavipaksayor, in the place of which I propose to read sa sapaksavipaksayor, and the last sentence which I should like to restore tentatively - I know that I am daring - as follows: yada tu nipunamatir bhavati tattatprayojakasya paryalocanaya (?) or anumanasya vilaksanataya (?) tasya kartstvakaranasyabhavad apauruseyatvam adhyavasyati. Those parts which I think I understand could be translated thus: "Similarly inference should also be carefully). examined ... For [a man] by whom inference has not been examined might construct an author for the Veda also in that he could be of the opinion that an inference can be made just because [the logical nexus] is there in a sapaksa or a vipaksa. But when he develops the [necessary] knowledge by properly reflecting on [the logical reason] which cogently proves this or that [probandum], [then) he correctly concludes that [the Veda] is not the work of an author because there is no reason [that would cogently prove] that [a person] is its author." The passage deserves attention of course insofar as it, too, is evidence of Me.'s - to all appearances general - attitude towards anumana: He almost emphatically cautions his readers against falling prey to various fallacies, false inferences which do not lead to valid cognition in that they do not meet all the logical exigencies. This attitude is similar to that of Bhartrhari, Kumarila and Sankara, 61 but Me. seems to base his criticism on the theory of anumana rather than on axiomatic ideas about the hierarchical relation between the Veda (as highest authority) and (human) inferential reasoning, - although he, too, is aware of the possibility of a contradiction between tarka and veda, 62 and surely does not regard the former as valid in such cases. 3.3. One might add that tarka is, of course, one of the other keywords that have to be taken into account in the context of the present essay. In fact what Me. has to say on tarkena in M. 12.10663 is important for his conception of and attitude towards anumana, although it is certainly also noteworthy with regard to the notion tarka itself. For he paraphrases it with anumanantarena yuktya64 and then adds the explanation tarka uhapohantaryasiddhih / idam atra yuktam uhitum idam apohitum / - which is followed by an example, viz. the mantra TS 1.4.1265 (devasya tva savituh prasave 'svinor bahubhyam pusno hastabhyam agnaye tva justam nirvapami), from which the word agni has to be removed because its meaning is not fitting" (agnipadasyarthasamavayad apohah)

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 147 in order to be replaced "by the word surya" (suryapadasya ca ksepah), if the mantra is to be used in an ritual offering to God Surya. This looks as if Me. thought of the ritualistic-technical meaning of uha and apoha only; but the paraphrase of tarkena by anumanantarena yuktya quite clearly shows that this is not the case - i.e. that Me. did not entirely misunderstand M. 12.106, and that he rather took the term tarka as being used by Manu in its, in fact well-known, meaning of "(methodical) reasoning, process of reflection" (literally: "turning something to and fro in one's mind"). Yet one cannot but wonder why at all he gives this ritualistic-technical explanation of uha and apoha; for, this is evidently not what Manu had in mind, it is - so it seems - inappropriate because the change, or rather adaption, of mantras has no connection with determining or applying the dharma; a further piece of evidence is the fact that apoha is not a term used elsewhere with reference to the process of changing a mantra so as to be suitable for another sacrifice. Another problem is created by the second member of the compound anumanantarena; Jha's translation ("by ratiocination - by means of inference") is - again - such that it does not reveal how he understood the words of the text; and Jha also does not take into account the expression -degantaryadeg of the compound uhapohantaryasiddhih (of the next sentence), even though one hesitates to separate it from oantara. This latter compound, however, cannot be correct, since tarka itself never leads (directly) to siddhi.66 That is to say, I fully agree with Preisendanz67 who regards this compound as corrupt and proposes the emendation uhapohasamarthabuddhih referring to Govindaraja's and Nandana's explanations of tarkin in M. 12.111. I find this emendation very plausible indeed because uha and apoha as used here by Me. are among the prajnagunas "intellectual capacity" enumerated in the Kautiliya Arthasastra (6.1.5),68 viz. susrusa, sravana, grahana, dharana, vijnana, uha, apoha, tattvabhinivesa. That tarka can be used as a generic term for uha and apoha as denotations of particular prajnagunas is indeed pausible, even though I am not able to point out other examples except for Me. on M. 12.111 (anumanadi kusalah tarky ayam uhapohabuddhiyuktah). The close phraseological connection between uha and apoha, in its turn, is clearly attested in Mbh. 13.133.43b and 134.27b; and this connection together with the context in which uhapohavisarada69 is used at the two places in the Epic is by itself already sufficient evidence that uha cannot in this case mean "modification of a mantra". It has rather the meaning sabdasyanuktasya lingenavagatih, or jnatasyarthasyopapattiparicintanam and apoha that

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148 ALBRECHT WEZLER of yuktyapetasya hanam or dustapaksaparityagah, as explained by Ganapati Sastri in his own commentary on AS 1.5.5 and 6.1.5, respectively. Sastri's explanations are not based on the - only - old commentary available on this part of the AS, viz. that written in Malayalam, which does not give any information worth noting;70 Sastri apparently got his inspiration from AS 15.1.69(f.), i.e. the definition of the tantrayukti uhya,71 and from NS 1.1.40, as regards uha; the source of his paraphrase of apoha could be Hemacandra's Abhidhanacintamani (2.225)72 where it is explained by asatpaksanirakaranam. That apoha = "negative reasoning",73 i.e. "the removal, i.e. rejection of an idea by reasoning", is attested only very rarely in older sources, may have to do with the fact that uha developed a broader meaning which practically includes that of apoha, and became thus a synonym/one of the synonyms of tarka, as is shown e.g. by NS 1.1.40 as well as GautDhS 19. (= 2.2.)23: nyayadhigame tarko 'bhyupayah.74 Now, Sastri's first paraphrase of uha, viz. sabdasyanuktasya lingenavagatih, in which linga should be taken to mean "(characteristic) mark, indicative (factor)", is not at all far removed from what I call the ritualistic-technical meaning of this expression, viz. "modification of a mantra"; for this in fact consists basically in the replacement of an undesirable element of a mantra by another element which is not itself used in the mantra, i.e. is anukta. Seen against this background one wonders whether Me.'s, at first sight strange, illustration of the process called uha and apoha, referred to above (p. 11 f.), could perhaps eventually be aimed at intimating that their two terminological meanings, i.e. the ritualistic one and the philosophical one, are closely related to each other: In both cases something is removed or rejected and something else moved in or accepted. Returning to Me.'s Bhasya on M. 12.106 I propose for anumanantarena yuktya the translation "by a kinds of anumana (i.e. something similar to, but not admissible as a member of the category 'anumana'), i.e. by a process of reasoning/arguing (which paves the way for an anumana proper]". And, following Preisendanz, I suppose that Me. defines tarka as "a mental activity/intellectual process capable of positive and negative reasoning (i.e. of finding out something new, not expressly stated in a textual authority, and of rejecting something else as not tenable)." 3.4. The predicate apratarkyam of M. 12.29,76 however, is explained by Me. by simply stating: tad anumanagocaram (II 463.26).77 This is

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 149 indeed not a case with regard to which one will consider a meaning related to that of the technical term tarka (i.e. generic term of the prajnagunas uha and apoha). 3.5. The verse M. 2.1178 by itself clearly shows that the expression hetusastrao cannot but have been used pejoratively. And as is to be expected, Me. indeed explains it as nastikasastram bauddhacarvakadisastram yatra vedo 'dharmayeti punah punar udghusyate,79 tadrsam tarkam asritya yo 'vajnam kuryat srutau smrtau ca / (1 72.12-14). It is not only because he subsequently uses also the synonym tarkasastra that one is reminded of his Bhasya on M.12.106; for in the second part of it Me. reports the interpretation of "others" (anye tu vyacaksate I 484.17) according to whom "what is denoted by 'tarkena' [of M. 2.106] are texts/works of which reasoning forms the main subject and which aim at setting forth the ordinary worldly means of cognition (such as] works on Nyaya, Vaisesika and Lokayata" (tarkeneti tarkapradhana grantha laukikapramananirupanapara nyayavaisesikalokayatika ucyante) (II 484.17). But he immediately afterwards adds the clarification that "among these, those which are inconsistent with the Veda, [i.e.) the texts/works of the Bauddhas, Lokayatikas, Nirgranthas, etc. are rejected; they are inconsistent with the Veda 80 [since] in them the Veda is not recognized as a valid means of cognition and authority, while it is recognized by Kapila, Kanada [and Aksapada]" (tatra vedaviruddhani bauddhalokayatikanairgranthadini paryudasyante / tani vedaviruddhani / na tatra pramanam vedah / kapilakanadakriya8l mavirathatanigrahantadisu hi sabdah pramanam) (II 484.18-20) and that "these [latter] sastras should be carefully listened to [and studied)" (... atas tani sastrani srotavyaniti ca)82 (II 484.22). Not surprisingly, for Me., too, the ultimate criterion for deciding whether a philosophical tradition at all deserves a Brahmin's attention is its acceptance or otherwise of the pramanya of the Veda, or of sabda as a valid means of cognition. The expression tarka, however, applied to sastras of either class, is in itself no guarantee for their 'orthodoxy' or else 'heterodoxy'. 3.6. In a passage of the Bhasya (on M. 2.6) touched upon by me elsewhere83 Me. explains, and in some detail at that, why it cannot be maintained that Manu and the other Smrtikaras perceived the dharmas:84 indriyair arthanam sannikarse yaj jnanam tat pratyaksam / na ca dharmasyendriyaih sannikarsah sambhavati tasya (i.e. dharmasya)

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150 ALBRECHT WEZLER kartavyatarsvabhavat / asiddham ca kartavyam / siddhavastuvisayas ca sannikarsah / anumanadini85 tadatve yady apy asantam artham avagamayanti ("... even though they make one cognize an object which does not exist at that particular point in time") pipilikandasancarena hi bhavisyantim vrstim anumimate tathapi na tebhyah kartavyatavagatih / (1 63.5-9). Does Me. refer here to the Nyayabhasya on NS 2.1.35 and 36, or what is his source? And what is even more important: Does the fact that Me. uses the 3. prs. plural (anumimate) indicate that he himself regards such an inference as problematic? 3.7. Almost in passing only it may be noted that at one place, viz. in the Bhasya on M. 2.16, Me. uses the expression samanyato 'numanam. 86 Yet this has nothing to do with the term samanyato drstam (anumanam), and is meant to characterize a particular (Vedic) injunction which can be inferred as a general one. 4. Of the many and different problems involved by the Bhasya passages presented in the foregoing there is one only that I am able to pursue a little further, viz. that of the origin of Me.'s distinction between visesato drstam and samanyato drstam anumanam. These terms are met with for the first time in the history of Indian logic87 in Varsaganya's Sastitantra88 and may very well also have been coined by this famous Samkhya philosopher. But apart from their designations the difference between these two classes of inferences as viewed by Varsaganya has nothing to do with the dichotomy referred to by Me. It is true that Me. does not define the former, or give an illustration of it; but quite the reverse holds good for samanyato drstam (anumanam), and it is hence highly probable, to put it not too strongly, that visesato drstam refers to a form of inductive conclusion,89 and not, so it seems, to the inference of an object previously already cognized by perception.90 Is Me.'s dichotomy therefore identical with that drawn by Prasastapada between drstam and samanyato drstam [anumanam]? Perhaps, that is to say, this possibility has certainly to be carefully examined, but the lack of a full terminological correspondence does not speak in favour of it. Besides there is another alternative, which suggests itself even earlier in view of the fact that, Me.'s knowledge and recognition of the Vaisesika" apart, it is the Purvamimamsa to which he mainly shows allegiance, philosophically, conceptually and methodologically. 92

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 151 NOTES * My thanks are due to Anne MacDonald, a Ph.D. student in Indian philosophy at our Institute, for correcting my English with great competence and remarkable sensitivity. The edition used is that published by Jha 1932; that of Dave 1972-1985 has been compared 2 In numbering verses of the Manusmrti I follow the NSP-edition (Bombay 1946). 3 As for the interpretation of the first sentence, I disagree with Jha 1920-1926: "Where we began and whereto we are carried!"; even if all Jha wished to do was to give a free paraphrase, I do not find his rendering acceptable. 4 The predicates, in my view, most smoothly fit to something which is discharged or hurled, most probably a weapon. 3 The well-known construction (cf. Speijer 1886: 322) of the repeated interrogative kva (which lives on in NIA languages) is, here, too, clearly meant to express an extraordinarily big difference, an utter discrepancy, - between what is announced by Manu and what he now does - which is similar to the large distance between the place of the archer, and the target hit by his arrow. I think the text has to be emended here: Sastroktadharman instead of sastroktanipatitadharman, onipatitao by mistake being carried over from the preceding clause. 7 On vya- kr see Thieme 1981. I take apurusartham ca to stand for apurusarthartham ca; cf. Me. on M. 1.1 and Wezler 1998a. 9 Note that this proverb does not belong to those dealt with by Hopkins 1887 and Pischel 1893.. 10 On kovidara cf. Das 1988: 334, 408 and 435. "I kva astah kva nipatitah / sastroktanipatitadharman prstas tan eva vaktavyataya pratijnaya jagato 'vyakstavasthavarnanam aprakrtam apurusartham ca / so 'yam satyo janapravadah 'amran prstah kovidaran acasta' iti / na casmin vastuni pramanam na ca prayojanam ity atah sarva evayam adhyayo nadhyetavyah / (1 8.5-8). - Note that I quote the text of the Bhasya as printed in Jha 1932. 12 On this verse cf. Wezler 1987. 13 Jha's (1920-1926) "inanimate objects" for sthavara is hardly just a misprint for "immovable living beings"! Note, however, that Me. explains sthavaram of M. 1.40 with vrksaparvatadi.. 14 Jha's translation of the compound dharmadharmanimitta(h) with "as forming the basis of Dharma and Adharma" is clearly wrong; it cannot but be a bahuvrihi qualifying gatayoo. ucyate / sastrasya mahaprayojanatvam anena sarvena pratipadyate / brahmadyah sthavaraparyantah samsaragatayo dharmadharmanimitta atra pratipadyante / 'tamasa bahurupena vestitah karmahetuneti' (slo. 49) / vaksyati ca - 'eta drstva tu jivasya gatih svenaiva cetasa / dharmato 'dharmatas caiva dharme dadhyat sada mana' iti (ao 12 sloo 23) / tatas ca niratisayaisvaryahetur dharmas tadviparitas cadharmas tadrupaparijnanartham idam sastram mahaprayojanam adhyetavyam ity adhyayatatparyam / (1 8.9-14). - In terms of the history of ideas it is quite remarkable that Me. does not think of any other explanation for the fact that most of the first adhyaya is devoted to cosmogony. 16 On mula cf. also Wezler 1998b. 17 Note that Sayana (who, by the way, reads tucchena instead of tucchyena) in his commentary on this Rgvedic verse quotes M. 1.5. 8 Indology does not seem to have properly appreciated that there exist a long

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152 ALBRECHT WEZLER series of explanations and interpretations of individual Vedic passages beyond the commentaries, i.e. seems to have neglected the tradition of vedartha, the claim of Hindu recipients of the Veda to understand its meaning. 19 Cf. also the very last sentence of the Bhasya on M. 1.5, viz. sarvato naikadesapralaya ity arthah (1 9.25). 20 Cf. above p. 2. 21 I by and large follow Jha 1920-1926 here. 22 This is to say, I agree with Jha 1920-1926 that kvacid must have a temporal meaning at this point; cf. the subsequent kadacit. 23 samanyato drstena mahapralayo 'pi sambhavyate / yasya hy ekadese naso drstas tasya sarvasyapi naso drsyate / yatha salapi kvacid dahyamana drsta kadacit sarvo gramo dahyate / ye ca kartrpurva bhavas te sarve vinasvara grhaprasadadayah 1 kartrpurvam cedam jagatsaritsamudrasailadyatmakam / ato grhadivan naksyatiti sambhavyate / kartrpurvataiva na siddheti cet tannivesavisesavattvadina grhadivat sapi sadhyata ityadi samanyato drstam / (1 8.27-9.2). 24 His translation - of the second sambhavyate - "it follows that", however, has to be replaced by "it is possible that". 25 There is some likelihood that when an author speaks of a/the (maha-)pralaya he generally has in mind a future event. 26 On which see Hacker 1959 and 1961. 27 Note that suddhi - of M. 12.105 - is explained by Me. as vivaranam purvapaksanirakaranena niscitasiddhantavyavasthapanam (II 484.16f.). 28 I do not think that Jha's 1920-1926 rendering of taddusane va by "or at refuting (the counter-arguments)" is correct. 29 na ca pramanasuddhau taddusane va prayatamahe 'nidamparatvac chastrasya / etad dhi yavan na vicarya nirupitam tavan na samyag avadharyate / tathanirupane ca tarkasastrata syan na dharmasastrata granthavistaras ca prasajyate (read: prasajyeta?) (1 9.3-5). 30 I personally regard this latter alternative as more probable because the examination of e.g. a particular inference almost inevitably leads to addressing questions of principal importance connected with this pramana as such. 31 Read, of course, tadrupavedakam (rupakadeg being due to a kind of dittography). 32 Jha 1920-1926 apparently regards these two sentences as part of the explanation of the preceding attribute apratarkyam. This - as well as his translation - does not stand a critical examination. 33 The qualification "those" is necessary because one cannot know of something if no means of cognition can ever operate with regard to it. 34 Birwe's (1964: 371 n. 14) criticism of Scharfe (1961: 78) is convincing, but I don't agree with him that the meaning of gamyate everywhere in the Mahabhasya, not to speak of other Sastric texts, is is inferred, cognized by conclusion". 35 CE. Bhasya I 9.24: asid iti / vartamana ("as something presently occurring) tu savastha na kasyacid vijneyety ata uktam avijneyam 1. 36 In Dave 1972: 16 this pratika - as also sarvato at the end of the Bhasya on 1.5 - is not marked off in bold type from the rest of the text. 37 Jha 1920-1926 renders agamat siddhartharupad abhasanumanebhyas ca tarkikanam avasiyate with "as is shown by the scriptures that describe things as they have actually existed, and also proved, for those who depend upon reasonings, by what appear to be sound inferences"! I wish only to refer to parallels, viz. na ca sabdaraser (what is meant is the Manusmrti, not the Veda) siddhasvabhavasyanustheyatvavagatih sambhavati and, from the Bhasya on 8.3. (na ca smrter eva pramanakalpana yukta I) na hi vyavaharasmrtir vedamula sakyate vaktum siddhartharupatvat pratyaksadyavagamyatvaj jayaparajayaprakaranam (II 76.26-28). Cf. also I 6.27

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 153 45 . f.: tad uktam 'sadhye 'rthe vedah pramanam, na siddharupe' / arthavadanam hi siddharupo 'rthah / na hi tadarthasya kartavyata pratiyate 1.- Henceforth I refrain from expressly stating that I disagree with Jha 1920-1926. 38 ** prasuptam iva jagratsvapnavattam parityajya samprasadavastha susuptir drstantatvenopatta / yatha ayam atma susuptyavasthayam nihsambodhaklesapradhvastasesavikalpa aste, na ca nastiti sakyate vaktum, prabuddhasya sukham asvapsam iti pratyabhijnanadarsanat, evam jagad agamat siddhartharupad abhasanumanebhyas ca tarkikanam avasiyate / (I 9.20-24). 39 Read visesasvabhavanam vikaranam. 40 visesanam svabhavanam vikaranam prakrtav upalayanad atah pratyaksenajnatam 1 anumanat tarhi jnayate, tad api nalaksanam (i.e. tad api na: alaksanam 1) laksanam lingam cihnam, tad api tasyam avasthayam pralinam eva, sarvavikaranam visesatmana vinastatvat / (1 9.12-15). 41 Cf. also the last sentence in the Bhasya on M. 1.5 quoted in n. 19 above. 42 Cf. e.g., from the Bhasya on 12.105, jvaladinu ca pratyaksena ksayam drstva sabde 'pi tatha sambhavayet ... (II 484.21 f.). 43 They are divided into "Index to Vol. I & II (Adhyayas I-IV)", "Index to ManuSmrti Vol. III (Adhyayas V and VI)" [in fact also VII), "Index to Manusmrti, Vol. IV (Adhyaya VIII)" and, finally, "Index. Chapters IX-XII." 44 Jha (1920-1926, indices) fails to refer to M. 12.105. yatha nayaty asrkpataih mrgasya mrgayuh padam / nayet tathanumanena dharmasya nrpatih padam II. Regarding the meaning of ni as used in this verse, see the Large Petrograd Dictionary, 4th part, p. 267 ("12) etwas herausbringen, hinter Etwas kommen, feststellen"). 40 That is to say, I assume that pratyakse is to be interpreted as 'pratyakse. Kulluka however explains the last line as follows: ... tathanumanena drstapramanena va dharmasya tattvam niscinuyat I. Should the text of the Bhasya be emended to anumanena parokse pratyakse va pratyaksena? 47 Cf. Jha 1920-1926, Vol. IV Pt. I, p. 60. 48 Which reads thus: pratyaham desadrstais ca sastradrstais ca hetubhih 1 astadasasu margesu nibaddhani prthak prthak II. 49 Cf. e.g. Me.'s explanation of hetubhir (of 8.3): hetur nirnayasadhanam / sa ca dvividhah / pramanarupo vyavastharupas ca / tatra pramanarupo 'rthanirnayahetuh saksyadih / ... (II 73.20f). 50 Viz. II 74,5 f. Read vyavaharatoh, and cf. the expression vivadisaksyadinam (II 83.22). 52 Or does api mean "and" here? 53 Cf. n. 50. 54 It should be remembered that I follow the orthography of the edition (of Jha 1932). >> I am not sure that my interpretation of mahaprakrti is correct; I do not know of any other occurrence of this expression. 56 The expression is, in my opinion, clear evidence of Alsdorf's (oral) interpretation of satyakriya (P. saccakiriya) as "speaking the truth/act of speaking the truth".

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154 ALBRECHT WEZLER 57 The expression pragalbha is found in the Arthasastra in the enumeration of the amatyasampat (1.9.11) as well as in that of the atmasampat (6.1.6); it is also one of the qualities of a particular type of secret agents (1.11.2). 58 It reads thus: pratyaksam canumanam ca sastram ca vividhagamam / trayam suviditam karyam dharmasuddhim abhipsata ll. 59 What is Me. here talking about the inclusion - by implication - of the other means of valid knowledge recognized by the Mimansa, i.e. upamana and arthapatti (cf. Kullaka on M. 12.106), or, rather, the difference between the apauruseyatva of the Veda and the pauruseyatva of "the Mahabharata and similar texts" (cf. e.g. Nyayamanjari, ed. by Varadacharya, Vol. I p. 575 ff. and Nyayakumudacandra ed. Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya p. 726 f.)? 60 Add karyam / kartavyam after suvivecitam, in accordance with the verse. 61 Cf. Halbfass 1991. 62 Cf. Bhasya on 12.106 where this possibility is however already presupposed by Manu himself; cf. n. 63. 63 It reads as follows: arsam dharmopadesam ca vedasastravirodhina / yas tarkenanusamdhatte sa dharmam veda netarah II. 64 The rest of this sentence is: nirupayati sa dharmam vedeti padayojanu /. 65 Not, as maintained by Jha 1920-1926, Vajs 2.11! 66 Cf. Oberhammer-Prets-Prandstetter 1991-1996 s.v. uhah. In passing it may be noted that the passage from the Nyayabhasya quoted first at the end of the article is not that translated by the authors, that the translation is demonstrably wrong and that it is the reading found in the (in reality translated) version quoted last which clearly has to be preferred (cf. e.g. Nyayamanjari (ed. Varadacharya) Vol. II p. 584.19 ff.) - I thank Ms. Preisendanz for this information. - The translation of the definition of uha as found at Sankhayana Srauta Sutra 6.1.3, which is given in the first paragraph of the article on uhah, is also not acceptable, even though the authors may have been mislead by Caland (1953: 141). 07 Reference is to a lecture which she gave at Hamburg University and which will be published, perhaps still this year in: Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Erkenntnistheorie der Religion. Weiterbildendes Studium Universitat Hamburg, ed. by Klaus Glashoff. 68 Cf. also AS 1.5.5. 69 The occurrence of uha in the Susruta S. referred to in the Large Petrograd Dictionary, viz. 2.44.18 = Cikitsasth. 5.29, for which Bohtlingk gives the meaning "Erschliessung", actually confirms the semantic explanation of Ganapati Sastri: Dalhana also paraphrases it by asrutasya kalpana. 70 My thanks are due to Mr. Narayan Ramachandran for rendering me assistance in consulting this commentary. It reads as follows: anuktakaranam uhyam. The example quoted thereafter (15.1.70) is AS 3.16.5 (yatha sa data pratigrahita ca nopahatau syatam tathanusayam kusalah kalpayeyuh) (cf. 3.15.99). Cf. also Oberhammer-Prets-Prandstetter 1991/96 s.v. uhyam. 72 Or any other work in which the AS's theory of prajnagunas was received. Note that the wording is slightly different in the Abhidhanacintamani.

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 155 73 Quoted from Apte 1978. 74 Cf. also sutra 24: tenabhyuhya yathasthanam gamayet. It is tempting to interpret the expression nyayadhigama as nyayenadhigama, "attaining [the truth) methodically", but the juridical meaning of nyaya has to be given its due (here, too). 75 Cf. the Critical Pali Dictionary s.v. antara. 76 Which reads thus: yat tu syan mohasamyuktam avyaktam visayatmakam / apratarkyam avijneyam tamas tad upadharayet II. 77 The edition has anumanagocaram, but Jha translates as though he read, or (rightly) silently emended the text to, anumanagocaram. 78 Which reads thus: yo 'vamanyeta te mule hetusastrasrayad dvijah / sa sadhubhir bahiskaryo nastiko vedanindakah il; as for the dual (mule) see verse 2.10 (sruti and smrti). 79 Note that Me. assumes that the blasphemous statement is repeated, and "proclaimed aloud", so that any error on the part of the listener can safely be excluded. So Why does Me. repeat the statement vedaviruddhani? For the sake of emphasis? Or is the text corrupt here? SI One expects aksapada to be mentioned, too, because Me. subsequently quotes Nyayasutra i.e. "Aksapadasutra") 1.1.3 (II 484.20 f.) - whereas, in the Bhasya on 1.7, he introduces the quotation of Nyayasutra 1.1.16 with tatha sa vaisesikah (I 10.17). Should we read oaksapadaviracitagranthadisu? The hi is also problematic. 82 I do not know how to explain the ca here. 83 Wezler 1998a, -84 As for the use of the plural, see Wezler 1998b. This is added as a parenthesis by Me. 50 The passage reads as follows: ucyate / yani kanicana sastrapratipadikani vakyani na tani sudrenadhyeyaniti sakyate samanyato 'numanam / yani vedavakyani yani tadarthavyakhyanavakyani vyakhyatrnam tatpratirupakani tany api pravahanityataya nityany eva l. . 87 For the justification of the application of this term see Nenninger 1992: 7-11. Cf. Frauwallner 1968. 89 See Nenninger 1992 and 1994. Cf. Frauwallner 1968. 91 See p. 15 above (Me. subsequently, i.e. II 484.21, quotes Vaisesikasutra 1.1.3), as also the Bhasya on 1.78 (tatha cah vaisesika 'ksitav eva gandha' iti) regarding which see Prasastapadabhasya on gandha. 92 To be continued. REFERENCES Apte (1978) Vaman Shivaram Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Repr. Kyoto 1978.

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156 ALBRECHT WEZLER Birwe (1964) Robert Birwe, review of K. V. Abhyankar, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, Baroda 1961. In: ZDMG 113 (1963, published 1964), 364-372. Caland (1953) W. Caland, Sankhayana Srautasutra, ed. by Lokesh Chandra, Nagpur (repr. Delhi-Varanasi-Patna 1980). Das (1988) Rahul Peter Das, Das Wissen von der Lebensspanne der Baume. Surapalas Vrksayurveda, kritisch ediert, ubersetzt und kommentiert. Stuttgart. Dave (1972-1985) Jayantakrishna Harikrishna Dave, Manusmrti With nine commen taries by Medhatithi, Sarvajnanarayana, Kullaka, Raghavananda, Nandana, Ramacandra, Manirama, Govindaraja and Bharuci, Vol. I-VI [Vol. IV Pt. 2 (= Adhyaya 8) not yet published], Bombay. Frauwallner (1968) Erich Frauwallner, Materialien zur altesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamimamsa, Wien. Ganapati Sastri (1924-1925) Ganapati Sastri, The Arthasastra of Kautalya with the commentary Srimala of Mahamahopadhyaya T.G.S., ed. by the commentator. 3 Vols. Trivandrum. Hacker (1959) Paul Hacker, "Two Accounts of Cosmogony". In: Jnanamuktavali. Commemoration Vol. in Honour of Joh. Nobel, ed. by Claus Vogel. New Delhi: 1963 [off-print dated 1959), 77-91 (= Kleine Schriften, ed. by L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, 389-403). Hacker (1961) Paul Hacker, "The Sankhyization of the Emanation Doctrine, Shown in a Critical Analysis of Texts". In: WZKSO 5 (1961), 75-112 (= Kleine Schriften, ed. by L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, 167-204). Halbfass (1991) Wilhelm Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection. Explorations in Indian Thought, Albany. Pt. Hargovindas and Pt. Behechardas (eds.) (1915/1916-1920/1921) Abhidhanacintamani of Kalilaka Sarvagna Shri Hemachandracharya, indices by Muniraj Jayanta Vijaya, Bhavnagar. Hopkins (1887) W. Washburn Hopkins, "On Proverb-literature". In: JAOS 13 (1887), CCXXVIII f. Jha (1920-1926) Mahamahopadhyaya Ganganatha Jha, Manu-Smrti. The Laws of Manu with the Bhasya of Medhatithi, transl. by Ganga-Natha Jha, Calcutta.. Jha (1932-1939) Mahamahopadhyaya Ganganatha Jha, Manu-Smrti with the 'Manubhasya' of Medhatithi, edited with the help of several manuscripts, Calcutta (repr. Delhi 1992). Kangle (1960) R. P. Kangle, The Kautiliya Arthasastra. Pt. I: A Critical Edition with a Glossary, Bombay. Nenninger (1992) Claudius Nenninger, Aus gutem Grund. Prasastapadas anumana Lehre und die drei Bedingungen des logischen Grundes, Reinbek. Nenninger (1994) Claudius Nenninger, "Samanyato drstam anumanam - Analogical Reasoning in Early Nyaya-Vaisesika". In: Proceedings of the Panel on Early Vaisesika, Hong-Kong, August 1993 (= AS XCVIII, 2, 1994), 819-832. Nyayacharya (1938-1941) Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya, Nyayakumudachandra of Srimat Prabhachandracharya, 2 Vols., Bombay. Oberhammer-Prets-Prandstetter (1991-1996) Gerhard Oberhammer, Terminologie der fruhen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien. Ein Begriffsworterbuch zur altindischen Dialektik, Erkenntnislehre und Methodologie. Unter Mitarbeit von E. Prets und J. Prandstetter. Bd. 1: A-J, Wien 1991, G. Oberhammer, Ernst Prets, Joachim Prandstetter, Terminologie ... Bd. 2: U-Pa, Wien 1996. Pischel (1893) Richard Pischel, "Verkannte Sprichworter". In: Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth zum Doctor-Jubilaum 24. August 1893 von seinen Freunden und Schulern, Stuttgart, 114-116. Scharfe (1961) Hartmut Scharfe, Die Logik im Mahabhasya, Berlin. Speijer (1886) J. S. Speijer, Sanskrit Syntax, Leyden (repr. Kyoto 1965).

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MEDHATITHI ON SAMANYATO DRSTAM (ANUMANAM] 157 Thieme (1982) Paul Thieme, "Meaning and form of the 'grammar' of Panini". In: StII 8/9 (1982), 1-34 (= Kleine Schriften II, ed. by R. Sohnen-Thieme, Stuttgart 1995, 1170-1201). Varadacharya (1969/93) Nyayamanjari of Jayantabhatta ..., critically edited by K. S. Vy, 2 Vols., Mysore. Wezler (1987) Albrecht Wezler, "On the term antahsamjna." In: ABORI LXVIII (R. G. Bhandarkar 150th Birth Anniversary Vol.) Poona, 111-131. Wezler (1998a) Albrecht Wezler, "Medhatithi on the role of Manu, the prayojana of the Manusmrti and the incentive of the Brahmins to study it" (to be published in the Dr. Yuyama Felicitation Volume ed. by Paul Harrison and Gregory Schopen). Wezler (1998b) Albrecht Wezler, "Uber den sakramentalen Charakter des Dharma nachsinnend" (to be published in: Raum-zeitliche Vermittlung von Transzendenz. Zur "sakramentalen" Dimension religioser Tradition. Arbeitsdokumentation eines Symposiums, ed. by Gerhard Oberhammer and Marcus Schmucker. Wien). University of Hamburg Bernhard Ihnen Strasse 18 D-21465 Reinbek Germany